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The varying levels of democracy in central and eastern Europe provide scholars with an 
interesting study of democratization.  Democracy grew to different levels and in varying ways in 
the region since the collapse of communism. The evolution of democracy in the region offers 
insight into which variables affect democracy, a test for established theories of democracy, and a 
workshop for new theories and hypotheses addressing democratization. This study sought to 
determine the impetus behind varying levels of post-communist democratization in the states of 
the region.  It explores the different theories of democratization. The work takes a regional 
approach to examining the states. This approach isolates less traditional factors that contribute to 
democratic quality: history, culture and geography.  
Each of the factors is relevant to democracy in the region. The exploration of the 
historical background explains some of the forces still at work in the region. It presents the core 
causes of some of the democratic short-comings that exist. It also assists in a presentation of the 
next contextual factor: how the political parties and systems evolved since 1989. Religion in the 
region is especially relevant to the degree of rights and freedoms, as well. The area is very 
diverse, with some countries of predominantly Catholic, some states with sizeable Islamic 
segments, countries with overwhelming Eastern Orthodox majorities and states with a relevant 
number of Protestant Christians. Finally, the region‟s location has a bearing of democracy. The 
region represents the eastern border of western civilization. Not only does this account for their 
religious diversity in many areas and ethnic diversity in others, it also helps define some of the 
aspects of their democracy. The region long found itself as the battlefields of wars between those 
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The varying levels of democracy in central and eastern Europe provide scholars with an 
interesting study of democratization.  Democracy grew to different levels and in varying ways in 
the region since the collapse of communism. The evolution of democracy in the region offers 
insight into which variables affected democracy, a test for established theories of democracy, and 
new theories in hypotheses addressing democratization in comparable areas.  This work aims to 
contribute to the literature by testing three hypotheses. First, a study of the region disproves 
many of the established theories about democratization. Namely, the use of economic theory as a 
basis for democracy falls short. Second, the region represents a “special case” in terms of 
studying democracy due to its history, culture and geography, especially its proximity and 
relations with Russia and the communist former Soviet Union. Very few other regions share this 
variable. In this respect, it eschews many of the theories that discuss democracy in a broader 
sense.  Third, it challenges the notion of interconnectedness as a positive factor in geopolitics. 
The concept aids in democratic development is some facets of a country‟s affairs, but causes 
unintended negative consequences in others.  
 This work is divided into six parts. The first part is this introduction, which sets the stage 
for the rest of the discussion. It presents the history of the region as well as the current political 
economic and social aspects of life in central and eastern Europe. The second section of this 
work is a literature review of the many theories of democratization. The third section of the work 
explains the hypotheses and analytical methodology used in the subsequent case studies. Case 
studies of Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria comprise the fourth section.  The fifth section of the 
work discusses the results and findings of an analysis of the hypotheses. The final section draws 
conclusions based on this analysis and overall study.  
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This introduction offers a context for the current levels of democracy. An exploration of 
the historical background illustrates it relevance in the region today: re-emerged nationalisms 
and ethnic tensions, for example. It presents the core causes of some of the democratic short-
comings that exist. It assists in a presentation of the next contextual factor: how the political 
parties and systems evolved since 1989. These political systems, due to history and other factors, 
moved and changed in different fashions in different countries. This sets the stage for an analysis 
of the politics in the capitals of central and eastern Europe. Concurrently, the states of the region 
moved from a command economy governed largely by Moscow to an open market. From there, 
they moved to a common market and, later a union.  This third change wrought a separate effect 
on democracy in the central and eastern Europe.  Finally, society changed a great deal since the 
collapse of communism, as well. Both the pre-collapse and present day, post-collapse societies 
affected the current levels of freedom, equality and rights for citizens on the region. These four 
aspects of history, development and change in central and eastern European molded the resulting 
democracies.     
 Religion in the region is especially relevant to the degree of rights and freedoms, as well. 
The area is very diverse, with some countries of predominantly Catholic, others with sizeable 
Islamic segments, countries with overwhelming Eastern Orthodox majorities and many states 
with a relevant number of Protestant Christians. This patchwork quilt of theologies varies further 
when the parish and ecclesiastical structures of Catholicism and Orthodoxy are included. The 
theological beliefs of the persons of central and eastern Europe become important to democracy 
when the width and breadth of religion‟s hand in legislating and politics is reviewed. While it is 
important to note that the study of religion in government is in fashion in regards to other parts of 
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the world, namely the Middle East, a comparable study of central and eastern Europe is equally 
fruitful.   
 It is along this vein that we find, in many cases, the predominant religion and the 
government or its policies interlaced. It also introduces a whole new field of study into the 
analysis. It enables us to dissect many of the laws and attitudes particular to some of the central 
and eastern European countries. Religion helps explain the Polish attitude towards abortion. The 
lack of religion aids in understanding Hungary‟s attitudes towards outsiders, especially refugees. 
We find that shared religion also manifests itself in church-state relationships like that of Putinist 
Russia and Bulgaria. Religion matters to the quality of democracy in central and eastern Europe 
despite its exclusion by established theories. 
 Central and Eastern Europe‟s location has a bearing on democracy. The region represents 
the eastern border of western civilization. Not only does this account for their religious diversity 
in many areas and ethnic diversity in others, it also defines some of the democratic aspects of 
their modern governments. The region long found itself as the battlefields of wars between larger 
powers of the east and west.  The Turks marauded through the countries of central and eastern 
Europe and fought armies from western Europe. After the Turks, the armies of Europe did much 
the same. By the mid-twentieth century the area was the fault line between two nuclear 
superpowers.  
Despite the collapse of communism, despite the emergence of the European Union and 
their membership, and despite the absence of military conflict, central and eastern Europe sits at 
ground zero of the East-West Paradigm. Russia and the European Union shadow box with 
economic policy, trade policy, military maneuvers and political rhetoric. Each regularly entreats 
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the states of the region to pursue different interests. Simultaneously, some of the states have long 
held apprehensions or deep associations with Russia. Both the paradigm and the established 
relationships with Russia shade the hue of democracy and rights in central and eastern Europe.   
Politics before the Iron Curtain 
The history of the states of central and eastern Europe impacts their levels of democracy 
in two different ways. First, it creates the context for much of what is happening today: ethnic 
differences, religious animosities, traditional allies, to name just a few. Second, it helps explain -
their democratic and economic development. It is important to note that both World Wars began 
in the region: the first in Yugoslavia and the second with the invasion of Poland. This is a 
testament to the Sturm und Drang that has existed in the region for centuries. While it would be 
superfluous to harken back to the time of the Goths and Vandals, it is pertinent to begin after the 
First World War. This began the period of 1914 to 1945, which illustrated a complexity that 
remains to this day. Since then, borders changed, communist governments collapsed, democracy 
emerged, and the states forged a union.  The resilient diversity of the region is undeniable and 
continues in the 21
st
 century with the added factor of immigration.   
The Treaty of Versailles left many geopolitical facets of central and eastern Europe 
frozen in time.
1
 In 1992, Vladimir Tismaneanu wrote that, “The conflicts that pre-existed 
communism have not been abolished during the four decades of state socialism.”2 The region in 
the early 20
th
 century is a stark contrast to the map of 1989 or today.  The early 20
th
 century saw 
an area dominated by the various empires of previous centuries. The Russian, Ottoman and 
                                                          
1
 Sharon L. Wolchik and Jane L. Curry, “Democracy, the Market, and the Return to Europe: From Communism to 
the European Union and NATO,” in Central and East European Politics: from Communism to Democracy (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, Inc, 2011), 5. 
2
 Vladimir Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 2.  
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Austro-Hungarian Empires controlled sizeable portions of central and eastern Europe. The 
Prussians did as well. 
3
 The First World War and the Treaty of Versailles changed this. The 
treaty was a punishing document. It sought retribution from Germany and the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire by redrawing borders. It threw various different ethnic groups together in newly created 
states.
4
 Romania was expanded. The nations of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were created. 
Hungary was pulled away from the larger empire and shrank to one third its previous size.  
Poland was reborn. 
5
 
During the interwar years, most countries of eastern and central Europe experienced 
dictatorships, monarchs or military rule. Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland had some success 
in establishing a democratic government.
6
 Most of the new states were not truly “nation-states”.7 
The new map of the region created large minorities in some countries. Some of these groups 
within the same state had centuries old animosities.
8
 There was internal, ethnic strife and 
religious tensions.
9
 Poor economic conditions compounded this.  Life in the region in this period 
was hard. Living standards were low and unemployment was high. Political extremism emerged 
in places throughout central and eastern Europe. Nationalism emerged in many of the states.
 10
 
Some saw right-wing authoritarian movements coalesce around their own brand of fascism. The 
                                                          
3
 Wolchik and Curry, “Democracy, the Market, and the Return to Europe,” 5. 
4
 Ibid., 8-9. 
5
 Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, 6-7.  
6
 Wolchik and Curry, “Democracy, the Market, and the Return to Europe,”  9.  
7
 Judy Batt, “Introduction: Defining Central and Eastern Europe,” in Developments in Central and East European 
Politics, eds. Stephen White, Judy Batt and Paul G. Lews (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 13. 
8
 Adam Bromke, “Post-communist countries: challenges and problems,” in Central and Eastern Europe: The 
Challenge of Transition, ed. Regina Cowen Karp (New York: Oxford University, 1994), 21.  
9
 Batt, “Introduction: Defining Central and Eastern Europe,” 14. 
10
 Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, 8; Batt, “Introduction: Defining Central and Eastern Europe,” 14. 
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Iron Guard in Romania and the Arrow Crosses in Hungary, who supported German Chancellor 
Adolf Hitler, developed a following in the 1930s.
11
 
Communist groups started in central and eastern Europe at this time, as well. One of the 
seminal events of the early 20
th
 century was the Russian Revolution. The young communist 
government of the Soviet Union sought to exert influence in the region through these upstart 
organizations abroad.  These European communist parties tried to undermine any advancement 
in democracy of the new governments. They slavishly followed the directions from the Kremlin. 
They endorsed Soviet claims to territory that even placed them at odds with many of their fellow 
countrymen. Their activities on behalf of Moscow led them to be banned in all central and 
eastern European countries except Czechoslovakia.
12
 World War II temporarily halted east 
European communist development.
13
   
The dynamic between eastern Europeans, their fellow countrymen who were 
communists, the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany was rather complicated. The Soviet Union 
found a willing collaborator in their intentions in Adolf Hitler.
 14
 For this, communists in 
Romania, Hungary and Yugoslavia were dispassionately pro-German.
15
 The Soviet Union and 
Germany signed a non-aggression pact on August 23, 1939. Stalin and Hitler split central and 
eastern Europe. The Soviet Union would gain eastern Poland, the Baltic States and part of 
Romania. In return, Stalin agreed not to attack Germany. The Second World War began eight 
days later when Germany invaded Poland.
16
 Hitler‟s betrayal of Stalin changed everything, 
                                                          
11
 Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, 9. 
12
 Ibid., 11. 
13
 Ibid., 16-17. 
14
 Williamson A. Murray “The World in Conflict,” in The Cambridge History of Warfare, ed. Geoffrey Parker (NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 322.  
15
 Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, 16. 
16
 Murray “The World in Conflict,” 322.  
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including local politics. Now, many east Europeans saw communists as an alternative to the 
Nazis. They embraced communism as a “cause of human freedom”.17 
In retrospect, the manner in which Hitler and Stalin bargained with the fate of the 
countries of central and eastern Europe was typical of the role larger countries played in the 
region from the end of the First World War until 1989. The states of central and eastern Europe 
served as secondary parcels to be bargained with. There was little regard for their aspirations. 
There were scant attempts to pursue national interests.  The end of Second World War offered an 
opportunity for true self determination and possibly democracy, but the victorious Allies felt 
otherwise. Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin agreed to the futures of Romania, Bulgaria, 
Hungary and Yugoslavia in five minutes on a half sheet of paper.
18
 Poland‟s future was 
determined for them later at Yalta.
19
 Roosevelt himself had endorsed Soviet control of the 
Baltics, though he could not make his view public.
20
  Roosevelt would back track the 
concessions to the Soviets. He telegraphed the Kremlin on October 4, 1944 and place them on 
notice that they would not have a “blank check” in Eastern Europe. This, some historians claim, 
started the Cold War.
21
  
The relationships between the Soviet satellites in the region and the Soviet Union started 
before the end of the Second World War. It was a practice in long distance, inner-party power 
politics. Each country‟s specific relationship with the leader of the Soviet Union shaped their 
relationship with Moscow.  Leaders of the communist groups in central and eastern Europe 
                                                          
17
Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, 1`8. 
18
 Churchill quoted by Joseph M. Siracusa, “The Night Stalin and Churchill Divided Europe: The View from 
Washington,” The Review of Politics 43, no. 3 (July 1981): 381. 
19
 J.R. Thackrah, “Aspects of American and British Policy Towards Poland from Yalta to the Potsdam Conferences, 
1945,” The Polish Review 21, no. 4 (1976): 6.  
20
 Soviet Ambassador to the United States Maxim Litvinov quoted by Anna M. Cienciala, “The United States and 
Poland in World War II,” The Polish Review 54, no. 2 (2009): 183-4. 
21
 Albert Reis quoted by Siracusa, “The Night Stalin and Churchill Divided Europe,” 384.  
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gambled during Kremlin power struggles like those in the party apparatus in Moscow. When 
Lenin died, those who did not support Stalin‟s initial bid for power or had crossed Stalin before 
were purged. He disbanded the entire communist party in Poland at one point. Stalin replaced 
these leaders with more hardline, pro-Kremlin communists.
 22
  Tismaneanu refers to them as 
“Muscovites”23.  There were some communists that tried to incorporate national interest into 
their brand of communism. Under Stalin, this was a crime.
24
 
The post-war, communist states of central and eastern Europe had varying political 
systems and different relationships with the Soviet government in Moscow.
25
 There were 
different types of communists. Tismaneanu refers to their study as “comparative communism.”26 
Poland allowed some private property and some free markets. The government of Romania was 
less tolerant and more hardline than that of Hungary.
27
 Poland even had a hegemonic party 
system with three parties. The dominant communist party  remained in control, but aligned with 
one of two non-communist parties.
28
 The most visible example of variety in communist rule in 
the region was Josip Tito in Yugoslavia. Tito had fought the Nazis in the Second World War and 
emerged as the leader of Yugoslavia after the 1938 purges of central and eastern European 
communist leaders by Stalin.
29
 Tito rejected Stalin‟s interference in his country‟s domestic 
                                                          
22
 Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, 12.  
23
 Ibid., 16. 
24
 Ibid., 41. 
25
 Michael McFaul “The Missing Variable: The `International System’ as the Link between Third and Fourth Wave 
Models of Democratization,” in Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Postcommunist World, eds. Valerie Bunce, 
Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 17 
26
 Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, x. 
27
 Michael McFaul, “The Missing Variable,” 17-18. 
28
 Sten Berglund and Jan Åke Dellenbrant, “The Breakdown of  Communism in Eastern Europe,” in The New 
Democracies in Eastern Europe, eds. Sten Berglund and Jan Åke Dellenbrant (Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgat 
Publishing Company, 1994), 9. 
29





  Shortly after Tito‟s ideological break with Stalin, Soviets prosecuted communists for 
placing national interests ahead of that of the Soviet Union or “Titoism”.31 In 1949, senior 
communists from Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Poland were placed on trial for Titoism. This 
had a dual effect. First, communism in central and eastern Europe lost ardent support outside of 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Second, Moscow became more selective about who led their 
satellite states in central and eastern Europe. Now, professional revolutionaries trained in 
Moscow led the communist parties in the region.
32
  
Nikita Khrushchev assumed control of the Soviet Union after Stalin‟s death. Stalin‟s 
policies left central and eastern Europe in economic turmoil. Khrushchev feared that there would 
be uprisings and relaxed some aspects of Soviet rule over the region. This accompanied his 
campaign of de-Stalinization and even reproached Tito.
33
 Locals saw a possibility for reform, but 
the countries of central and eastern Europe that pushed for changed all eventually faced 
crackdowns. This includes the use of military force in East Germany in 1953, Hungary and 
Poland in 1956.
34
 Khrushchev was ousted in 1964. Leonid Brezhnev took over. Brezhnev 
reasserted Soviet power in the region in the vein of Stalin. The region would remain quiet from 
that point through the 1970s with the exception of the Prague Spring of 1968.
35
 
All of this would change in 1985 with the ascension of Mikhail Gorbachev. He 
dismantled the established system of Soviet governance over the central and Eastern European 
communist states.
36
 He allowed these states to “go their own way”37, referred to as the Sinatra 
                                                          
30
 Ibid., 36. 
31
 Ibid., 41.  
32
 Ibid., 50. 
33
 Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, 56.  
34
 Michael McFaul, “The Missing Variable,” 20.  
35
 Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, 89-90. 
36





 The Soviets slowly withdrew support for more hardline European communist leaders 
like Honecker in East Germany and Ceauşescu in Romania. On June 4, 1989 Poland held its first 
free elections in 40 years.
39
 After this, communism collapsed elsewhere in the region. Months 
later the Berlin Wall fell, taking German communism with it. Czechoslovakia, Romanian and 
Bulgaria soon followed.
40
 Sten Berglund and Jan Åke Dellenbrant describe the spread of 
democracy as “reminiscent of the Domino Theory”41, but the region-wide event was neither 
uniform nor synchronized.  
Politics After Communism 
The post-communist political systems and political parties in central and eastern Europe 
grew differently as each state navigated the waters of democracy, many for the first time. Politics 
and democracy in the region ventured through three different phases: immediate post-
communism, a democratic hangover, and the era of the European Union. Along this trajectory, 
the political leadership and electorates became quick studies in subjects as old as traditional 
European parliamentary democracy and as new as supranational statehood. These states founded 
parliaments, dealt with scandal, rejoiced at new rights and privileges and contemplated 
accession. Generally, speaking central and eastern Europe‟s move to democracy is a success. 
Most people can vote; own property; have the right to free speech and worship how and where 
they want. Their political systems are not perfect. They remain challenged by some ghosts of the 
past and other specters of the future. Democracy in the region depends on how the states of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
37
 Wolchik and Curry, “Democracy, the Market, and the Return to Europe,” 22. 
38
 Ibid., 22. 
39
 Berglund and Dellenbrant, “The Breakdown of Communism in Eastern Europe,” 3. 
40
 David Ost, “East-Central Europe in Transition,” in European Politics in Transition, eds. Mark Kesselman, et al. 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,  2009), 411. 
41
 Berglund and Dellenbrant, “The Breakdown of Communism in Eastern Europe,” 4. 
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region will address remnants of 19
th
 century conflicts and frictions from 21
st
 century Union 
membership.  
Some central and east European states took longer than others. Once more, their 
transitions took different forms. The transition in Hungary, Poland and East Germany took 
months. The same transition took weeks in Bulgaria and Romania. The Czechs only took ten 
days! The Baltic states remained Soviet Republics until a failed coup and the emergence of Boris 
Yeltsin.
42
 The initial transition from communism was the first step, but in most cases it was not 
the last.  Poland would have “table talks” to determine the fate of their political system. East 
Germany would reunify with West Germany the following year. Czechoslovakia would 
eventually split into two nations, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.   
The manner of these initial transitions varied, as well. Poland and Hungary had “pacted 
transitions.” There were committees formed, different topics discussed. The communists were 
included. In this instance, there was a collective dealing with the end of communism. 
Communism in East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Romania had sudden ends fueled by public 
protest. In Romania‟s case, this was accented by the show trial and summary execution of 
communist leader Nicholae Ceauşescu on television. Bulgaria and Albania saw other less 
oppressive pseudo-communist and communist regimes assume power. Yugoslavia had the most 
heart-breaking of destinies: a long, bloody armed conflict that involved ethnic cleansing and 
other war crimes. The war in Yugoslavia produced a myriad of states occupied by groups with 
aspirations that date back centuries.
43
 
                                                          
42
 Ibid., 4-6. 
43




The days immediately after communism in the central and eastern European states were 
difficult, tedious and wrought with peril. In short, all that was would be nevermore. The collapse 
of communism left a geopolitical vacuum.  Most of the countries of the region lacked basic 
democratic institutions, security policies and armed forces.
44
 All the while, there was an 
underlying fear that the Soviet s might reassert their authority with military action.
45
 (There were 
still Soviet forces in East Germany.
46
 ) The states needed to move to market economies. State-
owned assets needed to be sold and privatized. They needed new trading patterns. Their 
governments needed to establish relationships with international financial institutions.
47
 There 
were questions about reconciliation over crimes of the communist era and treatment of 
minorities. The leadership of these states faced the challenge of bringing their countries into the 
20
th
 century quickly, but in a manner that would not tear their countries apart.   
The history of political parties following the collapse of communism in the region begins 
with a very pessimistic tone. Political parties as an institution were understandably unpopular. 
The parties that the citizens of central and eastern Europe were accustomed to “tended to 
resemble organized crime”48 not the political parties their neighbors to the west knew.  The new 
liberal parties in the region were not parties in neither the traditional sense or in name. First, their 
structure and membership was different. They were umbrella groups. Many were civic initiatives 
and movements with supporters and followers not traditional parties with members. They named 
themselves alliances, movements or fronts. They did not even want to be known as parties. The 
                                                          
44
 Regina Cowen Karp, “Introduction,”in Central and Eastern Europe: The Challenge of Transition, ed. Regina Cowen 
Karp (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 4.  
45
 Zbiginiew Brzezinski, Second Chance (NY: Basic Books, 2007), 53. 
46
 Ibid., 57. 
47
 Wolchik and Curry, “Democracy, the Market, and the Return to Europe,” 4.  
48
 Tomáš Kostelecký, “Political Transformation in East-Central Europe,” (paper presented at the CEE-Japan Forum 
for the 21
st




Civic Forum in Czechoslovakia, Solidarity in Poland and the Hungarian Democratic Forum were 
examples. These groups stood in the first elections as simply anti-communist.  They had little in 
the way of a platform. This is why they initially succeeded and eventually fell apart.  
Communism in central and eastern European politics has a remarkable history since 
1989. In the immediate aftermath of communism‟s collapse, many communists remained.  
Second and third tier figures from the Soviet-era communist parties led the reformed communist 
parties in the initial elections.
49
 Some helped form the current socialist parties in many countries. 
Romania, Bulgaria and Albania have reformed communist parties that are popular.
50
 Montani 
Guido and Adam Bromke explain that the continued support for communist parties has a 
generational aspect. Both point out that much of the generation that fought and lived through the 
Second World War is retiring from professional life or passing away.
51
  Furthermore, people 
under the age of 35 probably do not remember life under communism. This plays an important 
role in the current popularity of communism and democratic socialism.  
Political systems in central and eastern Europe did not develop quickly or as anticipated. 
Few states developed capable stable political parties immediately. The consolidation of 
democracy enhanced many aspects of democracy and created some new national identities. 
However, critics point out that democracy reveals racism, chauvinism and militarism. Much of 
this was absent under communism. These scholars say things were better under “Sovietism”.52 
Despite being democracies, the years immediately following 1989 saw ethnic rivalries, political 
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bickering and government corruption.
53
 This environment saw the rise of radical populist, 
sometimes opposed to EU membership, at times illiberal parties in many central and east 
European states. 
There are different theories behind the rise of illiberal parties in the region opposed to the 
EU. Many in central and eastern Europe have strong and deep feelings against the EU, known as 
euroscepticism.
54
 Euroscepticism is characteristic of many parties in Europe. Many of these 
parties simply wish for greater dialogue and negotiation. They are referred to as soft eurosceptic. 
Many mainstream parties in western Europe, including the Conservative Party in the United 
Kingdom fall into this category. There are other parties that are more absolute in their opposition 
to membership to in the European Union. These are labeled hard eurosceptic. These parties 
include the United Kingdom Independence Party, the Front Nationale in France and Jobbik in 
Hungary. Some of these parties in western Europe date back to the 1970s. Most of the 
eurosceptic parties in central and eastern Europe started after 2000. Many of the hard eurosceptic 
parties of the region are problematic to basic democracy. Many of these parties are xenophobic 
and scapegoat ethnic minorities. These minorities have been physically attacked in some states 
and legally attacked in others.  Some state legislatures attempted to abridge the basic rights of 
these minority groups. Other states of central and eastern Europe curtailed the most basic 
freedoms in recent years. These forms of backsliding are a collection of much that is deficient in 
central and eastern European democracy.  
Another theory behind the rise of eurosceptic parties is more structural. Grigore Pop-
Eleches maintains that voter dissatisfaction with the traditional left and right led to support for 
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populist, eurosceptic parties. In his theory, radical populist parties of evolved over three different 
election cycles. The first cycle, posed post-communist, non-communist groups against reformed 
communists. The non-communists won easily. These anti-communist coalitions fell apart before 
the next elections.
55
 The following elections were about the actual issues facing the states of 
central and eastern Europe. The pieces and parts of the initial, non-communist fronts and 
alliances had key policy differences. The largest issue pertained to the marketization of the 
economies of the former communist states.
56
 New liberal democracy parties formed around more 
cohesive, concrete policy platforms. They won the second set of elections, but with smaller 
majorities and margins of victory than their forerunners, the anti-communist alliances.  
There were large changes in some of the parties of central and eastern Europe following 
the second elections. Many of the parties reoriented themselves. Many parties changed their 
names. Some changed their names several times. Eventually, many of the newer parties 
splintered merged or simply disappeared. The total number of parties fell in this period as 
democracy consolidated. The second election also coincided with the first appearance of populist 
and extreme nationalist parties in some states of the region.
57
 At this point, these parties sat on 
the periphery with small numbers of members and little electoral success.  
 The reformed communists and the liberal, post-communist democratic parties began a 
strange dynamic where the two alternated being in power after the second election cycle. Life in 
eastern and central Europe did not improve as expected. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
large portions of the population saw falling standards of living. Because of involvement with 
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western countries as financiers and lenders, the IMF and the ECB, there have been limits to 
domestic spending and sovereign debt. This impacted social welfare programs and financial 
security net for citizens. Then, there were several cases of government corruption in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Finally, their political systems are relatively new. It is not uncommon for parties 
to splinter, merge, disappear or have defections to others.
58
  In this second generation of 
elections, voters vacillated between the two major groups of parties. 
 The third generation of elections in central and eastern Europe was a protest vote. By this 
time, both the reformed communists and liberal democrats had opportunities to lead. Neither 
party saw any motivation to change. They both assumed that eventually they would be back in 
power. They never accounted for a third option, like the populist parties of the radical right.
59
 
Now, populist parties could run as political “outsiders”.60 Populist leaders also appealed to the 
people, promising “to regenerate the nation, combat privileged groups and transform the 
`corrupt‟ established institutions.”61 In the situations of central and eastern Europe, the elites 
include politicians from both the left and the center-right. These elections have incumbents lose 
by wide margins. Radical–left and nationalist parties gain in their share of the vote. New parties, 
usually centrist and populist, form.
62
  
Former EU President Rompuy repeatedly called populism the greatest danger to the EU 
because these parties threaten to weave their way into the EU itself with the parliamentary 
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elections in May 2014.
 63
 Only days after one of Rompuy‟s many speeches lamenting populist 
parties, it was reported that the anti-EU, populist parties of several member states were creating a 
“pan-European” network. 64 Their goal is to stand against EU influence from its headquarters in 
Brussels.  A few members of far-right parties elected to the EU Parliament currently attend as 
independents, but the radical right can form a parliamentary faction if they garner 25 
representatives from seven different countries.
65
 A radical right faction in the European 
Parliament could stymie further European integration and obstruct Union prerogatives internally. 
The rise of the populist, radical right parties of Europe gave new focus to the subject of 
euroscepticism. There have always been Europeans who doubted or opposed the European 
Union. Support for the EU remains fluid in different countries at different times.
66
 This is 
common in European politics and government. Political support for anything or anyone can ebb 
and flow with time. EU support fell in the wake of the economic and financial crises of 2008 and 
2009.  This scared many in Europe because the EU was no longer aspirational, but operational. It 
asserted its power, in order to preserve the Union.  The conditionality attached to the assistance 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) made the EU unpopular. 
Some scholars note that European citizens are less pro-European than politicians.
67
 
Opinion polls of citizens of EU member states illustrate the roots of euroscepticism. There are 
fears of member states lack of influence within the organization. Many feel the EU lowers the 
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quality of life for citizens. Some voters in EU member states think the EU endangers jobs and 
limits economic growth. Another, more moderate response is that many feel that national 
governments should deal with certain important issues, not Brussels.
68
 The Downsian Hypothesis 
explains this growth of eurosceptic parties. The parties positioned themselves to pick up 
unrepresented voters.
69
 Voter sentiment shaped the radical right party‟s views on the EU. These 
parties do not feel national governments are doing enough to protect national interests. They 
protest against loss of sovereignty. They oppose more EU policies than mainstream parties.
70
   
 The eurosceptic parties of Europe have expanded their width and depth. The United 
Kingdom (UKIP), France (Front Nationale) and Holland (Party for Freedom) are the most 
notable and visible of these parties in the west. Italy, Belgium and Switzerland have comparable 
parties.
71
 The central and eastern region of the continent is home to the two of the more 
prominent eurosceptic parties. Hungary has two such parties: Fidesz, which is the party of the 
current Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, and Jobbik.
72
 Elsewhere, Poland‟s President Andrzej Duda 
is officially unaffiliated but is supported by the eurosceptic party Law and Justice. The Prime 
Minister Beata Szyłdo is a member of Law and Justice, as well. Most other countries of central 
and eastern Europe have anti-EU parties, as well. They vary in strength.
73
 The European 
Parliamentary Elections of 2014 illustrate the growing strength of eurosceptic parties. The 
eurosceptic voting block earned 16 more seats than the previous election. The states of central 
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and eastern Europe accounted for three of these members of parliament.
74
 These small numbers 
understate the growing influence of eurosceptic groups domestically.  
 




These results are indicative of central and east European sentiments towards the EU. The 
Czech Republic has steadily trusted and relied on the EU less. They never entered the Eurozone. 
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Czechs view the bailouts of southern Europe with derision. Czechs see these countries as rich 
and irresponsible. Recent Czech leaders are eurosceptic, which adds to the collective negative 
opinion of Brussels.
 76
 In 2012, for the first time since the poll began, Poles viewed the EU as 
less trustworthy. This is largely based on the economic problems that plague the Eurozone. Now 
many Poles do not want to adopt the Euro. Yet, their leadership knows that it would help in 
moving Poland into a power position in the Union.
77
 The only notable improvement in the 
opinion of the EU was in Bulgaria. This was because of distrust in their domestic political 
institutions. The EU is perceived as an organization that helps correct issues in Bulgaria. Protests 




Many central and eastern Europeans are unhappy with the economic and social results of 
EU membership. Economically, many in the region resent migrant workers from entering their 
countries and see the economic difficulties as a basis for anti-immigration positions.
79
 Migrants 
are the target of very easy criticism. There are two different sides to the debate concerning 
migration and benefits. First, some argue that migration and open markets will allow cheap labor 
to move to states with more generous welfare benefits. In turn, capital and businesses will leave 
these areas due to higher taxes needed to pay for increased welfare rolls. The competing view is 
that states need foreign workers and the relationship is mutually beneficial. Workers want work 
not welfare. The former of these theories, referred to as “push-pull” by Christine S. Lipsmeyer 
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and Ling Zhu, is not solidly based.
80
 Martin Kahanec maintains that migrants are in search of 
better lives. Jobs and better living conditions drive migration. They seek higher wages, more 
opportunities, and better social conditions.
81
 
The legacy of the first 24 years of democracy in central and eastern Europe is one of 
mixed results. Most states experienced a positive transition to democracy. There have been 
obstacles and pitfalls along the way. It is obvious that lives for people in the region are more 
politically free than the era under communism. These states established democratic political 
systems and political parties. True democracy and the democratic ideals of the EU in the region 
is a topic for debate. The greatest political challenge to democracy today is the treatment of 
minorities. The epicenter of this is the political struggle between the hard eurosceptic parties and 
the rest of the political spectrum. In most cases, national elections safely relegated them to third 
or fourth tier parties within the government. Yet, these same parties remain a threat to democracy 
at the local level in some cases. Most of central and eastern Europe already joined the European 
Union. Now, these states must embrace its democratic pillars.    
Economics 
Creating a free market economy was almost as much a herculean task as creating a 
democracy. The two are closely interwoven. Economics can play an essential part in maintaining 
democratic ideals, especially equality.  The establishment of a functioning economy is 
considered by some to be the “single determining factor” as to when states enter a “post-post-
communist stage.”82 There have been economic successes and failures. The financial crises of 
                                                          
80
 Christine Lipsmeyer and Ling Zhu, “Immigration, Globalization and Unemployment Benefits in Developed EU 
States,” American Journal of Political Science 55, no. 3 (July 2011): 647. 
81
 Kahanec, “Skilled Labor Flows: Lessons from the European Union.”  
82
 Bromke, “Post-communist countries: challenges and problems,” 42 
22 
 
the last decade, an inability to deal with migrants and immigration and the “greying” of Europe 
continue to hinder economic prosperity and growth. Unemployment is still very high in some 
countries. Income inequality remains a serious problem in certain places. With the recent events 
within the Eurozone, sovereign debts, fiscal deficits, and the associated pension liabilities are 
worthy of review as well.  
Many decisions made shortly after the collapse of communism about the economic 
structure in their states affect democracy, freedom and personal rights in the region today. The 
economic evolution of the states varied much in the same fashion as politics. Different states in 
the region had different starting points, strategies and philosophies about the free market, labor 
and capital. In addition to trying to both create and learn about the free market economy, the 
larger global economy endured shocks along the way. These fledgling economies experienced 
the various crises that plagued the global financial landscape since 1990.  Along the way, some 
joined the Eurozone. The countries of central and eastern Europe saw different fiscal outcomes. 
These varying outcomes yielded different levels of income equality, differing levels of 
development in social programs and affected the durability of regimes.  
Most of the countries of the region began their march towards a free market from 
nothing. The states needed to privatize businesses. There were questions about post-communist 
property reconciliation. Moscow practiced horrendous industrial practices that devastated the 
environment. Few decision makers in eastern and central Europe knew much about trade and 
trade patterns. Most did not know how to work with international financial institutions.
83
 Key 
infrastructures in many places were dilapidated, unmaintained or simply missing. There was a 
                                                          
83
 Wolchik and Curry, “Democracy, the Market and the Return to Europe,” 24.  
23 
 
hazard of these states meandering on the periphery of the developed world. 
84
 The west provided 
ample, initial funds and tutelage to prevent this.
85
  
The problems facing the countries of the region were fairly consistent. Hungary was an 
exception. (It started “market socialism” in the waning years of communist rule as an attempt to 
save a faltering system.)
 86
 The states‟ approaches to solving the post-communist economic 
problems were different. Pasquale Tridico explains that the countries had three reform options. 
There was a Scandinavian option, which foresaw the political pluralism introduced and 
economic liberalization to happen separately. In this blueprint, workers and unions had very 
prominent role. The second proposal was known as the Washington Consensus. Foreign 
advisers, like Jeffrey Sachs, espoused this. It was Reaganomics for central eastern Europe. The 
third set of reforms was based on the German-French glide path. It allowed for a gradual 
privatization controlled by the state. The Washington Consensus was supported by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Many policymakers in these two bodies 
became high level advisors to the new countries of central and eastern Europe. Most countries 
eventually adopted this plan. Only Hungary and Slovenia opted for the German-French 
strategy.
87
 No states adopted the Scandinavian framework.  
The larger debate about the transition of the economies of the region concerned the 
competing notions of action. Some economists and countries of the region implemented shock 
therapy. This involved quick, sudden changes to the system and structure. Czechoslovakia, 
Bulgaria and Poland implemented this. This strategy depended on prices. “Get prices right” and 
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everything else falls into place. It depends on the relationship with everything else. The belief is 
that the sudden changes in price would cascade a series of changes elsewhere.
88
 This includes 
democratic institutions. The command economy and stet ownership were abolished. It 
necessitated the establishment of private ownership laws, a court system to adjudicate simple 
economic implements like contracts and other basic parts of democracy necessary for a free 
market.
89
 Some heralded Sach‟s shock therapy in Poland a success.90  
Some scholars advocated for a gradual approach or sequencing.
91
 Paul Hare and his 
fellow authors note that gradualism was a better choice for Hungary. They acknowledge that the 
transition might take two generations. However, it meant better short term conditions in 
Hungary. Living standards were more stable.
92
  Politically, this allows the government to evolve. 
Over time, it learns about market forces and adapts to managing a larger debt burden. Ownership 
laws and policies on fiscal and monetary policy evolve with it.
93
 A majority of reviewed scholars 
support the idea of a gradual approach to entering the free market. This avoids the gaps that form 
between market forces and established law. Ábel and Bonin cite Schaffer who alludes to a 
“legislative lag” in Poland‟s shock therapy.94  
Tridico and Marie Lavigne discuss these at great length and complete their own 
comparison of the results. Some states implemented shock therapy on their economies and swift 
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stabilization. Others (Hungary, Slovenia and Romania) chose sequencing, gradualism and 
structural reforms first.
95
 The results differed, but there was a consistent disappointment in the 
results of both approaches.
96
  Central and eastern Europeans had high expectations. The grim 
economic reality ended the euphoria of the democratic honeymoon for many. Tridico quotes 
Kovalik who wrote that even the most successful central and eastern European economies dealt 
with the same social problems as western Europe in the same time period: income inequality, 
unemployment, gender discrimination and corruption.
97
  
The transition was difficult. The people of central and eastern Europe had new rights and 
privileges that accompany democracy, but they had the chaff as well. The new economy was 
characterized by large gaps of inequality, high unemployment and many people living in 
poverty. The economic woes of the region fueled social tragedies of prostitution, street crime, 
juvenile delinquency and alcoholism.
98
 Tridico quotes D. Mario Nuti as saying “former 
communist countries passed from a central planning system to a pure and simple 
underdevelopment.”99 It would take years for most of the central and eastern European 
economies to improve.  
The most current numbers economic indicators for the region are evidence of a 
moderately successful economic integration into Europe. Gross domestic product has grown at 
levels very close to that of western Europe and usually slightly higher than the rest of the 
European Union member states. Recently, unemployment in central and eastern Europe was 
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comparable to that of western Europe. However, workforce participation steadily declined since 
1990. Per capita income in the region is far below the rest of Europe. There are large 
discrepancies between neighboring states within the region, as well. Income inequality improved 
over a long period of time with no consistent path. Only recently has income equality improved 
to the levels of western Europe.  
 Most of the central and eastern European countries rejoined Europe and face the same 
problems as their western neighbors. The current state of economic affairs presents Europe with 
a dangerous triangular dilemma. First, the states of Europe are experiencing a graying, as large 
segments of the population are reaching retirement age. Second, there are the economic 
implications of the contentious issue of immigration. Third, budget shortfalls challenge many of 
the member states of the European Union. These three issues in concert endanger fiscal solvency, 
the governments‟ abilities to provide infrastructure and essential social programs . This equates 
to uncertainty ripe for political opportunists.  
The greying of Europe endangers the tax base of European countries. This could have a 
disastrous effect on quality of life for many. Unless the financial course changes in some way 
very basic social programs are in danger. The population of Europe has been aging for decades. 
Fertility decreased after the post-World War II “baby boom”. 100 Europe is now experiencing a 
“grand parent boom”. In 1960 there were three persons under the age of 14 for every one person 
over the age of 65. By 2060, there will be two persons over the age of 65 for every one person 
under 14. Families are becoming more “horizontal” and less “vertical”. There are more 
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generations and at the same time smaller generations.
101
 This change is in the European 
population is “unprecedented.”102 
This poses a large challenge for the governments and businesses of Europe. In Germany 
for example, Holger Schäfer, Senior Economist at the Cologne Institute for Economic Research, 
states that there is a projected labor gap of 3M workers in the next three years. Ten years later, 
this gap will increase to over 6M workers. Over the next 20 years, this gap will be over 9M 
workers. In Germany, almost 20% of the population is already over 65. Most other European 
countries are close behind.
103
 As this large part of the workforce transforms from workers to 
pensioners, the stress on national budgets could prove catastrophic. 
 One obvious solution to the quandary of a shrinking workforce is immigration. In terms 
of population numbers, net immigration is the only positive addition to the population in many 
EU countries. Italy and Germany have zero and net immigration, respectively.
104
 Christoph von 
Ingelheim, who is on the staff of Christian Social Union Bundestag minister Andrea Lindholz, 
confirms this paradigm in Germany. In 2012, there were 700,000 people who left Germany and 
1.1M incoming migrants. “Immigration can therefore be seen as an option for softening the aging 
process.”105 Furthermore, many countries have become very dependent on migrant workers. 
 Migration offers Europe an opportunity to revitalize its workforce. Migrant workers are 
needed not only to remedy negative and zero fertility of European countries, but also to take care 
of the aged. Many countries have been relying on migrant caregivers for decades already. The 
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struggle for skilled workers continues, moving through yet another challenging cycle. At this 
point, policies are geared towards offering opportunities to workers with two and four year 
degrees. This is largely hampered by bureaucracy and nativist attitudes towards immigration.  
There are two important areas of fiscal policy that orbit around the twin poles of a 
greying Europe and the topic of migration. First is the subject of pension sustainability. This is 
largely a reality that many European countries are reluctant to confront. The second topic is very 
important to the migration conversation: social programs to include welfare and unemployment. 
These two issues are the most debated not only in central and eastern Europe, but in developed 
countries around the globe. This is due in large part to the poor economic conditions since the 
late 2000s. The task of sustaining these important social safety nets offers government officials 
with few good (read popular) answers. The question in many countries is not only how to pay for 
them, but who is entitled to them. There are fears specific to Europe that their coffers will be laid 
waste by immigrants.  Pension sustainability is an authentic concern, but, fear  of “welfare 
tourism”106 is largely a fallacy. Set immigration aside. Many of the pension systems in Europe 
need systematic reform or change.   
 The graying population in Europe and the shrinking workforce demands large scale 
changes to the pensions of EU member states. In 2010 there were four people working for each 
person over the age of 65. By 2060, there will only be two people working to support each 
person over the age of 65.
107
 The European Commission began addressing this problem two 
years ago with the “White Paper on Adequate, Safe and Sustainable Pensions”. The document 
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suggests that employers do more to adapt jobs and tasks to older workers, suggests a few 
different options to supplement traditional pensions, and restrict access to early retirement. Old 
age poverty is already an issue in some parts of Europe.
108
 Some of the adjustments suggested by 
the EC White Paper caused outrage and even violence in some member states.
109
  
 The current fiscal situation in central and eastern Europe is not as dire as some locales in 
western Europe, but the age trend is just as problematic. The states of the region do not have 
much of a dilemma with debt as a group. The average debt to GDP for the states is far below the 
European Union average, both including and excluding the states of southern Europe.  
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However, Croatia, Hungary and Slovenia all have debt levels that exceed the averages for the 
region and the EU. This combined with the changes in the median age and their current 
trajectories are cause for alarm. The states of central and eastern Europe are now aging faster. 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Albania and Macedonia all have age trends that exceed those of the 
rest of Europe. The populations of Romania and Albania are aging two years for every year the 
population ages elsewhere. Early in the 2000s central and eastern Europe‟s trend was slower than 
the rest of Europe. There was a lag in the trend. The lag is over and the trend accelerated.  
 The economic strength of the region is very dependent on growth. The economies of the 
states of eastern and central Europe grew faster than the economies in the rest of the European 
Union. They had to catch up to western Europe. They showed strong resilience following the 
global economic crisis of 2009.  A sudden shock to these results: another currency crisis, a debt 
crisis elsewhere in the EU perhaps could trigger a dampening of growth. This could be the 
preamble to a problem in managing debt in the countries of the region already leveraged at close 
to 90% of GDP.  A large enough lag in growth could be catastrophic to infrastructure projects, 
basic domestic programs like pensions, and the fiscal solvency of the government.  
Ethnicity and Culture 
Ethnic tensions and cultural issues often operate as a factor in the level of democracy in 
states. This is especially true in central and eastern Europe. Some scholars view ethnic and 
internal conflicts as the chief threat to democracy in the region. These tensions arise from three 
different phases of historical population change: pre-WWI shifts, Soviet attempts at 
Russificiation and post EU Schengen immigration. The first phase consists of the different 
imperial wars and changes to borders that affected the population of the region. The Soviet 
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attempts to make the areas more Russian and side effects of stationing Soviet troops in the region 
form the second phase. Population changes associated with EU membership and the Schengen 
Treaty represent the most recent changes.  
Many ethnic animosities emerged in post-communist central and eastern Europe. A war 
erupted and Yugoslavia quickly shattered along ethnic and religious lines. The countries of the 
former Yugoslavia are still struggling with re-establishing a civic society with acceptable levels 
of law, order, rights and education.  Many who are guilty of war crimes during the Balkan Wars 
of the 1990s remain at large.
111
Amnesty International catalogs reported widespread human rights 
violations. Hungary and Romania have been reported to the European Commission for 
“Antizigansim”112 or racism against Roma minorities. Roma have been the victims of physical 
attacks by violent mobs. Their houses have been burnt down.
113
 Roma also dealt with 
substandard housing and Antinot the only targets of injustice in the region.  
Central and eastern European cultures can clash with the ideals of the EU, as well. Some 
governments have curtailed widely-held, basic rights endorsed by the EU. Many of these rights 
are the norm in democracies throughout the world. Poland was cited by the European Court of 
Human Rights for excessive pretrial detention. One such victim remained in prison for two years 
before trial. Gender discrimination remains an issue, as well. Poland failed to adopt anti-
discrimination laws to protect women. Women do not always have access to abortions even 
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when legal or when their own health is at risk. Freedom of the press has come under fire in many 
of the states in central and eastern Europe.
114
 Many specifically note Hungary‟s “roll back” of 
democracy. Orbán‟s government now controls all media outlets. They control content, 
advertising and even have access to employee records.
115
 This led the European Parliament to 
request that the European Commission form a watchdog group. This group will monitor all 




Following a general analysis of the differing levels of democracy in the countries in 
central and eastern Europe, this research singles out the cases of Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria 
for closer analysis. Poland was largely regarded as the success story of post-communist 
democracy. This was recently punctuated by the election of the Polish Prime Minister Donald 
Tusk as President of the European Council.
117
 Additionally, Tusk was the first Polish Prime 
Minister to be re-elected since the fall of communism. This signaled a new found stability in 
their domestic politics and a higher standing among their EU neighbors. Then in 2015, the Law 
and Justice party took control of the country. They have made not too subtle changes to the 
structure of government, amended various freedoms and have supported groups that politically 
attack the EU and its policies. The backsliding met with fierce opposition by the Polish people. 
The final political result is yet to be seen.   Economically, Poland enjoys the highest GDP in 
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central and eastern Europe and the fifth highest in the European Union.
118
 Arguably, Poland is 
the fourth strongest country in Europe.  
Democracy in Hungary, our second case study, faces larger challenges. Viktor Orbán is 
the first Hungarian leader that will serve more than one full term since the fall of communism. 
Some criticize changes made by Orbán and his party, Fidesz.  They replaced the liberal 
constitution.
119
 The new more authoritarian constitution places strict regulation on the press.
120
 
This caused an outcry from many, especially from international rights groups. The regime has 
also occasionally taken pro-Russian attitudes and positions. This is troubling to many because of 
the implications for the European Union and Cold War memories. Additionally, immigration and 
minority rights in Hungary emerged as a pressing topic. Jobbik, a far right anti-immigration 
party, has continued gaining votes and parliament seats. They are militant, xenophobic 
nationalists. Their paramilitary groups have been implicated in violence against Gypsies and 
Jews.  
Finally, this work uses Bulgaria as something of a blind test. Bulgaria is a lesser studied 
country in the region. It‟s not an economic powerhouse. Its leaders are not widely known on the 
world stage. Bulgaria saw harder economic times than most after the fall of Soviet communism. 
Many former communists remained powerful in Bulgaria years after they had faded from public 
life in other former Warsaw Pact countries. They maintained their Cold War ties with criminal 
organizations. This dark partnership developed into the modern Bulgarian mafia. It represents the 
largest issue for democracy in the country. Bulgaria showed recent economic improvements and 
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some stability thanks to foreign investments. It is also important to point out that Bulgaria has a 
demographic composition parallel to Hungary. The country is 75% Bulgarian with other 
minorities rounding out the population. Unlike Hungary and many other countries in the region, 
Bulgaria has a large Eastern Orthodox population.  
Conclusion 
Central and eastern Europe present an interesting study in the effect of history, culture 
and geography on democracy. Democratic quality grew to different levels and in varying ways in 
central and eastern Europe states since the collapse of communism. The political evolutions 
specific to the region, the states‟ histories with Russia and cultural receptions of 
interconnectedness are large factors in the different levels of freedom and rights people of the 
respective countries enjoy today. This work contributes to the literature by testing three 
hypotheses. The levels of the democracy in the region are independent of most established 
economic-based political theory. There are other examples of this throughout the world: the 
Middle East and Africa. In each case, there are variables and conditions specific to each region. 
The countries of all three regions share different cultures, different ethnic relationships and 
histories, different sometimes unique political legacies within themselves.  
Measuring diverse groups of states challenges models that seek to simplify and quantify. 
In central and eastern Europe, we see some states with robust growth and average income 
equality, but horrible conditions for many based on their race, ethnicity or religion. In others, we 
see a lower standard of living, lower growth and higher inequality economically, but fewer 
challenges to what are considered basic rights. In the region and the wider entirety of Europe, 
there are states that are very diverse numerically with better conditions for minorities, yet much 
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of the same can be said for the other relatively homogenous countries, as well. The history and 
cultural differences of the specific groups living amongst each other and the legacies 
communism left behind explain these cases. They are outliers and anomalies to most traditional 






II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Democratization has several different facets important to explaining the varying levels of 
democracy in central and eastern Europe. This literature review seeks to review the scholarly 
writing for these different aspects. An assessment of the nature of democracy in the region needs 
a working definition of “democracy”.  Research of the established measuring methods and 
theories of democratization provides a broad foundation for establishing a methodology. A 
review of the region specific literature narrows the focus of the methodology and subsequent 
explanation.   Each section contributes to a study of democracy in the area and formation of an 
educated and effective methodology.  
 The first step in explaining the qualitative differences in democratic governments is 
defining democracy. Defining democracy challenges scholars. The literature studying and 
discussing democracy spans decades, continents, ideologies and theories. Coppedge and his 
colleagues cite David Held who noted that the concept finds its origins in ancient Greece.
1
 Held 
wrote that democracy is “rule by the people,” and added that “political leaders of extraordinarily 
diverse views profess to be democrats.”2 Most of the scholars in the body of literature use 
different definitions of democracy. This is attributed to the different themes of their work. A bulk 
of contemporary literature uses Robert Dahl‟s definition of democracy in whole or as a 
foundation. Dahl stated that democracy is a government system that is responsive to citizens and 
empowers informed contestation.  He enumerates this extensively with a list of different rights 
afforded citizens.  
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 A broad study of the contemporary measure of democracy and modern theories of 
democratization offers a foundation for a methodology to measure democracy in the region. The 
practice of coding, quantifying and grading governments is very popular. This work yields 
volumes of research every year. The combinations researchers can create and combine are 
virtually limitless. Many of these measuring indices attempt to operationalize different theories 
of democratization. These theories are only somewhat useful to a study of democracy in the 
region. Some successfully explain the democratic transitions in the region after the collapse of 
their Cold War communist regimes. Most fail to account for the subsequent democratic 
evolution. The literature in whole illustrates the need for a specific approach to examine the 
region.  
Region specific study of democracy and democratization achieves two goals. First, it 
focuses the study on a very unique area in a very historically unique time. Second, researching 
the evolution and current levels of rights and freedoms in central and eastern Europe aids in 
developing a methodology to analyze the political realities of central and eastern Europe. 
Widely-used indices and other contemporary measures used for other regions fail to explain the 
reality of democracy in the region. The product of exhaustive region-specific study is a body of 
literature that attempts to explain how most found independence, many found EU membership, 
yet only some found true democracy.  
Defining Democracy 
A comprehensive, modern and applicable definition of “democracy” is one of the more 
elusive pursuits of the modern age. Larry Diamond points out that few subjects have been 
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subjected to “more prolific scrutiny” than what is democracy.3 He joins Chris Hasselmann who 
wrote that there “is no agreed upon definition for democracy.”4 It is clear that democracy takes 
different forms and changes with time. Andranik Tangian noted that in the cradle of democracy, 
Greeks only voted for positions that demand special skills.
5
 Indeed, Aristotle‟s Constitution of 
Athens cites some officials chosen “by lot”, or random. Different scholars focus on different 
aspects of government in search of an effective definition of democracy. 
Modern political science has developed variations on the concept of democracy. Alvarez, 
et al. takes a very minimalist focus. They look at three different distinctions in government. First, 
they analyze the limitations on government; whether the government is limited or despotic. 
Second, they see legal structure as a factor. Laws are either created by the governed – 
“autonomous”- or are legislators set aside from the laws they make – “heteronomous”. Third, the 
final subject of Alvarez and his fellow scholars is the level of competition and contention in 
elections.
6
 Hasselmann claims that there is an “underlying consensus” on a set of characteristics. 
These include elections, various freedoms, a system of checks and balances and a separation of 
powers. Each definition carries strengths and liabilities.
7
 The minimalist approach omits many 
relevant attributes, despite its basic strength.
8
 It ignores what is regarded as fair, who in the 
populace can vote, and other freedoms.
9
 The maximalist approached is criticized as simply being 
too big. The numerous aspects of social justice in its definition of democracy make the definition 
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 To this point, Alvarez and his fellow scholars note that “many definitions don‟t 
describe any existing governments.” 11 
Many of the theories of democracy share one common element: Robert A. Dahl‟s notion 
of contestation. Munk and Verkuilen, Schmidt, Diamond, Tangian, Hasselmann and many others 
included a reference to the concepts he put forth in his 1971 work, Polyarchy. It serves as a basis 
for much of the minimalist study of democracy and is included in broader studies as well. Dahl‟s 
foundations are rather basic. He wrote, “I assume that a key characteristic of a democracy is the 
continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens considered as 
political equals.”12 He expands on the notion of a responsive government, continuing that 
democracy is “a political system of which is the quality of being completely or almost 
completely responsive to all its citizens.” He elaborates on the obligations of a truly responsive 
government. He wrote that democratic regimes are required to offer citizens “unimpaired 
opportunities” to voice their will, beliefs and preferences.13 
Dahl illustrates his combination of contestation and responsibility with a bulleted point 
list of what this means for citizens, their rights and opportunities in a true democracy. 
Democracy by Dahl‟s design is not simply the right to vote. Instead, it includes rights of 
expression, association, eligibility for office and fair and free elections among other things. 
Dahl‟s democracy also calls for the rights of political parties and politicians to lobby for support 
and voter‟s right to choose between candidates or parties. He sets forth much of the blueprint for 
modern democracy. Dahl‟s Polyarchy illustrates the basis for political parties, interest groups, 
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politicians, campaigning and legislative government in the context of a democracy. The primary 
differences in the various definitions of democracy are additional rights attached to Dahl‟s 
foundation.   
Some scholars have ventured to explain democracy without basic rights. The concepts of 
hybrid regimes, illiberal democracy or democracy in authoritarian regimes seeks to explain how 
oppressive governments remain in power despite human rights violations, restrictions on civil 
liberties and other phenomena many scholars would clearly label undemocratic. This type of 
government emerged in the 1960s and 1970s in countries like Mexico, Singapore and South 
Africa.
14
 Their continued spread has left an “unresolved puzzle”15. Elections strengthen 
authoritarian regimes in some countries and defeat it in others. The study of these regimes led to 
different classifications of illiberal democracies, also known as electoral authoritarian regimes. 
Researchers find hegemonic authoritarian regimes and competitive authoritarian regimes among 
these states. The larger question is if these states should be recognized as democracies at all. 
Larry Diamond referred to these types of states as “pseudodemocracies”. 16 Mehran Kamrava‟s 
Politics & Society in the Developing World chronicled the evolution of these types of states in 
the Third World. He also wrote that many of these democratic states “do not really deserve the 
label”.17   
 The debate over the legitimacy of democracy in these hybrid regimes feeds into another 
larger question about the nature of democracy. All scholars agree that one of the primary 
characteristics of democracy is voting. The real variations in the levels of democracy lie within 
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important details like voter eligibility, voting conditions, voting accessibility, and education. 
Politically, these are the factors above and beyond Dahl‟s basic foundation that effect 
democracy. Scholars, especially those of other fields such as sociology and economics, see other 
factors effecting democracy as well. Combinations of these factors, along with understood 
presumptions about democracy (like Dahl‟s foundation) imperil the notion of democracy‟s 
absolute nature.  
Measuring Democracy 
The past time of attempting to measure democracy is a manifestation of the debate 
surrounding its nature. Some scholars view democracy as a noun: “Angola is a democracy.” 
Others see it as a descriptor; an adjective: “Angola has a democratic government.” A very 
popular and more recent discussion is what factors can measure democracy of a varying nature. 
(The notion of democracy as a binary measure is not that popular.) Many researchers seek to 
measure democracy using complex mathematical models, using variables and indicators from 
different official and unofficial sources. Other scholars seek to look past measuring democracy 
and the associated labels. This group finds research models helpful, but seeks more insight into 
more non-quantifiable factors.  
The rise of the hybrid regimes and illiberal democracy are at the core of the debate over 
the nature of democracy. There are two positions in the debate. One school of study views 
democracy as dichotomous. Adam Przeworski argues that democracy is a kind of government, 
not a degree. There is one kind of democratic government: a democracy. The proponents of this 
binary view argue that “efforts to look for traces of democracy in `nondemocracies‟ are both 
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invalid and error-prone.” 18 Other scholars think that gradient democracy “negates the concept of 
regime and regime type.”19 Russia is held up as an example. Diamond refers to modern Russia as 
a “pseudodemocracy” while Laurel Miller calls it “imitation democracy”.20   
This argument holds a great deal validity in regards to Dahl‟s definition of democracy.  
Based on this definition, there can be no democracy without certain rights institutionally 
guaranteed.  Some states in the world violate press freedoms. Some governments hold 
monopolies on TV, radio and media.  There are still allegations of voter fraud and voter 
suppression and intimidation. Governments still jail candidates facing incumbents in some places 
in the world.  There are significant barriers to being eligible for public office in places. Any of 
this disqualifies a country from being a democracy according to Dahl.  
The other school sees democracy as a “matter of degrees”.21 Zachary Elkins argues that 
graded measures are reliable, realistic and more theoretically faithful.
 22
  The rise of these hybrid 
regimes “has encouraged attempts to empirically capture these new categories with the help of 
existing measures of democracy.” 23 There are two widely used studies to this end: Polity IV and 
Freedom House. Both of these analyses assign a score to each country. Freedom House goes 
further and assigns various labels “free”, “partly free” and not free.24  The graduated concept of 
                                                          
18
 Przeworski quoted by Zachary Elkins, “Gradations of Democracy? Empirical Tests of Alternative 
Conceptualizations,” America Journal of Political Science 44, no. 2 (April 2000), 293-4.  
19
 Matthiji Bogaards, “Measure of Democratization: From Degree to Type to War,” Political Research Quarterly 63, 
no. 2 (June 2010): 476. 
20
 Diamond, “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes”, 25; Laurel E. Miller, et al. Democratization in the Arab World 
(Arlington VA: The Rand Corporation, 2012), 185.  
21
 Nathan J. Brown and Craig M. Kauffman, “Introduction,” in The Dynamics of Democratization, ed. Nathan J. 
Brown (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 2011), 12. 
22
 Przeworski quoted by Elkins, “Gadiations of Democracy?”  293-4.  
23
 Bogaards, “Measure of Democratization,” 475. 
24
 Miller, et al. Democratization in the Arab World, 13-14. 
43 
 
democracy and its grey zone allows for the study of states such as Russia, Cambodia and 
Venezuela. 
 Attempting to mimic the science of Freedom House and Polity IV is a popular endeavor 
in political science.  Researchers use the most popular datasets from Polity IV, Freedom House. 
Their results and datasets are available of the Internet.
25
 There are others: Adam Przeworski‟s 
“DD” (a binary measure of democracy and dictatorship), Michael Bernhard, Timothy Nordstrom 
and Christopher Reenock‟s “BNR” (an index created by the Economist Intelligence Unit: the 
“EIU”), the “BTI” from the Bertelsmann Foundation,26 and the work of Mark Gasiorowski .27  
There are still others that use these indices or their data as starting points for other models. Carl 
Henrik Knutsen cites that Ronald Ingelhart and Christian Welzel‟s Effective Democracy Index 
(EDI) is an aggregation of the Freedom House Index, Transparency International‟s Corruption 
Perception Index or Control of Corruption index from the World Governance Indicators.
28
 
Shawn Treier and Simon Jackman use indicators from Polity in a different model.
29
 
These different indices expand on Dahl‟s operational definition of “democracy”.  The 
United Nations embraces representative government in Article I of its charter. More recently, the 
European Union promotes democratization within its candidate countries.
30
  Dahl‟s proposition 
of a free press is widely embraced, as well. The United Nations sponsors a World Press Freedom 
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 while UNESCO (The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) 
concurrently “promotes freedom of expression and freedom of the press and fosters media 
independence and pluralism by providing advisory services on media legislation and by making 
governments, parliamentarians and other decision-makers aware of the need to guarantee free 
expression.”32 Dahl‟s work is a foundation for democracy, but only a foundation.  
International organizations, non-government organizations and various transnational 
networks added to the Dahl‟s original democratic attributes or clarified their meaning.  The most 
voluminous source of additional rights is the much older Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. It was adopted by the United Nations in 1948. It calls for equality of all persons under the 
law, seeks to guarantee freedom from most discrimination, espouses an individual‟s rights to 
marry, own property and practice the religion of their choice and declares that all people have the 
right to an education.
33
 Many UN member states have comparable domestic rights for their 
citizens. The European Union made most of these rights compulsory for membership.   
The reality of these expanded rights is the basis for Elkin‟s argument supporting the idea 
of the variable nature of democracy and expanded number of indicators in democracy indices. 
Researchers consider these expanded rights when selecting variables for their indices because 
they are points of difference between countries.  Country A and Country B might both hold free 
elections, but Country B might not allow women to vote. Country C and Country D might allow 
both sexes to vote, but Country D might only allow people of a certain religion to be citizens. 
Education is a large matter to consider. Countries have different levels of compulsory education 
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and even more divergent completion rates. All of these variables matter to the researcher seeking 
to expound upon Dahl‟s work and create a realistic comparison of governments.  
The various democracy indices have critics. Daniel Pemstein, Stephen A. Meserve and 
James Melton wrote, “There is no consensus on the reliability of any of these measures.” 34 Some 
find fault with the theoretical aspects. Most indices do not include variables like geography, 
history or ethnic groups. Some researchers find operational and mathematical flaws common to 
the indices. There are debates over measurement and coding of data. Some take issue with the 
aggregation of the different variables. It is interesting to note that scholars do not dismiss the 
practice, but seek to improve operationalizing democracy study. Their suggestions usually 
involve incorporating less traditional but intriguing factors into the aggregation process. In short, 
these researchers want to adopt a different approach.   
Many scholars cite theoretical flaws in the many democracy indices. Laurel Miller et al 
warn that the “hard-and-fast labeling” of Polity IV and Freedom House is not beneficial. They 
contend that many of the produced labels are not realistic. However, such studies can answer 
questions over periods of time.
35
 They can illustrate changes and democratic transition or 
backsliding.  Miller saw problems with this very scientific study of seemingly unscientific 
material. She sees democratization scholars pre-occupied with causes.
36
 Gerardo Munck and Jay 
Verkuilen wrote, “Democracy indices reflect insufficient sensitivity to the key issues involved in 
the choice of indicators.” 37 Matthiji Bogaards wrote that researchers who assume that democracy 
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has a gradual nature “treat democracy and its absence as endpoints of a continuum, on which any 
thresholds or boundaries are arbitrary.”38  
Researchers agree that there are operational and structural flaws in the democracy 
indices. Munck and Verkuilen wrote that researchers need to pick between parsimony and 
fidelity.
 39
 Freedom House has too many components for some attributes.
 40
 One journal article 
selected eleven different variables for study!
41
 They also highlight that indices are restricted by 
data. Similarly, Coppedge at al wrote there are problems with “coverage and sources”.42 Both 
equate to the fact that for some countries, data is available only some years.
43
 Munck and 
Verkuilen wrote that some models, including Polity IV suffer from redundancy. Some models 
use components that relate to two attributes.
 44
 Munck, Verkuilen and Coppedge agree many 
indices have issues with measurement, coding and aggregation. Measurement and coding can be 
subject to bias. Aggregation can be either biased or wrong.
45
 
While some scholars allude to the difficulty in creating accurate democratic indices, none 
advocate abandoning them. Most proposed ways to improve them. Coppedge and his fellow 
scholars proposed including a variable that addressed history. They noted, “One cannot 
understand the future of democracy in the world and how to shape it unless one understands the 
forces that produced the regime types that populate the world today.”46 Additionally, they 
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offered six different forms of “rule by people” as a coded variable in an effort to measure 
democracy using another six more standard variables.
47
  Muck and Verkuilen warn researchers 
of using systemic sources because laws change. They urge researchers to justify their indicators. 
In measurements, they urge researchers to “maximize the homogeneity within measurements 
with a minimum number of necessary distinctions“. 48 
Some researchers focus on unquantifiable factors.  Miller ponders if democracy was 
contagious, occurring in geographic clusters, found in oppositional strategies (reform movements 
versus the Communist governments) or there were other socio-economic factors linked to 
development. She alludes to Jan Teorell‟s work, which uses a complex statistical model and 
explains little about how democratization occurs: 40% in the long run at best.
49
  Analyzing 
democracy with fidelity is more than a simple math problem. There are other unquantifiable 
factors at work. Teorell wrote that there can be “non-structural country specific” aspects to 
democratization.
50
  He proposes that a perfect theory of democratization does not exist and the 
three different forms of testing theories should be combined: statistical, historical-comparative 
and case studies. Each of the three methods fails on their own.
51
 Grzegorz Ekiert wrote, 
“Analytical lenses were therefore turned increasingly to the past, with recent work emphasizing 
the importance of historical legacies at the expense of the policy and institutional choices 
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stressed in the earlier literature.” He cites the role that history, geography, conflicts and wars can 
have on the political outcomes of regime change.
52
  
This less statistical approach allows for more of a focus on the determination of 
democracy and less on establishing mathematical relationships. The product of researchers‟ work 
on indices is useful, yet not to the extent that some might argue. There are very few locales on 
the globe where there are absolutely no cultural or historical animosities. In terms of ethnicity, 
the role that diversity plays in developing democracy and the democracy‟s hardiness is 
debatable. Religion remains both a unifying and divisive force simultaneously at different points 
around the world. Many of these factors cannot be addressed by clever coding and contributing 
factors can change from region to region. Statistically explaining resulting levels of democracy, 
products of transition, and what determines democracy remain somewhat elusive.  
Determinants of Democratization 
A review of the established literature of democratization and its offspring, democracy, is 
essential in an analysis of the different levels of democratic quality in post-communist Europe. 
Most scholars view and concede a wave-like nature in democratic change and, at times, a 
domino-like theory. The debate over the factors that actually contribute to a democratic state 
with basic rights and freedoms is continuous. Many scholars attest to the role that existing 
conditions play. Others allude to the importance of economics and finance. Just as many 
researchers dismiss the primary role of these contributors in favor of other factors: history, 
democratic structure, or geography to name a few.  
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Tracking democratic transitions is relatively new. Samuel P. Huntington was the first to 
attempt it in 1991.
53
  Accounting for democracy is an older pursuit. Yet, the two can be studied 
in tandem by combining the Huntington‟s work and a chronological review at the dominant 
theories over time. Democratic transitions are grouped into different “waves” based on when 
they occur.  This concept of waves was established by Huntington in his work The Third Wave: 
Democracy in the Late Twentieth Century. A “wave” is a “group of transitions from 
nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specific period of time and that 
specifically outnumbers transitions in the other direction during that period of time.”54 It is 
important to note that Huntington wrote that every wave of democratization is post-scripted by a 
reverse wave where some of the young democracies revert back to nondemocracy.  
The date of the commencement of the first wave of democratization in the world is a 
point of contention. Jan Teorell marks the period after World War One as the first wave of 
democratization.
55
 However, Huntington wrote that the first wave began in 1828 with the 
American and French Revolutions.  Huntington bases this on the fact that more than more than 
half of adult males could vote and that there were representative bodies with executives chosen 
in the U.S. and France at this time.  The reversal of the first wave began with Mussolini‟s reign 
in Italy, followed by coups all over Europe. This ended democracy in Baltics, Poland, Brazil, 
Argentina and Portugal. The rise of Hitler and the Anschluss imposed a single totalitarian regime 
over Germany and Austria.
56
  World War Two occurred. According to Huntington, the second 
wave began with the Allied occupations in West Germany, Italy, Japan and Korea.  The reversal 
of the second wave began in 1958. Over the next 18 years, one third of the democracies in the 
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The 1960s was the era of modernization theory. Western Europe was held up as an 
example. It was accepted that modernization could be difficult and democracy would take time.
58
 
The basis for the theory is the principle that development equaled democracy and freedom. 
Seymour Martin Lipset wrote that “this means that the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the 
chances that it will sustain democracy.”59   Proponents see democracy as a manifestation of 
economic development, industrialization and expanded education.
60
 In analyzing states, Lipset 
wrote, “In each case, the average wealth, degree of industrialization and urbanization, and level 
of education is much higher for the more democratic countries [referring to his dataset].”61 He 
continues, “[Statistically] the factors that subsumed under economic development carry with it 
the political correlate of democracy.”62  Written in 1959, Lipset and other researchers looked at 
the results of the post-war reconstruction of the former battlefields of World War Two and linked 
democracy to it.   
The reverse of the second wave occurred from 1958-1975.
63
 In this period, dependency 
theory emerged and dispatched modernization theory as the popular theory of democratization. 
Dictatorships in developed Latin America countries disproved modernization theory.
64
 On the 
topic of development, Teorell cites Przeworski and others who wrote that modernization does not 
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aid in democracy, but simply hampers authoritarianism
65
 and backsliding. Providing a structure 
helps build democracy, but only with external forces, meaning the international factors of the 
diffusion of democracy and pressure to embrace it. Teorell wrote that while income matters, 
modernization theory is pre-occupied with it.
66
 Scholars of dependency theory acknowledge the 
role of economic development, but note that enthusiasm among key groups does not correlate 
with modernization theory‟s economic indicators.67  
Dependency theory approaches democratization from an anthropocentric point of view. It 
focuses on people as opposed to other research that “has been overwhelmed by the flood of state-
centric work that has dominated comparative politics for the past decade.”68 Teorell refers to it as 
the “social forces” theory.69 There are two distinct schools within dependency theory. The first 
identifies the capitalist class as agents of democracy. Barrington Moore wrote, “no bourgeoisie, 
no democracy.”70 The second school identifies the working class as the agents of democracy. 
Both groups agree on the basics of dependency theory. Democracy is struggle with a prominent 
role for social forces. It is about interest, which propels change in government. This yields the 
pessimistic view that material interests are the highest priority. These forces are more important 
than economic development or history and culture. 
71
 
The social forces approach of dependency theory is far from ironclad. It cannot explain 
everything or all events. Political changes in Korea, Chile and Brazil validated the theory. Social 
forces theory impact was more muted in Mexico, Tunisia and Egypt. The same forces opposed 
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democracy in Indonesia, Singapore and Syria.
72
 Paul James writes a detailed account of the death 
of dependency theory. He regards it as “a once-relevant attempt to understand a long-gone era 
(that is prior to the 1970s).”73 He cites the rise of globalism for the demise of the once popular 
theory. He cites Susan Strange, who wrote: 
  It is no accident that the “dependency school” of writers of the 
  1970s have lost so much of their audience. In Latin America (where 
  most of this writing was focused), politicians and professors were 
  almost unanimous in the 1970s in castigating the multinationals as 
  agents of American imperialism, but now they acknowledge them as 
  potential allies in earning the foreign exchange badly needed for 
  further development.
74
 
International capitalism is now a forgone conclusion.  Discussions of interdependency and post-
colonialism replaced the topics of dependency and imperialism in theories and study. 
75
 James 
clarifies that inequality and dependence still exist in the world. Dependency theory simply did 
not address their roles in democratic transition adequately.
76
 
Huntington marks the beginnings of the third wave of democratization with the 
Portuguese coup de-tat in April 1974.
77
  In the 1980s and 1990s authoritarian regimes broke 
down.
78
 (The most obvious of these was Central and Eastern Europe.)  These democratic 
transitions were different. In the second wave, many transitions occurred through decolonization 
or by having democracy imposed by an outside force.
79
 Huntington divides the transitions of the 
third wave into three different classes: transformations, replacements or transplacements. Elites 
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in power led changes, resulting in democracy during transformations. Replacement scenarios 
occurred when authoritarian regimes were overthrown in favor of democracy. Transplacements 
were joint actions between the government and citizenry of states.
80
  
A large number of democracies emerged in Latin America, Southern Europe and Asia in 
the third wave. Many foreign policy officials in the Reagan Administration saw a “worldwide 
democratic revolution”. Guillermo O‟Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter compiled a transition 
paradigm. The scholars pointed out that it was not a testable theory.
81
 It provided different linear 
steps towards democracy. The main premise is that countries are moving away from an 
authoritarian government are moving towards democracy.
82
 The foundations of the paradigm are 
simple: liberalization and democratization.
83
 A commitment to these two these two goals trumps 
all other factors. These include poverty, ethnic fragmentation, and past politics. O‟Donnell and 
Schmitter wrote that pre-existing political institutions have little effect on authoritarian rule. At 
times, institutions survive and matter, as the king did in fascist Italy.  Yet, early 20
th
 century 
Greece saw different authoritarian groups demolish established political institutions repeatedly.  
Elections are the definitive step in democratization, according to O‟Donnell and Schmitter. 
“Elections equal democracy”.84 This plan faltered with the reverse of the third wave.  
A reverse of the third wave occurred in the 2000s. Several authoritarian regimes proved 
durable.
85
 “Many countries settled into a `gray zone‟ of diverse forms of government where 
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autocratic and democratic features combined.”86 Diamond described it as a "democratic 
rollback”. A “powerful authoritarian undertow” caught the governments in Nigeria, Thailand, 
Bangladesh, and the Philippines. Freedom and civil rights also weakened in Chile, Ghana, 
Poland and South Africa.
87
   This changed the landscape of democratization research and the 
analyses of democracy. First, the emergence of hybrid regimes invalidated O‟Donnell and 
Schmitter‟s transition paradigm. Second, democracy study evolved into a new form of analysis. 
This analysis steps away from the straight science of democratic indices and older theories noted 
for their exclusive nature.  
The movement away from the most scientific of political analysis in democracy happened 
in steps. The first step was the emergence of the notion of “young democracies”. The second was 
a less mathematical analysis. Ethan B. Kapstein and Nathan Converse explained that younger 
democracies act differently than older democratic governments. Kapstein and Converse use six 
years as a cut-off. This is used to explain why many recessions of the third wave and fourth wave 
democratic transitions flew in the face of established mantra. These governments were simply 
not old enough to be judged with their older peers. They write: 
 Early indicators are, therefore, that initial conditions do significantly  
affect  the survival chances of democratic regimes. Low per capita income,  
high levels of inequality, high rates of poverty, and higher ethnic  
fragmentation  all harm the prospects that democracy will endure.  
Yet these relationships are not deterministic. There are several  
countries (among them Guatemala and Mozambique) in which initial  
conditions  were extremely unfavorable, yet where democracy had  
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endured as of 2004, albeit not without difficulties.
88
 
Economic factors were especially over estimated in prior study. This allows for the next step in 
departure from the traditional study of democratic transition.  
Laurel E. Miller and Jeffrey Martini take up the second step. They note that there are 
several different conditions to consider when examining democracy and democratization in the 
third wave. Their blueprint bisects and includes several different established theories and 
practices. First, consider the mode of change.
89
 Within the context of central and eastern Europe 
there were three types of transitions. Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria were regime-initiated. East 
Germany and Czechoslovakia were society-initiated.  Romania experienced a violent 
overthrow.
90
 Second, a country‟s past history with political pluralism is important.91 Tighter the 
repression of dissent created more difficult the transition to democracy.
92
 Third, critical policy 
choices during transition: role of the military in government, structure of representative bodies, 
transitional justice or reconciliation court are included. Fourth, both sets of scholars alluded to 
the importance of national cohesion. A number of states suffered from ethnic rivalries, unsettled 
borders or insurgent groups.
93
 Some of these “frozen conflicts”94 of the region reignited in the 
absence of Soviet central control. Fifth, economic stability is important. Kapstein and Converse 
wrote that while important, economics cannot be estimated using a single factor or determine the 
fate of governments.  Miller and Martini hold that the last two factors towards democratization 
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are dependent on external forces.
95
 This could include regional security, the status and conditions 
in neighboring states, efforts by non-government organizations and involvement in international 
organizations to name a few items.  
Post-Communist Democracy in Europe 
 The collapse of communism afforded scholars and researchers in democracy a very 
unique situation. Never before, and perhaps never again, will the countries of an entire region of 
a single continent break free or simply walk away from ideologically similar totalitarian regimes. 
The literature of post-communist democracy in eastern and central Europe tends to be very 
region specific. It includes different theories. The most prominent of them is Rokkan‟s ideas 
about political development.    Contemporary researchers have used much of his work to analyze 
the territory and culture as factors in the democratization of the region. The end of the Cold War 
also presented powerful international influences affecting democracy in the area. The most 
recent literature specific to central and eastern Europe addresses post-EU accession regression 
from democracy.  
Many current studies about democracy in central and eastern Europe focus on historical 
legacies, culture, outside support and geography. This practice faces a large amount of criticism. 
Many researchers and member of the broader political science community view democratization 
as “a process that displays fairly regular contours.” This creates a theoretical friction between 
area specialists and general democracy scholars. Separate concentrations on theme and location 
collide. Area scholars are referred to as “typical area scholars”. They are accused of being over 
concerned with “trivial details of states”. They can be labeled as “deficient as social scientists”. 
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At the same time, researchers specializing in certain regions accuse their detractors of using 
“faddish theories” and showing “overeagerness”.96 
Researchers point out that there are similarities with other regions of the world, but that 
the shock of communism‟s collapse in central and eastern Europe was unique. Many of the states 
of the region had no democratic tradition.
97
 Many of the new states had been parts of the Austro-
Hungarian, Ottoman or Russian Empires. There was little memory or experience with a capitalist 
economy.
98
 The military played little or no role in the end of communism in most central and 
eastern European countries. Economically, most of these states started from a position of almost 
perfect equal wealth distribution.
99
 It led Ekiert to write that, “Explanations emphasizing 
geographic locations, deep historical preconditions and affinities for dense relations with the 
West pose significant limitations to our thinking about policy lessons that can be transferred to 
other regions.”100  
Analysis about democracy in central and Eastern Europe evolved over time. Valerie 
Bunce sees the democratic transition of central and eastern Europe in two distinct stages. The 
first occurred from 1989 to 1996. The second occurred from 1996 to 2009. The first stage 
included the democratization of approximately half of former Soviet states in the region. It was 
characterized by increased political diversity, relative nonviolence and political cohesion of post-
communist parties. In the second stage, the “laggards” moved in a more democratic direction, 
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some to relative democracy.
101
 Researchers pursued several popular theories of democratization. 
Some theorized that the age of the state would reflect the quality of democracy after 
communism.
 
Bunce points out that Bulgaria and Romania were two of the older countries in the 
region, yet evolved into illiberal democracies and hybrid regimes. Another theory attempted to 
establish a correlation between religious and ethnic diversity and democracy. Bunce points out 
that Poland and Albania are both very heterogeneous, but have completely different 
governments.
 
Some scholars saw that a difference in communist policies linked to a difference of 
democratic result.
102
        
A very popular attempt to explain democracy in the region emphasized elites and their 
choices. This used the same templates researchers used in studying democratic transitions in 
Latin America and elsewhere.
103
 Ekiert and Ziblatt, as well as Bunce, state this was conceptually 
flawed.
104
  Reusing analytical frameworks used on Latin America and Africa overlook that the 
process in Europe after the fall of communism is “distinctly European”.105 Ekiert and Ziblatt 
write: 
  To compare the post-communist experience to democratic experiments 
  in other temporally proximate third-wave cases in other world regions  
  is to make the mistake of the drunkard whose search for his keys leads  
him to the spot he can most easily see – under the lamppost.106 
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This approach used “proximate factors”, such as mode of transition and framework decisions. 
The theory was dismissed.
107
  Most of the transitions in central and eastern Europe were 
similar.
108
 The election results in central and eastern Europe were not.
 109
 
New theories about the democracy in the region combine much of these other theories. 
They are akin to Stein Rokkan‟s analysis of western European nation-building. First and 
foremost, they are intended to study only central and eastern Europe. Rokkan wrote that “smaller 
political systems tend to be so heavily dependent on their cultural contexts that there is likely to 
be very small payoffs in attempts at indiscriminate comparisons across distinctive cultural 
regions.” 110 The theories account for the factors contributing to economy, territory and culture. 
Rokkan‟s earlier model addressed these different forces along continuums containing four 
thresholds: legitimacy, incorporation, representation and executive power.
111
 The factors have 
different impacts depending on “various historical conditions”, such as the national revolutions 
(until 1789) or industrial revolutions.  The impact of economics depended on economic growth. 
Territory impacted democratization based on geopolitical position, periphery control and timing 
of national unification. Culture comprised of church-state relations and language.
112
 Regional 
experts use Rokkan‟s approach to explain that democracy in the region can be linked to the 
history, geography, culture and external forces in addition to the more conventional economic 
factors. 
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 There are deep historical roots in many of the resulting democracies in central and eastern 
Europe. The history of the region affected the immediate post-communist regimes, the more 
developed democratic governments and subsequent accession to the European Union. There are 
smaller debates and differences within the literature. Researchers contemplate which past matters 
more. The first debate draws on the pre-1940s history and the legacy of the empires. Grzegorz 
Ekiert and Daniel Ziblatt view democratization in the region on an unbroken continuum. 
Communist and Soviet domination was simply a pause. The states of central and eastern Europe 
simply started moving towards democracy again.
113
 Arista Maria Cirtautas and Frank 
Schimmelfennig quote Jeffrey Kopstein: 
  The relevant past has been identified as the policy choices in the initial  
post communist years that have been influenced by the path of extrication  
from Communism. Whether roundtables or revolutions, that have in turn  
been determined by the types of Communist regimes that are themselves  
the product of the types of postcommunist state and society, which ultimately  
reflect the level of modernization at the time of national independence 
 after World War I.
114
  
Sten Berglund and Jan Åke Dellenbrant point out that many of the political parties in central and 
eastern Europe immediately after communism‟s fall had roots in pre-World War II political 
parties.
115
 Also, countries with pre-Second World War parliamentary traditions had higher levels 
of political pluralism in the immediate aftermath of communism.
116
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  Ekiert and Ziblatt advance their idea further. They write that varying quality of freedom, 
rights, economic development and political stability in central and eastern Europe correlate to 
two different forces: pre-communist political patterns and more current events (reforms, wars 
and crises). The challenge to researchers is combining the two stimuli. Researchers should 
recognize the importance of pre-communist legacies, but that they are not deterministic.
117
 The 
Czech Republic was industrialized before communism. Poland had limited experience with 
democracy before communism. Hungary‟s right-wing politics reflect the legacy of the Soviet 
crackdown in 1956, the failed communist revolt of 1919 and angst over the punishing Trianon 
Treaty.
118
 Pre-communist patterns and current events are combined by the “institutional 
mimicry” caused by sudden changes or shocks. Discontinuous changes do not allow for 
evolution. Gaps form when governments simply collapse; disappear.
 119
  This is why “critical 
antecedents”: religion, imperial legacies, pre-communist voting patterns, matter.120  
 A second issue in discussing historical relevance is the role of communism. Frank 
Schimmelfennig, Hanno Scholtz and Arista Maria Cirtautas point out that in terms of states 
within the former Soviet Union, there are two groups. Communism emerged in one group around 
the time of World War One and the Russian Revolution. Another group became communist after 
falling victim to Soviet, post-Second World War domination. 
121
 Bunce points out a strong 
correlation between the duration of communist rule and the resulting quality of democracy in the 
former Soviet Union. Most of the more democratic states became communist following World 
War Two. Democracy is weaker or non-existent in other parts of the former U.S.S.R. where 
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communism began after World War One: Belarus, Uzbekistan, the Ukraine (before 2004), 
Armenia and Russia.  Bunce reasons that longer communist rule and “deeper penetration” 
conditioned these states for authoritarianism.
122
 
 Democracy in central and eastern Europe has an internal geographic aspect to it as well. 
In short, location and proximity to Russia matters.  One only needs look at a map of the region 
and its periphery to understand that the farther east a researcher looks, the lower the chance of 
finding even a moderate democracy.
123
 Bunce reverses this viewpoint. She wrote that states‟ 
geographic proximity to the West is a factor in the results of democratic transition. Before 
communism, many central and eastern European countries were trading partners, shared cultural 
ties and political ideas with the West.
124
 Michael Emerson and Gergana Noutcheva agree and 
wrote “fast and deep democratization is explained to a significant degree by the proximity and 
possibly of anchorage and integration with a major world centre of democracy.”125 More 
recently, Russia, a historical symbol of oppression to many in the region, reasserted themselves 
militarily in the republics of Georgia
126
 and the Ukraine. History causes concern. Current events 
compound it.  
 The security questions surrounding geography overshadow larger issues than proximity 
and history with the former Soviet Union present. There are factors of ethnicity and religion to 
ponder. Many of the states of the region had large minority groups when communism 
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 10% of Slovakia‟s population was Hungarian. There were two million Hungarians 
in Romania and another 400,000 in Serbia. There was a large German minority in Poland and a 
Polish minority in Lithuania.
128
 Soviet policy dictated immigration and, at times, forced it. In the 
immediate aftermath of communism in the region, Berglund and Dellenbrant classified regimes 
into three different groups. First, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary underwent successful 
government reforms and showed reasonable levels of stability. Second, the Baltic States 
established independence and made progress towards democracy. There are some lingering 
concerns over sizeable Russian minorities. Ethnic conflicts and nationalism racked the third 
group. Berglund and Dellenbrant included Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria in this group.
129
 The 
former Yugoslavia would have definitely belonged in this group, as well, but the editors decided 
not to include an analysis of the country in their study. 
 The study of religion as a factor in democratization became popular in contemporary 
literature due in great part to developments in the Middle East. Natalia Vlas and Sergiu 
Gherghina wrote that “For a long time, religion has been peripheral to the concerns of political 
scientists.”130 The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the collapse of Gaddafi, and the Arab Spring 
changed this. Interest in the Middle East yielded a useful by-product: an analysis of religion‟s 
impact on democracy. The resulting body of work supports both a regional approach to the 
study, but also a Rokkansian approach. The literature explores four different religious groups: 
Protestant Christians, Catholics, Orthodox Christians and Muslims. It aids explaining different 
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developments in post-communist governments, different levels of democracy and persistence of 
some authoritarian regimes.  
 Any broad generalization about Christianity and its relation to democracy is an error. The 
relationship between Christianity and democracy is “often taken for granted.”131 The new 
literature on the topic cracks the perceived political monolith of Christianity. Peter Berger writes 
that “Modern democracy originated in one part of the world - Western Europe - and there only, 
through the course it has spread throughout the globe. In religious terms, it originated in the part 
of the world crucially shaped by Christianity, and by Western Christianity at that.”132 Natalia 
Vlas and Sergiu Gherghina see Western Europe as being built on a Christian foundation forged 
by the victory over Holy Roman Emperors. However, the process was not as simple as Papal 
supremacy. Two key events in Catholicism would play a role: the Protestant Reformation and the 
Second Vatican Council.  
The Protestant Reformation, its progeny and democracy have close relationships in the 
context of a Rokkansian model. Robert D. Woodberry and Timothy S. Shah use the colonization 
of the New World and the subsequent 18
th
 century revolutions in explaining the positive impact 
Christian Protestant religion has on democracy. Berger refers to it as a “natural affinity”.133 
Unlike the scholars of Catholicism, Orthodoxy or Islam, Woodberry and Shah pointed to the 
favorable conditions for democracy Protestantism provides. From this point, the Woodberry and 
Shah cite a basic blueprint of modernization as a path to democracy: education, economic 
development, democratic practices and pluralism.
134
 Berger notes that the Lutheran Church in 
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 The separation of Church and State and religious pluralism present in Protestantism and 
Catholicism are absent in Orthodox Christianity. This separation is essential in liberal 
democracy.
136
 The Eastern Church never experienced a reformation or anything like the Second 
Vatican Council. The only religious pluralism experienced by Orthodox churches has been 
hoisted upon them or accepted hesitantly. The Russian Orthodox Church today is aligned with 
the Putin Regime.
137
 The Romanian Orthodox Church collaborated with the communist regime 
in Bucharest. The Greek Orthodox Church had no role in the various democratic movements in 
that country.
138




Berger and Daniel Philpot explained that the Catholic Church only recently endorsed 
democracy. The church played two basic roles in relation to authoritarian regimes before the 
Second Vatican Council in the early 1960s. It was either outlawed, as it was in Eastern Europe, 
or it was aligned with authoritarian governments. The Catholic Church collaborated with rulers 
like Franco in Spain.
140
 The Second Vatican Council espoused individual rights and the 
                                                          
135
 Berger, “The Global Picture,” 79. 
136
 Vlas and Ghergina, “Where does a religion meet democracy? A comparative analysis of attitudes in 
Europe,”340-1. 
137
 Berger, “The Global Picture,” 80. 
138
 Vlas and Ghergina, “Where does a religion meet democracy? A comparative analysis of attitudes in 
Europe,”341. 
139
 Schimmelfennig and Schultz, “Legacies and Leverage: EU Political Conditionality and Democracy Promotion in 
Historical Perspective,”  447; Berger, “The Global Picture,” 80; Vlas and Ghergina, “Where does a religion meet 
democracy? A comparative analysis of attitudes in Europe,”344. 
140
 Daniel Philpott, “The Catholic Wave,” Journal of Democracy 15, no. 2 (April 2004): 37. 
66 
 
separation of church and state and the Catholic Church became proponents of democracy.
141
 
Philpot explores the implications of Catholicism in central and eastern Europe. He implies that 
the democratizing impact of Catholicism depends on the size of the catholic community. He cites 
the large role the church played in Poland and notes that more than 90% of the country identified 




The literature concerning democracy‟s compatibility with Islam is extensive, theoretically 
deep and very theological. The academic literature delves farther into Islam than the other three 
counterparts discussed. It is a contemporarily contentious issue due to the aforementioned events 
in the Middle East. The scholarly debate between Niklas Potrafke and Marek Hanush in the 
pages of Public Choice in 2012 and 2013 prove that the question of democracy‟s viability in 
Islamic countries is not settled.
143
 Some Arab scholars cite that there are inconsistencies between 
the basic principles of separation of religion and state and individual rights with some 
interpretations of Islamic law and teachings.
144
 Sometimes researchers gloss over them because 
democracy became “fashionable” in the 1980s.145 Güneş Murat Tezcür and others point out that 
many citizens may not understand democracy. They cited data from Vietnam, Egypt, Jordan and 
Iraq. Scholars speculate that citizens in emerging democracies have unrealistic expectations 
about it.
146
  This can lead to disappointment, frustration and skepticism in the notion of 
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 Additionally, Tezcür and his fellow scholars found that religious fervor in a state 
like Iran has an inverse relationship with attitudes about democracy.
148
 Scholars agree that Islam 
effects democratization and can make it a precarious proposition.
149
   
 International influences have a strong impact on central and eastern European regimes. 
This was especially true following the collapse of communism. Scholars reason that there are 
different combinations of outside influences that affect the region.  Neighboring states, modern 
Russia, the United States and NATO, and the European Union influence domestic affairs.
 150
 
These different actors affect politics, trade and security in the region. They also interact with 
each other. Relations between the West and Russia can place the region in the middle of larger 
geopolitical tensions and chess games. This complicates political life in central and eastern 
Europe. The most contemporary literature shows regimes balance improving their economies 
through trade and being aware of military and security matters. This can recreate a Cold War 
dynamic where countries in central and eastern Europe choose between being more pro-Western 
or more pro-Russian. This balance was greatly affected by two events: Vladimir Putin‟s rise to 
power and the initial foreign policy decisions of the Obama Administration.  
 The influence countries of the region have on one another markedly changed following 
the successful transition away from communism. Berglund and Dellenbrant noted a domino 
theory behind the spread of democracy and Huntington‟s idea of waves. Yet, much of this is 
absent in more recent politics within the region; between the states of central and eastern Europe. 
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There are completely different levels of priority afforded to regional politics by the different 
countries. Andrew Curry pointed out that “Poland may be the most assertive of all of the new EU 
countries in using its foreign aid budget to influence its neighbors.” He attributes this to Poland‟s 
long legacy as victims of invasion and foreign influence. He noted that Poland assisted 
democratic efforts in the Ukraine, Georgia and Belarus.
151
 Yet, András Rácz describes regional 
politics as a “limited priority” for Hungary. They limited their initial direct involvement to the 
countries of the Ukraine and Moldova. Most states concentrate their efforts within regional 
groups: the Visegrad Cooperation, the Eastern Partnership and the Danube Strategy.
152
 
Slovenia‟s foreign policy is similar, concentrating assistance efforts to the Western Balkans. This 
is due in great part to both the shared Yugoslavian history and current political fragility of the 
area.
153
 The influence the countries have on one another pale in comparison to that of Russia and 
the West. 
Immediately after the collapse of communism, central and eastern European countries 
received ample support from the West. There were large benefits to EU and NATO 
membership.
154
 Membership in the European Union equated to being civilized. Their return to 
Europe offered the states of the region to “catch up” to other European countries.155 The onset of 
accession for countries of central and eastern Europe offered a positive outlook for the future. 
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The recent Euro crisis hurt the image of the European Union in the region.
156
 The Euro is no 
longer a symbol of stability. The fiscal policies from the EU are undemocratic dictates.  
The specter of modern Russia looms large over many of the countries in central and 
eastern Europe. F. Stephen Larrabee points wrote that this has a geographic element. Countries 
close to Russia have a greater fear of Russian military might.
157
 Guido and Bromke pointed out 
the generational aspect of feelings towards communism and Russia.
158
 Most scholars attribute 
the increase in fear of Russian influence with Vladimir Putin‟s ascension to power.159 He began 
the reassertion of Russian power with the intervention in Georgia in 2008.
160
 Russia also seeks to 
redevelop their Cold War era spheres of influence using other means, specifically through oil 
trade. Various countries in the region have felt these commercial repercussions for resisting 
Russian influence and leaning towards Brussels and the West.
161
 These tactics yielded numerous 
Moscow-friendly governments on the periphery of Russia. Larrabee and Alex Palmer see this 
creation of buffer states one of their minor goals in regional hegemony.
162
  
 Security concerns over Russia as a “revisionist power”163 involve the region‟s 
relationship and perception of the NATO and the United States. The literature does not discuss 
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the military role of the EU in terms of defending members from a Russian threat. There are 
minor discussions about the outside agreements some member states forged with Russia. 
Larrabee alludes to Russia‟s growing ties with Germany.164  
Most scholars agree that much of the fear of Russia is wrought in the escalating doubt in 
U.S. and NATO resolve.
165
 They all allude to the cancelled missile defense commitment 
cancelled by U.S. President Barack Obama in 2009. The U.S. decided to deploy missile 
interceptors on naval ships in the vicinity instead. Undeterred by the change, Russian President 
Dimitri Medvedev announced increased radar systems and advanced warheads in the area of the 
Polish border.
166
 Countries in central and eastern Europe did not feel like the region was a 





Everything points to this concern as misplaced. First, the change to the missile defense 
program actually helps the governments of central and eastern Europe, as well as the United 
States. Second, the increased conventional American military presence does not support doubt in 
the U.S. commitment to the defense of the region. These two aspects of the situation reaffirm the 
traditional European reliance on American military might.  
The alterations to the U.S. missile defense plan serve two purposes. One is a foreign 
policy issue. The other is more military. From a foreign policy stand point, the move benefits the 
states of the region and the United States. The missiles will not be on foreign soil. Putin cannot 
allege a military threat. There won‟t be any domestic opposition.   The states of the region are 
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defended without much of the typical war of words. From a military standpoint, the United 
States is more comfortable and enjoys versatility. They remain in command of the missiles and 
fears of missile security or government stability in the host countries are assuaged. The missiles 
can also can be dispatched anywhere a guided missile destroyed can go.   
President Obama‟s pivot to Asia might have had all of the best intentions of refocusing 
U.S foreign policy to China. He felt that the Bush administration had been pre-occupied with 
other areas and other priorities.
168
 However, the Russian invasion of the Ukraine contributed to 
pre-empting it. America has a strong cultural connection to Europe. This yielded the largest 
American military deployment to Europe since the Cold War. NTO was the key. American 
ground forces were sent to Poland.
169
 NATO performed Operation Atlantic Resolve that included 
former Soviet satellites Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary and the Balkans. 170 Even the 
most loyal Soviet satellite, Bulgaria, received American troops.171 
The feelings are widespread affecting newer members and old alike. European specialists 
acknowledge a “democratic fatigue” in the EU.172 “Distance between Central Europe‟s new EU 
members and others has been growing,” wrote Ekiert. East-Central Europe thrives. The Balkans 
struggle. The Eastern Slavic countries ride a carousel between instability and authoritarian 
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 Fligstein and his colleagues note this with a major exception. They observed that already 




 Most researchers agree that Diamond‟s democratic recession175 is real and global. 
Several scholars noted that countries in different parts of the world backslid away from 
democracy. Francis Fukuyama wrote that authoritarianism was on the march in 2014.
176
  There 
are several different explanations for the incidents of illiberal democracy, hybrid regimes and 
higher levels of authoritarianism in central and eastern Europe. This backsliding occurs in two 
different ways. First, it occurs in the nature of the EU structure. Mihai Dinescu defines the 
democratic deficit in the EU as “growing with the extension of competencies and prerogatives, 
which Brussels claims from national capitals in a constantly larger number of policy 
domains.”177 Peter Vesterdorf stated that “It [the EU] often replaces national legislation and 
edges National Parliaments out of the game.”178 The second manner of backsliding occurs when 
member states depart from EU expectations and norms. These two phenomena drive differing 
schools of analysis on the topic.  
A major failed assumption was that EU membership was the best way to democratize 
central and eastern Europe. Jürgen Habermas wrote extensively about the topic, noting that 
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“there has always been a democratic deficit” in the EU. The capitals of Europe wanted the EU 
more than the people of their countries.
179
 His work noted the large initial economic interests 
behind forming and expanding the EU and how the political aspects of it floundered from 
neglect. This created vexing issues for Brussels. First, many see the Union as lacking legitimacy. 
Second, the heralded economic benefits for many have soured as there are deadlocks between 
member state governments and central bodies of the EU.   
Richard Rosseau supports Habermas‟ assertion that the EU had legitimacy issues from 
the start.
180
 Rosseau and Viven A. Schmidt share Fritz Scharpf‟s definition of legitimacy. It is 
either input legitimation (government by the people) or output legitimation (government for the 
people).
181
 Rosseau wrote that despite how scholars analyze the Union, it has legitimacy.
182
 
Schmidt wrote in a different voice that throughput, what happens between the democratic input 
and output, tells a different story.
183
  In two different pieces, Schmidt examined the EU structure 
and cited several disconnects from theoretical legitimacy and the true reality of representation in 
the Union. Members lack equality on the European Council. Germany and other larger more 
affluent countries hold sway.
184
 The European Parliament is shut out of much what goes on when 
heads of state or the high level EU appointees strike agreements behind closed doors.
185
 Jens-
Peter Bonde noted that in 49 different areas, authority and control moved away from member 
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capitals to the supranational EU level.
186
 He highlighted the fact that there are 90,000 rules that 
voters can do nothing about. Even their elected European Parliament members are powerless to 
act on many of them.
187
  
The faulty structure of the EU hampers the development of a modern European identity. 
Habermas points out that this is one of the chief criticisms of the EU: there is “no demos”; no 
common people.
188
 They claim the EU is “built on sand.”189 The subsequent effect of the EU 
structure is that European‟s do not feel important. This keeps voter turnout low. Habermas and 
Schmidt see political involvement is imperative for the formation of a different national identity 
for the EU.
190
 European citizens need to forge a new identity through developing a European 
civic society, building a politically oriented public and creating a political culture. This will 
enable Europeans to form political parties across state borders, create a belief in a democratic EU 
process and learn to live with differences amongst other nations and states.
191
 Habermas 
envisions this as a post nationalist democracy.
192
  
 This could resolve many of the deadlocks between the European capitals and the EU 
leadership. The early economic prospects and coordination clash with the current lack of political 
integration. Attila Agh cited economic woes for the ebb of democracy in the EU and the region. 
He wrote that the three consecutive crises account for backsliding in central and eastern Europe. 
First, there was a transformation recession. A post EU Accession crisis followed. The global 
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economic crisis completed the triumvirate.
193
 Agh‟s explanation is very popular. Habermas, 
however, refers to the EU structure again. He wrote that the crisis exposed major flaws in the 
EU. First, The EU had no regulatory capacities.
194
 Second, the EU only controls half of its 
member‟s economies: monetary policy. National parliaments still control fiscal policy. 
Governments are walking a tightrope of free markets, social security and public debt.
195
 
Habermas advocates further integration to resolve this and most issues.  
Problems from a lack of political integration are not only economic. A failure to 
adequately address other areas of policy allowed some undemocratic institutions and practices to 
continue, contrary to EU principles. Some of the states in central and eastern Europe had bad 
starts on the path to democracy and very troubled pasts. Othon Anastasakis wrote that transition 
decisions caused instability in some areas of former Soviet rule. These states had illiberal starts 
and strong communist pasts and suffered sustained democratic deficits.
196
 Transition decisions 
propelled this political legacy. In other situations, domestic factors (often rooted in history) 
created variations in approaches and solutions to problems. In this regard, the literature points to 
three concepts. First, history matters. Second, perhaps Ekiert and Ziblatt were more correct than 
they thought. Not only did states pause along their paths to democracy, but during accession to 
the EU as well. This leads to the third idea: Ekiert and Ziblatt‟s institutional mimicry. Cirtautas 
and Schimmelfennig pointed out that EU enlargement lost momentum. Member states were left 
to deal with crises and problems on their own. Their separate histories shaped their decisions 
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absent EU enticements. Pop-Eleches wrote that researchers neglect post-communist legacies in 
this respect.
197
   
The rush to enlarge the Union is also suspect in a decline of democratic ideals in some 
member states. Problems existed in these fledging states before EU accession and were simply 
covered by what Alina Mungiu-Pippidi called “the EU “anesthetic”.198 Then, it was too late.  
Rupnik and Zielonka agree with Mungiu-Pippidi‟s assertion that the EU lost leverage and control 
over states after accession.
199
 EU influence weakens without these domestic reforms.
200
 Agh 
wrote that several changes implemented to gain membership were not operational. They were 
simply changes; boxes to check. The post accession result was what Venelin Ganev called 
“hooliganism”. Ruling elites chose to violate established norms.201 This is characterized by 
government cronyism, corruption and suppression of the media.
202
 This is only one product of 
backsliding the region has experienced. 
Conclusions 
 The literature on the state of democracy in central and eastern Europe illustrates a 
politically evolving region with a very unique political and cultural history, subject to many 
different factors. Close study revealed that democracy is not a monolith. It has several strains, 
forms and fashions. Measuring it can be easily done using equations and computers. Accurately 
measuring it requires other, sometimes less quantifiable information. Furthermore, events in 
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central and eastern Europe require historical and cultural context. The literature illustrates that 
this is probably true for most regions of the globe.   
There are tentative debates about the difference between democracy in a classical sense, a 
modern European democracy in a contemporary sense and the role the EU will play in central 
and eastern Europe. Dahl provides a neat and packaged definition of democracy. Yet, this is in a 
more classical sense. Despite being far from parsimonious, it also does not address many modern 
realities of global politics. Habermas‟ and Schmidt‟s contributions take a discussion of modern 
European democracy to a more complete conclusion. The problems with transparency in 
Schmidt‟s research into throughput legitimation illustrate the problems in developing a modern 
European identity needed to achieve Habermas‟ post-nationalist democracy. This civic identity 
provides the EU with a demos.   
Most mainstream measurements of democracy are inundated with empirical, 
mathematical data. Many of the conclusions depend largely on modernization theory. The 
literature makes very valid arguments against these measures. Whether it is per capita gross 
domestic product or income inequality, this information needs some context. Information on 
regional culture and history enhance models. Yet, alone they too are faulty. No one empirical 
factor or cultural aspect is deterministic.  The two schools of research need to be combined for 
the best assessment about political life. 
Determinants of democracy vary region to region and, sometimes, within regions. There 
are several different factors: internal political history, neighboring states, global trends and 
external forces. This demands democracy development account for individual histories. 
Memories can be powerful. Geography can be a strong factor. Regional events can pressure 
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governments and motivate domestic political groups. Changes in the global economy can 
manifest tensions or assuage fears. External forces can offer aspirational goals, instill fear or 
provide stability.   
The best research methodology accounting for the differing levels of democracy in 
central and eastern Europe is one that is regionally specific. The literature illustrates that the 
region is different from others elsewhere in the world. The states that comprise the area are very 
diverse. They have different languages, religions, and heritages. A methodology seeking to 
explain political difference in these states needs to include and incorporate the different histories, 





The research question of this work is “does history, culture, and geography effect post-
communist democracy in central and eastern Europe?" The study used a combination of methods 
and a regional approach. The lion‟s share of research and data deals with history, culture and 
geography. These are qualitatively assessed. There are a limited number of factors used to help 
measure democracy that are quantitative. It attempts to avoid either extreme posed by the 
arguments Bunce highlighted: completely relying on empirical data or material from simple area 
studies. It includes analysis of certain aspects important to political life specific to the region. 
These might not be as important elsewhere. Yet, it also incorporates a limited number of 
variables that political science researchers use in assessing states globally.  
 This approach is based on a combination of different theoretical approaches and 
assessments: Dahl, Rokkan and Teorell. Dahl‟s definition lays the foundation for a useable 
criterion to examine the quality of democracy. Teorell interjects ideas about the role of 
economics and democracy. The work analyzed case study subjects according to the assembled 
criterion of democracy. Then, it reviews their different aspects of history, culture and geography. 
Rokkan‟s work established that these different variations in society effect government and 
politics. This illustrates any impact that history, culture and geography have on democracy.  
This paper purposefully does not do a number of things. First, it does not look to establish 
a set of specific variables to explain the quality of democracy to be used in other places. The 
work uses a regional approach. However, Rokkan‟s different aspects of culture, history and 
territory might be useful to future researchers. The countries of Southeast Asia might 
operationalize the aspect of geography by their proximity to China. The countries of South 
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America might include the role indigenous Indians into an assessment of their culture. The same 
can be said about the role of the European Union. There are few other organizations like it in the 
world. Yet, there are minor similarities to ASEAN and the African Union. These are decisions 
for others to make.  
The work also does not attempt to reformulate a numeric measure or quantitative scale 
for democracy. The work seeks to illustrate democratic differences due to a set of factors; not 
estimate the exact amount of difference. It embraces the idea of democracy‟s relative nature and 
seeks to incorporate the unquantifiable. Democracies will be compared to one another and the 
general conditions of the region, not placed on a scale. It also does not attempt to assess 
democracy in the region compared to the rest of the world.   
The methodology of this work contains three subsequent parts. First, it establishes 
criterion to analyze democracy. This uses a combination of works from the literature review with 
Dahl‟s definition of democracy as a basis. This section also establishes different criterion to 
research the impact that history, culture and geography have on post-Communist governments in 
the region. It is a Rokkansian approach that draws on specific theories related to the political 
roles of history, culture and geography. Next, it presents various hypotheses to be tested and 
measured. Finally, it discusses and presents three countries of the region for subsequent case 








O‟Donnell and Schmitter wrote that “elections equal democracy.”1 However, elections 
are simply one of a variety of conditions required for democracy. True liberal democracy is not 
about the singular event of voting and holding elections. Dahl educates us that, in its truest form, 
democracy is more about conditions and different concurrent institutions. Democracy is 
impossible without multiple political parties. These parties cannot truly operate without a free 
press and methods of expression. This educates and informs an electorate made of responsible 
adults.
2
 The ability to vote is yet another aspect. Then, the nature of elections is a question. 
Liberal democracy demands a certain level of competition and contention. Second, the depth and 
width of voting rights matter. Finally, without a peaceful transition of power, the system fails. 
This work does not seek to create the ever allusive absolute definition of democracy. It 
combines several notions of democracy and creates criteria to measure it in a relative manner. It 
assumes that no country is a completely free and liberal state. Central and eastern Europe is no 
exception. The research seeks to explain differences in democratic conditions. Are there 
differences in who can vote? Why? Are there free and fair elections? If not, how are they unfair? 
Why are they unfair? Are the factors of history, culture or geography the cause of any of this? 
 The criterion is assembled from Dahl‟s ideas in Polyarchy, Habermas‟ regionally specific 
work and Teorell‟s observations of the role economics plays in political systems. Dahl and 
Habermas furnish the appropriate philosophical material and structural benchmarks. Dahl 
provides a broad view and observations about the general practice of liberal democracy. 
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Habermas contributes a modern European context to the concept.  Teorell injects some of the 
economic realities of globalism felt by populations and governments. The conditions of rights 
and freedoms in the modern states of central and eastern Europe can be assessed using the 
subsequent criteria.   
This study incorporates the aspects of Dahl‟s broad definition of democracy to analyze 
the status of current post-communist states of central and eastern Europe. Dahl wrote that there 
were eight different “requirements for democracy among a large number of people.” These eight 
structural requirements are: 
1. The freedom to form and join organizations 
2. Freedom of expression 
3. Right to vote 
4. Eligibility for public office 
5. Right of political leaders to compete for support 
5a. Right of political leaders to compete for votes 
6. Alternative sources for information 
7. Free and fair elections 




Most researchers agree that these requirements are the bare essentials to a truly free, liberal 
democratic government. 
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 More specifically for European Union countries, their involvement in EU politics, 
participation in EU Parliamentary elections, is an important facet of modern European 
democracy. It is true that EU membership led to the sacrifice of some sovereignty on the part of 
the capitals of Europe. Europeans still have a voice in Brussels. This is achieved by participating 
in the elections for their own heads of state that comprise the European Council and their 
representatives in the European Parliament.  
While democracy is a global phenomenon, it has a regional aspect, as well. The 
democratic deficit highlighted by Dinescu, Vesterdorf, Rousseau and Schmidt is a structural 
issue for the countries of the region and the entire EU. The disconnect from Dahl‟s portents of 
democracy and the EU structure occurs in relation to his last point: institutions for making 
policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference. This is evidenced further by 
Schmidt‟s observations on throughput and Bonde‟s noted 90,000 rules that Europeans can 
seemingly do nothing about. This causes low voter turnout.  
 Habermas contributes an essential aspect to this study‟s by citing the imperative of 
political involvement.  Increased involvement will forge a new European identity. In relation to 
Dahl‟s broader points about democracy, his eight points will apply to the larger union and not 
just their sovereign members. Hypothetically, political parties will form of people from different 
states. Supporters of large causes will include people from different countries. Habermas‟ post-
national democracy will form. Democracy will be in practice, blind to EU member state borders. 
   Another important facet of democracy is the general economic condition of a country 
over time. This is can be an important factor in politics. Economic health and wealth is far from 
the ultimate barometer of freedom and rights. China is a trading juggernaut and is far from a 
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democracy. Many of the richest countries of the Middle East treat women as second class 
citizens or property.  (These situations can be addressed by another factor relating to liberal 
democracy covered in this research: culture.) However, the poor economic conditions over time 
can lead to stress and strain on a liberal democratic system.  
Some of the established definitions of democracy fail to acknowledge the role of 
economics. These definitions treat democracy as a noun. Both modernization theory and 
dependency theory dealt with income and capitalism in terms of democratization. Teorell 
encapsulated the reality of globalization. While, poor countries are not always authoritarian, 
becoming poorer can lead to it. In this regard, relative economic health is important to 
democracy. This explains the popularity and widespread support enjoyed by modernization and 
dependency theory in the past. It also illustrates the different role that economics plays in 
democracy in the globalized world.  
In summary, this study uses criterion wrought from the combination of Dahl, Habermas 
and Teorell to illustrate the differences in the quality of rights and freedoms in the former 
communist states of central and eastern Europe. Dahl presented a widely accepted model of 
democracy that is applicable most anywhere in the globe. Habermas presented solutions to the 
structural issues presented to the countries of the continent that are members of the EU. Teorell 
dealt with the economic impact of globalization on the politics. Dahl‟s structure, Habermas‟ 
political participation and Teorell‟s economics present an adequate tool in looking at the politics 





Figure 3. Operationalized Democratic Criteria 
Field of Assessment  Criteria 
Right to form and join political parties and 
interest groups. 
Are there any laws forbidding certain political 
groups from forming? 
Freedom of Speech and Expression What protests are permitted? Are there 
restrictions on press, Internet or other media? 
Right to Vote Who votes? 18 and older? Men and Women? 
Are citizens of all races or religions allowed to 
vote? 
Eligibility for Public Office What restraints are there on holding office? 
Right of political leaders to compete for 
support/votes 
Is there any systematic repression of 
opposition leaders (imprisonment, etc.)? 
Alternative sources of information Is there a viewpoint opposing the 
government‟s available? Is there Internet 
freedom? Are certain languages banned? Who 
controls television and radio? 
Free and fair elections Is there voter intimidation? Domestically, who 
declares elections valid? 
Institutions for making government policies 
depend on votes and other expressions of 
preference 
Who is elected?  
Political participation in the European Union Is there higher than average participation in EU 
elections? What is the government‟s role in 
this? 
General Economic Conditions over Time GDP Growth and GINI Change over Time 
   
 
History 
Incorporating history into the methodology of the study is important because of the 
intensely turbulent history of the region. Rokkan cited that history affected the impact of more 
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contemporary forces in the development of government.
4
  This part of the globe witnessed the 
start of two world wars with the rise of communism in different countries after each one, the first 
in 1917 and the second in 1945. Prior to this, many of the current states were holdings or part of 
far flung empires or repressive, non-democratic regimes of various types. This history helps 
explain why different forms of democracy evolved after much of the area achieved true self-
determination.  
The states of central and eastern Europe experienced many different forms and fashion of 
rule before the collapse of communism. Researching the different political systems in the states 
of the region and the events that yielded them are important to current levels of democracy in 
these states today. Before the First World War, some states were parts of large empires. Others 
were smaller monarchies. Some countries were run by different unstable combinations. An 
entirely different patchwork quilt of comparable varieties occupied the states of central and 
eastern Europe following the Second World War. While Soviet domination was a common 
characteristic of rule after the wars, it took different shapes in some countries. Their post-
communist governments had similar differences, as well. There are four distinct different eras in 
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Figure 4. Historical Criteria 
Political Eras of the Region Criterion 
Pre-First World War What type of government?  
Interwar Governments What type of government? 
Communist Rule Length of Communist Rule. Nature of 
Communist Rule. 
Post-Communist Rule References to Pre-Communist Antecedents. 




 The first political era, Pre- First World War, saw little government by the people in 
central and eastern Europe. Many of the modern states did not exist in the period. Parts, portions 
or the whole of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Serbia, Slovakia and Romania lay within 
the borders of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Ottoman Empire held some of the same 
territory intermittently within the previous 50 years. This dynastic control affects the culture of 
the modern state today.  
 The interwar governments of the era following the First World War were the first 
opportunity for many of these states to exercise self-government. The victorious Allies created 
some of the states in the region from the remnants of the defeated Austro-Hungarian Empire. The 
period was relatively unstable.  Various small wars between countries of the region 
honeycombed the period. Politically, a small number of countries had some success in liberal 
democratic government. Some started as liberal democracies only to fall under authoritarian 
regimes.  Notably, Czechoslovakia was exceptionally successful at establishing a resilient 
democratic government.  
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 The analysis of the communist rule of the states of central and eastern Europe is a more 
complicated endeavor. The states of the region experienced different communisms. First, the 
duration of communist rule varied. Some became communist after the First World War and 
others after the Second World War. Bunce wrote that states ruled by communism for longer 
periods are more tolerant of lower levels of democracy.
5
 Second, the states experienced different 
levels of systematic oppression internally under communist rule. This refers to the nature of 
communist rule. There was more than a cosmetic difference between Ceauşescu„s Romania and 
Tito‟s Yugoslavia. Late in the communist era, Polish leaders were blasted by Ceauşescu and 
Honecker for allowing liberal reforms. There were differences between regimes, their ideologies 
and their relationships with Moscow.  
 The final era of political history is post-communist rule. The literature review revealed a 
consensus that the pre-Second World War politics helped mold the political landscape after 
communism. This is the basis from Eikert and Ziblatt‟s proposal that democratization in these 
states started after the First World War and continues despite being interrupted by communism. 
Kopstein agrees with them. Some states politically reverted to “critical antecedents” or 
“institutional mimicry”6, referring to what they historically knew. Some of the same pre-World 
War Two parties formed. Many of the same institutions evolved. Some of the produced regimes 
are still in place. This involves the different decisions made in relation to political and economic 
framework. An important aspect is also EU membership, NATO membership and the states‟ 
relationships with Russia. The democratic level of these current governments is the topic of the 
research.    
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 It is important to understand that the role history plays in democracy, politics and 
government in the region is not always positive. History‟s power is subject to one universal 
constraint: memory. The generation that survived of the Second World War is slowly dying off. 
Many people in the region who lived through communism and Soviet domination have retired 
from public life. Few people under the age of 30 remember either period. This generational 
amnesia provides fertile ground for some of the same far right and far left political ideology of 
that characterized Europe in the early 20
th
 century. The ideas of isolationism, nationalism and, in 
some cases, xenophobia are popular with many.  These are generally found in the eurosceptic 
parties. Even some mainstream political parties in Europe seem to be migrating back to the 
politics of eras past. Notions of a “Fortress Europe”, the United Kingdom‟s “Splendid 
Isolationism” and perceived threats to “Polishness” are examples.  
Culture 
 Examining the cultural differences in the states of central and eastern Europe is important 
in helping explain their different levels of rights and freedoms. The region offers a very diverse 
group of peoples living among different states with vastly varying cultures. Few other regions in 
the world have a more dense population that is more culturally heterogeneous. Bunce notes this 
extensively. This supports taking a regional approach to the area. Culture is made up of a number 
of things: cuisine, language, music and religion to name a few.  This work draws on Rokkan and 
Bromke to set criteria to research and analyze culture‟s political impact.   
Religion, language and ethnicity collectively impact the level of liberal democracy in the 
region. In many states, these different aspects of culture have the strongest impact. Rokkan chose 
to use language and religion as the primary sources for studying the effect culture has on 
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government and politics. He noted that the two were important in the culturally based policies of 
governments.
7
 Bromke pointed out that large minorities were a factor immediately after 
communism. Ethnic diversity persists as a political factor in many of the countries. 
 Religion remains one of the strongest unifying and divisive factors in central and eastern 
European life.  All three Abrahamic religions are represented. It serves as the crossroads for 
Christianity and Islam. It sits between the two ancient Christian churches, Roman Catholic and 
Eastern Orthodox.  It is home to millions of Jews. It borders Germany, the home of the Protestant 
Reformation.  Many countries are religiously homogenous and at peace. Others are religiously 
diverse and much the same. However, some states experience contemporary tensions from age 
old religious wars. The states of the former Yugoslavia contend with animosities dating back as 





Religious beliefs help mold domestic policies in central and eastern Europe. It is one of 
the strongest social institutions remaining after the fall of atheistic communism. Rokkan alludes 
to the relationship “the church” has to the government in his discussion of nation-building in 
Western Europe.
9
 Select works of Philpot, Bergen and others who deal with contemporary 
religion and democracy. Many of their themes are seen operationalized in this respect. Religion 
affects many different types of laws by serving as part of its moral foundation. It helps form 
social policy, like abortion. It informs an essential aspect of the judicial systems of the region.  
Religious beliefs are evident in the extension of voting rights and rights of minorities.   
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The literature review presented different aspects of the debate over the role religion plays 
in democracy. Religion and its relation to government and politics is a rather popular subject 
today because of the more recent wars and military options in the Middle East. Islam is a 
primary, popular focus. The literature review offered beneficial secondary research: the 
comparisons of the different denominational families of Christianity. In terms of this study, a 
comparison of Catholicism, Protestantism and Orthodoxy are important. A vast majority of the 
population in the region is Christian.  
Minorities of different varieties play a very important part in the democratic process in 
the states of central and eastern Europe. Many of the states were left with very large minorities 
following the collapse of communism. The policies towards these groups by the newly birthed 
democratic regimes varied from state to state. Some states opted to treat them as citizens first and 
relegated ethnicity in the name of providing universal rights to all citizens. Others states did not 
prioritize rights and freedoms. These states were susceptible to ethnic fragmentation and even 
scapegoating in the subsequent years.  
This is also an important aspect to the role ethnicity plays and the larger topic of culture 
is language.  Rokkan‟s analysis feeds into Dahl‟s democratic principles in interesting fashion. 
Rokkan notes that there tend to be three different ways governments deal with multilingualism. 
States can declare a national language and ban others, passively declare a national language 
without suppressing others or embrace multilingualism.
10
 This is vital to the model of democracy 
Dahl‟s sketches. The ability to communicate, campaign and engage in political discourse is 
essential to liberal democracy. Forbidding a certain language or alternatives to a national 
language would be antithetical. Citizens have the right to express themselves and form and join 
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political groups in Dahl‟s democracy. Candidates also have the right to compete for support. 
Much of this is achieved by providing and accessing information. Much of Dahl‟s portrait of 
liberal democracy is impossible with an institutionalized language barrier.  
 
Figure 5. Cultural Criteria 
Aspects of Culture Impacting 
Democracy 
Criterion 
Religion Toleration. Dominant Principles. Church-
State Relations. 
Ethnicity Minority Rights: Economic and Political… 
Voting rights, Employment Discrimination,  
Hate Crime Laws 




 Geography in select fashions affects the quality of democracy in central and eastern 
Europe. Broadly speaking, the notion of geography became popular in the Cold War era with the 
ballyhooed concept of Domino Theory. This idea of a political concept spreading continued as 
analysts, historians and politicians fashioned theories around an updated concept: the contagion. 
While the terms “Domino Theory” and “contagion” might seem recent additions to the lexicon of 
political science, the term is not as new as it seems. Rokkan discussed the concept of territory in 
relation to the formation of modern Western Europe in terms of democratic consolidation. This, 
of course, pre-dates Cold War literature about the spread of communism.  Subsequent 




 The Literature Review revealed that there are different theories about geography and the 
level of democracy in central and eastern Europe. This takes shape in several different ways. 
First, the states of the region face an aged old dilemma. While a residually strong Putinist Russia 
stands at its doorstep, Brussels and the European Union also try to exert influence. These two 
competing forces wage geopolitical war over what could be described as the region‟s soul. This 
forms an East-West dynamic. A closer relationship with the EU, its members and further 
integration into the European experiment offer great benefits.  
This stands true in terms of commerce, but also democratic quality. The economic benefit 
is well established. The political benefits for citizens for EU member states is not always clear. 
There are difficulties. The EU is still, in many ways,  a work in progress. Access to the affluence 
of the European market as a member state came with prerequisite directives. These directives 
had to be met to the satisfaction of Brussels before membership was granted. There are several 
aspects that some members continue to improve on, but this is the nature of the EU state. 
Membership is conditional and aspirational even if it is already operational. In terms of 
democratic rights and freedoms, accession to the EU benefited democratic quality and 
membership helps ensure it.  
The other side of the paradigm is Putinist Russia. There are some very contemporary 
things to consider when analyzing Russian relations with central and eastern European states: 
trade, especially in energy, and military threat. There are also parts of the relationships that bleed 
into other areas of history and culture. Addressing the contemporary aspects, Russia is a large 
trading partner with many in the region. This is especially true in the trade in natural gas and oil. 
While this relationship is symbiotic, it is important to note the political leverage this give Putin 
and the oligarchs in Moscow. This is unfortunate for the relationship with the EU since Russia 
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sees the EU as representative of a West it does not trust. Putin uses Russia‟s economic leverage 
and military threat to create a Cold War-like set of buffer states around Russia‟s periphery.11 He 
has punished some states for failing to support Russian interests. The military threat is obvious, 
especially after the annexation of the Crimea and the American retrenchment.
12
  
The second political of geography is the deeper, unilateral relationships the countries of 
the region have with Moscow. This is a strange collection of cognitions from different groups in 
the region. First, there are large Russian minorities in some states. Many of these minorities 
embrace Russia as their homeland, while living in neighboring countries of eastern Europe. 
Second, there are still dark memories of Soviet domination, gulags and life under communism. 
This is seen in the citizens of the states that are old enough to remember life in Soviet satellites. 
This apprehension can also hurt relationships in the region. Third, there are some non-Russians 
that feel cultural ties with Russia. Many speak Russian and practice Eastern Orthodoxy. This 
latter aspect alone affects democratic rights and freedoms in an adverse manner.  The consensus 
is that certain aspects of Eastern Orthodoxy hamper democratic development. This is evidenced 
by various traits of the religion. They do not allow female priests. Orthodox dioceses are also 
very nationalistic in nature. They lack a linguistic toleration. (The services are in the specific 
languages.) Orthodox churches are specifically non-Western.  
The final democratic impact of geography is Miller‟s notion of democratic contagion.13 
The first two of these is highly regional. The East-West notion is based on the nature of 
Orthodox Christianity and regional history. This religion and political history of domination is 
rather rare outside of central and eastern Europe. The idea of distance to the Soviet Union/Russia 
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is both regional and temporal. Note that Finnish democracy remained intact for decades, even 
thru the Cold War and borders Russia. Additionally, Russia has not always been the threat they 
represented under Soviet communism or the threat they represent today under Vladimir Putin. 
Finally, not every country east of Europe is less democratic, of course. Several states including 
the largest democracy in the world lie to the right of Europe on a map.  
 The final theory behind democratic quality in central and eastern Europe is Miller‟s 
Democratic contagion idea. Many researchers used this to explain the spread of democracy in the 
final days of communism. Berglund and Dellenbrant agreed.
14
 The question is if the theory 
applies to countries of the region more than two decades later. The spread of higher levels of 
rights and freedoms continues but at an inconsistent rate. Much of this is now done through the 
European Union when it occurs. The negotiating format, dissimilar parliamentary composition 
and different political priorities in spreading EU principles help account for the asymmetrical 
spread.    
Figure 6. Geographic Criteria 
Geography Criterion 




Relations with Russia, 
including the related 
threat 
Democratic Contagion Look at Neighboring 
States‟ policies.  
 
Hypotheses  
 Central and Eastern Europe has a very unique history. It was part of the Roman Empire 
and later overrun by Barbarians in Classic Antiquity. It was sliced, portioned and traded by the 
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kings and queens of early Europe. The region was invaded by Muslim Turks.  It reverted back to 
the empires of Europe. It furnished the spark that started the First World War. It was conquered 
by Germany in World War Two and was dismantled by an agreement between Allies following 
the war. Then, it existed under communist rule for forty years. Now, these states turn to 
democracy.  
 The region offers a very unique set of questions pertaining to democracy. Is the current 
quality of democracy in central and eastern Europe affected by the history before the First World 
War? or the Second? Does the duration or nature of communist rule have an impact on 
contemporary politics in the states of the region? How consistent is the impact of these forces 
across different states? If it is not consistent, why not? While history helps shape states, 
governments and peoples everywhere, this work endeavors to two tests hypotheses about central 
and eastern Europe: 
H1: The earlier democracy is achieved historically, the stronger the post-communist 
democracy in the region. The region democratized in two different groups: the initial 
states that emerged democratic shortly after communism collapsed and another group 
later.
15
 . Bunce said that states that experienced longer periods of communist rule are the 
more tolerant of lower levels of democracy.
16
 Ekiert and Ziblatt‟s contention of a 
continuous movement towards democracy support this.
17
  Logically, the sooner a country 
shed communism and continued their move towards democracy the stronger it would be.  
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H2: The level of former communist oppression does not appear to affect the quality of 
liberal rights and democratic quality in the region. There were major differences in the 
communist regimes across the region.
18
 Many even changed over time.  Miller wrote that 
high levels of oppression hampered the transition of democracy.
19
 This also connects to 
the psychological impact of Bunce‟s notion of duration.  
The research looked at specific political policies, practices and institutions in relation to 
democracy and the countries‟ histories. There is, of course, a general relation to history and 
political systems. The past is part of the evolution of any country‟s political system. The study  
looked at how specific differences in democracy can be traced to historical relationships and 
events and shocks specific to each country. For example, is there a seminal event in history that 
helped shape laws on voting in a specific state? Is there a traditional animosity with another 
group that affords them a lower level of democracy?  The work seeks to explain how much 
history matters to democracy in central and eastern Europe. 
The history of the region created a culture that is as diverse as any in the world. Central 
and eastern Europe is a combination of more than ten different peoples and nations, with a 
similar number of languages all living amongst one another in the different states. Three of the 
five major religions in the world have substantial populations in the region. Central and eastern 
Europe is a unique opportunity to study how different people can live with alongside each other 
successfully and unsuccessfully. Contemporarily, migration has contributed to the discussion of 
culture in the region.  
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 These facts make it basically impossible to make generalizations about religion in central 
and eastern Europe. Several questions emerge. Does religious homogeneity aid democracy? If 
there is religious homogeneity, do the facts support past work about the positive effect of 
Western religions? Does diversity impact democracy? If it does, are there consistent exceptions 
across multiple states? Finally, with the Internet, cell phones and international media 
conglomerates, does language matter like it used to? This study researched three hypotheses 
about the impact of ethnicity:  
H3: Western religions tend to promote a higher quality of democracy in the region.  This 
question pertains to the states of the region that widely practice Catholicism and 
Protestant Christianity. It further investigates Vlas and Ghergina‟s contention that the 
relationship between Christianity and democracy is “often taken for granted”.20 Modern 
democracy began in Western Europe.
21
 Many in central and eastern Europe practice the 
same religions with different democratic rights. Is there causation? 
 
H4: Western ethnic heterogeneity has no effect on post-communist democracy in the 
region, while the presence of non-Western minorities does. This is a new and different 
theory. Most researchers look at homogeneity in a vacuum. This study analyzes the role 
that non-western minorities have on democracy. The purpose is to see the political and 
legal reaction to migration in the region and potential backsliding.  
The study seeks specific laws in the countries of region and traces their relationship to 
culture. The research delved into the motivations behind regulations placed on language use. It 
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reviewed  government policies on both diversity and hate crimes. It examined any faith-based 
laws or policies. It questioned how much culture impacts laws, rights and privileges in the 
central and eastern Europe. 
Geography plays a prominent role in the political history of central and eastern Europe. It 
defined the intensity of threat from land invasions; from the various conquerors throughout the 
ages. Many say that it played a part in the collapse of communism. Today, it plays a role in 
international trade and relations between the rest of Europe, the United States and Russia. While 
the Cold War relationships changed, is there a comparable dynamic: East versus West? Do the 
states of the region find themselves “caught in the middle”? Is there a larger East/West paradigm 
that is at work? If this is true, what does this mean to the notion of political contagion? If such a 
contagion exists, what does it mean to democracy within the region, excluding outsiders, namely 
Brussels and Moscow?   
H5: Relations with Russia have little to do with the quality of democracy in the region. 
The traditional relationships between Russia and some central and eastern European 
states are strong. However, there are some scholars that argue the pre-1940s political 
history matters more.
22
 This leads to question the impact of EU membership. A break 
from the traditional subservient role to the Russians would be historic for many countries 
in central and eastern Europe. 
 
H6: Democracy spread through parts of the region like a contagion, but now this type of 
effect is sporadic. Looking at the first group of emerged democracies Bunce named, there 
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is a good case to be made for the contagion argument.
23
  Perhaps EU accession is the 
terminus of the contagion. Perhaps, these states can be referred to as mature democracies. 
The advancement of rights and freedoms comes in the hand of domestic pressure, 
international trends from international organizations like NATO, the UN and the EU. 
However, there can be arguments made for illiberal contagions.
24
  
The specific impact of geography on rights and freedoms is more difficult to clearly see. The 
Russian aspect of geography can be assessed through foreign policy and the treatment Russian 
minorities. More important democratically is the government‟s reaction to domestic opinions 
about affairs with Russia.  The impact of an East-West paradigm can be read through policy 
towards the EU, NATO and Russia and to public sentiment. Voter sentiment is evident in the 
notion of contagion, as well. States often mimic their neighbors for a variety of reasons. This is 
especially true in a region with widespread viewership of international news, an unfettered 
Internet and open borders.   
This research examines select states of central and eastern Europe and determine the 
effect that history, culture and geography have on the quality of democracy. The analysis is 
based on he works of Dahl, Rokkan, and Teorell. Each contributes to a mixed criterion of 
democracy. The work then looks at history, culture and geography to explain the differences in 
democratic quality. It seeks to review theories found in the established literature, ideas formed 
from recent scholarship and historically held notions. It explains that the history, culture and 
geography of the states of central and eastern Europe help account for the difference in 
democracy in the states of the region.  
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Selection of Case Studies 
 The diversity of central and eastern Europe is well established. Selecting three countries 
to serve as a representative cross section of the region is challenging. Many have sizeable 
minorities.  Countries in the region include states that fought on both sides of both World Wars. 
This primes one‟s focus to the political. None of the states had democracy before the First World 
War. Only a few had any success with it afterwards. Some states were established after World 
War One. Others were created after World War Two.  Some gained independence in the 1990s. 
Economically, the region is a mosaic of successes and failures.  
 Poland is an obvious choice for a case study. They are arguably the fourth power in the 
European Union. It has the sixth largest population with 38M people.
25
 It is also large: over 
300,000 square kilometers.
26
 They are the largest and most populous in central and eastern 
Europe.  They have the healthiest economy in the region and one of the healthier in the EU. The 
country has a tragic history until the late twentieth century. After the First World War, their 
attempt at democracy was an unstable failure. Then, they were invaded by Germany. After the 
war, they fell under Soviet domination.  Poland offered the world most of the first images of 
opposition to Moscow. Unusual for the region, Poland is largely homogenous. Demographically, 
the country is very Polish and very Catholic.   
 Hungary has a far different history. The country existed as part of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire and fought on the side of Imperial Germany. During the Second World War, the country 
aligned itself with the Nazis. Communism followed. Today, the country is largely Hungarian. It 
is 37% Catholic. Other religions make up the reminder with 27% not specifying a denomination. 




 World Bank 
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It is an economically stable state.
27
 While similar to Poland in many ways, their politics took a 
nationalist veer. The government faces widespread criticism due to its policy towards domestic 
opposition, minorities and immigration.  
 Bulgaria is a solid choice for a case study because of its unique characteristics. The 
country is markedly different historically, geographically and culturally. It experienced a half 
century of Ottoman domination.
28
  The state‟s southern border is the southern border of central 
and eastern Europe.  Bulgaria is also home to one of the largest Orthodox populations in the 
region.
 29
 This might explain their traditionally close ties to Russia.
30
 (Russia has the largest 
Orthodox population in the world.
31
) It is also important to note that it has minority populations 
of Turks, Russians and Armenians. The country has a small number of very large issues.  They 
are the poorest country in the EU. 
32
 Groups like Human Rights Watch and Reporters Without 
Borders are critical of the government in Sofia.
33
  Yet, Bulgaria‟s real albatross is their 
reputation for corruption. This has earned international criticism and hurt foreign direct 
investment in the country.
34
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 The study uses Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria as subjects of case studies because of their 
shared communist experience and very different internal characteristics and post-democratic 
results. It is the contention of this study that examining these differences helps explain the 
different levels of quality in their democratic governments. One country was dominated by a 
non-Western empire. Another was dominated by a traditional European power. Two of the three 
countries aligned with Germany during the Second World War. The other was Hitler‟s first 
victim. One of the states experienced a communist revolution in 1919. The other two states only 
experienced communism after Soviet domination. Two states are dominated by denominations of 
Western Christianity. A third is home to a large Orthodox majority. Despite these differences, all 
began their current democratic regimes at the same time, but provide different levels of rights 
and freedoms to their citizens. 
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IV. CASE STUDYS 
POLAND 
 History, culture and geography have a profound role in molding the post-Communist 
government and quality of democracy in the modern state of Poland. The subsequent political 
product is a semi-liberal, Catholic democracy. The chronicle of oppression and suppression of 
the nation of Poland helped form a national identity. This identity espouses the main pillars of 
liberal democracy: equality, freedom and individual rights. This modern Polish identity is also 
distinctly Catholic. It is impossible to untwine the two. Polish Catholicism originated in with the 
Polish state in Antiquity.  There are Polish Catholic beliefs that are contrary to some widely held 
individual rights: abortion and gay marriage. However, in the grand scheme Poland‟s geography 
helps counter these restrictions. Poland‟s lean to the west of the East/West paradigm, EU 
membership, and liberal rights in neighboring countries, counter weigh some of this restriction 
and act as a safeguard from illiberal policies.  
 This includes the policies and tactics of the Law and Justice supported regime led by 
President Andrzej Duda and Prime Minister Beata Szydło. A dark cloud of uncertainty befell 
Poland and its democracy in 2015. The Duda government staged various attacks on the 
fundamental freedoms and rights. This imperils the notion of liberal democracy in Poland. Yet, 
recent events illustrate that the Polish people will protect these rights if the government violates 
the constitution or tries to abridge the rights them. Steps taken by the current government to 
change the media landscape and alter the formulation of the constitutional tribunal sparked 
outrage and protest. Many fear that the right-wing contagion perceived in Hungary might spread 
to Poland. This fear remains in the hearts of many Poles after waiting for over a millennium to 




 The de jure political structure and quality of rights and freedoms in Poland fulfills much 
of the operationalized democratic criteria set forth in the previous methodology section. The 
government in Poland seems relatively liberal when one reads their constitution. The prevailing 
document is the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, signed into effect on April 2, 2997. It 
insures the rights and privileges enjoyed in most other liberal democracies in the world: freedom 
of religion, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly among other basic rights. There are 
articles in the Polish Constitution that stand out. One article specifically outlaws Nazism, 
Fascism, Communism and any group that sanctions national or racial hatred.
 
 Other articles 
provide for traditional rights and freedoms, but seem more modern. It does not only ensure the 
freedom of the press, but also “social communication.” Gender equality and minority rights are 
also addressed. These are items absent from the Constitutions of many other older liberal 
democracies of the West. Likewise, there are a group of articles that set forth economic rights 
and freedoms: establishing a minimum wage, holidays and a social security system. These 








                                                          
1
 The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2
nd
 April, 1997, 
http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm. -Accessed January 12, 2016. 
106 
 
Figure 7. Democratic Criteria of Poland 
Field of Assessment  Criteria 
Right to form and join political parties and interest 
groups. 
Polish Constitution, Chapter 1, Article 11-12 
Freedom of Speech and Expression Chapter 1, Article 14 
Right to Vote Chapter 2, Article 62  
Eligibility for Public Office Chapter 4, Article 99 & Chapter 5, Article 127 
Right of political leaders to compete for support/votes Chapter 1, Article 11-12 
Alternative sources of information Chapter 1, Article 14 
Free and fair elections Chapter 4, Article 101 
Institutions for making government policies depend on 
votes and other expressions of preference 
Chapter 4, Article 99 & Chapter 5, Article 127  
Political participation in the European Union 23.8% versus 42.5 Member State Average in 2014 EP 
Elections 
General Economic Conditions over Time GDP growth: +96% from 2003-2013.  
GINI: -4.9 points over 10 years 
 
 
The Constitution establishes a three branched, parliamentary democratic government. 
Any Polish citizens over 18 years of age can vote. The President is the chief of state, but not 
head of the government. He serves as a check and balance on the legislative branch of the 
government. The President is directly elected by a simple majority. The Polish Head of State is 
the Prime Minister.  The Prime Minister is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Sejm 
(the lower house of a bicameral legislature). The Sejm and the upper house of parliament, the 
Senat, are both popularly elected. Their legislative system is not unlike the bicameral legislature 
107 
 
in the United States. The Senat is 100 seats and the Sejm is 460. The Senat is based on single 
constituency, while the Sejm is proportional.
2
  
The Judicial Branch of the Polish government is established by a separate article of the 
Polish Constitution. There are several different levels of courts. The highest being the 
Constitutional Tribunal. All judges are appointed by the President of the Republic and the 
National Council of the Judiciary. It is very difficult to remove judges from their posts. It is a 
lifetime appointment. They cannot even be detained except for a special court appointed by 
special legislation approved by the Senat and Sejm. The National Council of the Judiciary is 
made up of the First President of the Supreme Court, 15 other judges, four members of the Sejm 
and 2 members of the Senat, these chosen by their peers.  
 The Constitutional Tribunal addresses questions pertaining to the Constitution, rights, 
freedoms and general democracy. It provides judicial review for legislation and new laws as well 
as the ratification of international treaties. A variety of different parties may bring cases before 
the court: the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, leaders of either of the legislative 
houses, the National Judiciary Council, churches, and labor unions. The members of the Tribunal 
are elected by the Sejm for 9 year terms. The members of the Tribunal nominate the President of 
the Tribunal, who is selected from the nominees by the President of the Republic.  
Poland enjoys a higher quality of rights and freedoms than in other areas of the world. 
However, there are two aspects of modern Polish democracy criticized by some in the 
democratic community, Europe, and the European Union. First, some are alarmed by specific 
Polish constitutional articles. Second, there are subsequent government actions. There are Polish 
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constitution contains some very unpopular constraints on the rights of some citizens. Abortion is 
a prominent topic when researchers critique the quality of democracy in Poland. Chapter I, 
Article 38 establishes that the government will protect “the life of every human being”. This 
specifically alludes to unborn fetuses. Poland is only one of three EU members with an 
exemption on abortion restrictions. Others criticize the establishment of marriage between a man 
and a woman in Chapter I, Article 18. It is doubtful that either article will be changed in the 
future 
Since the collapse of communism and the advent of modern Polish democracy, Poland 
enjoyed a relatively healthy quality of democracy. This changed in 2015. Poland was plunged 
into a constitutional crisis. The Duda regime undertook sweeping political moves against 
established democratic rights and practices. Poland was rocked in the first days of the year as the 
Law and Justice-led government passed two very controversial pieces of legislation. First, Duda 
signed a law to “reform” the Constitutional Tribunal. Many saw the changes as an attack on its 
independence and ability to act as a safeguard against a runaway Law and Justice Government. 
3
 
Then, the Duda government passed a law that gave authorities greater ability to conduct 
surveillance.
4
 Later in the spring, the administration took over the power to dismiss and appoint 
heads of public media channels. An independent committee had the task previously.
5
 In June, the 
parliament passed new counterterrorism laws that limit the freedom of assembly, allow the 
arbitrary detention of foreigners and empowered the state security service, Agencja 
Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrzneg (the ABW), to block Internet sites the government declare 
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 Later in the year, NGOs faced a government crackdown following 
criticism of the laws passed by the Law and Justice regime.
7
  
Poland‟s Constitutional checks and balances stymied the Law and Justice agenda. The 
Duda government took aim at the Constitutional Tribunal. They force through measures to 
weaken the court.
8
 These tactics took the shape of executive action on the part of Duda 
personally and legislative acts produced by the Law and Justice dominated parliament. 
Collectively, they impaired the impartiality of the court, left the members of the court subject to 
the same political currents as the legislature and all but ended the principle of judicial review. 




Duda‟s administration broke from established political practice and even rewrote several 
the very basic laws governing the Constitutional Tribunal. There were five vacancies on the 
tribunal when Law & Order took power in November 2015. The former government had already 
selected three of the justices. This left Law and Justice to select two more justices and seat all 
five of them. Instead, Duda selected all five justices, replacing the three from his predecessor. 
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Thus, he packed the court with Law and Justice aligned jurors.
10
  Simultaneously, the 
government took legislative steps to subjugate the court.  
At the same time as Duda‟s moved to pack the court, the parliament passed a series of 
measures altering the status and independence of the members of the Constitutional Tribunal. 
The new laws make it easier to investigate and remove judges. This leaves the court subject to 
many of the political winds as that of the legislature. The Law and Justice sponsored changes to 
the court laws also require a 2/3s majority to invalidate a law.  The legal change cripples the 
court‟s basic ability of judicial review.11 Striking down laws that violate the constitution is 
essentially impossible. The court now serves as little more than a rubber stamp for the 
government in Warsaw.  
This muting of the court by the Law and Justice Party make true democracy impossible in 
Poland. From the standpoint of Alvarez, et al and the minimalists, one of the primary aspects of 
democracy is the limitations placed on government.
12
 The judicial review of an independent 
branch of government serves this role in most liberal democracies. Absent of this check on 
unbridled government power, democracy cannot truly exist. The maximalist perspective of 
Hasselmann finds the events in Poland problematic as well. This view demands among other 
things a system of checks and balances and a separation of powers.
13
 The packing of the court 
with party loyalists, implementation of a supermajority to render a decision and all around 
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subjugation of the court violate these tenants of Hasselmann‟s view and model. This tampering 
with the Constitutional Tribunal might sound the death knell for modern Polish democracy. 
The regime in Warsaw abridged other basic rights. In June 2016, the government passed 
other laws in the guise of anti-terror legislation. The wave of terror attacks across Western 
Europe lent credence to enhanced government powers that breached several basic rights under 
most definitions of liberal democracy.  There were several attacks in Western Europe in late 
2015 and early 2016, but even the government admits that the risk of an attack in Poland is 
low.
14
 The need for counterterrorism efforts was clearly “imported”.15 Despite this black letter 
confession by those in the Duda regime, the government curbed basic rights. This chipped away 
further at the quality of liberal democracy in the state.  
The enhanced surveillance law in Poland went into effect despite that it denies individual 
privacy.
16
 The government gave the ABW the ability to look at citizen‟s tax reports, vehicle 
information, banking records and insurance information.
17
  It serves as a dark reminder of the 
nation‟s communist past. The law allows for covert surveillance based on “vague conditions”18 
to investigate an “unspecified catalogue of crimes”19. The law does not provide for any judicial 
oversight. The law does not require any type of probable cause before the government 
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 It sparked outrage among many Poles and led to the creation of new opposition 
groups like the Defense of Democracy (KOD).
21
  
The Duda government attacked press freedom, as well. It forced through a law that 
placed the power to hire and fire broadcast executives in the hands of the Treasury Minister. The 
task formerly belonged to a supervisory committee. Admittedly, past regimes replaced broadcast 
executives, but the Law and Justice law goes “faster and farther”.22 The government stated that it 
sought to make the media presented in the country more balanced. They cited that the media was 
largely made of parties opposing the Law and Justice Party. Media freedom advocates from all 
over voiced the concern and disapproval in the changes. It placed very large, popular television 
and radio stations under much tighter control of the government. One of the media companies, 
TVP, has two popular television channels. They combine for a market share of 30% and reach 
90% of Polish viewers weekly. The other large outlet is Public Polish radio, which reaches over 
half the population and have 200 stations.
23
 
The same law also limits two of the most basic rights of democracies: the right to 
assemble and seeks to censor and control the Internet. The law gives government officials the 
authority to ban demonstrations that counter government approved events. Before, local 
authorities had the power.
24
 The mustered domestic control of the Internet allows the ABW “to 
block websites deemed a threat to national security”. The law also codifies a “kill switch”25. 
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During a state of emergency the Polish authorities have the power to disable all 
telecommunications. These laws have brought widespread protest from NGO watchdogs, civil 
rights groups, and domestic political opposition.
26
     
These abridgements of fundamental rights strike at the heart of Dahl‟s consensus 
definition of democracy. The premise of a conditional right to assemble undercuts the basic right 
to assemble and further injures the right to expression (through protest) and freedom to form and 
join organizations.
27
 The Solidarity movement that was at the forefront of modern Polish 
democracy would not have succeeded under laws like this. Furthermore, the implementation of 
warrantless surveillance, data collection and control of Internet content all have implications on 
citizen‟s rights to alternative sources of information and potentially the rights‟ of political leaders 
to compete for support.
28
 With no check or balance in a system containing these laws, the 
phenomena of Polish democracy is in peril.  
 The final move of 2016 by the Law and Justice regime in Warsaw came when Prime 
Minister Beata Szydło new announced plans to control NGOs in the country. NGOs have been 
widely critical of the Law and Justice changes to the government, especially Constitutional 
Tribunal.
29
 The President‟s spokesman, Marek Magierowski, called the NGOs‟ allegations “one-
sided” and uninformed.30 The government half-heartedly justified the retribution against its NGO 
critics. Szydło stated that too many NGOs were working under the policies of the former 
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 and that the government wanted to “clean up the country‟s civic sector.”32 The 
measure would leave the primary public funding for NGOs in the hands of a new department, the 
“national centre for the development of civic society”.33 
 The government has fought a quiet, subtle war against NGOs.  The radio and television 
stations brought under government control in 2016 openly attack NGOs. These media stations 
allege that the groups are counter to Polish interests and “lackeys of Western powers”.34 
Additionally, the government sponsors competing groups, like Solidarni and Ordo luris. These 
two groups promoted the conspiracy theory behind the plane crash that took the life of former 
President Lech Kaczynski and supported a near complete ban on abortion. The government 
peddles these state-sponsored groups as speaking for the consensus of Poles.
35
   
Duda‟s tactics and challenges to democracy in Poland will be telling for the futures of 
both Poland and the EU. Before, many trumpeted Poland as an example for other EU member 
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According to Habermas, this enhances the quality of Polish rights and freedoms by developing a 
post nationalist democracy.
37
 The President of the European Council is former Polish Prime 
Minister Donald Tusk. Poland holds over 6.5% of the seats in the European Parliament.
38
 
Poland‟s broader European political future seems bright. However, Law and Justice‟s 
euroscpeticism increases the chances of allowing Poland‟s democratic progress to backslide. The 
EU reaction might be the catalyst to stopping Poland from possibly developing into an illiberal 
democracy.   
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There are conflicting theories about what legal action from Brussels could bring. 
Habermas argues that EU action against the Duda regime might force Poles to take a greater 
interest in European Union policies and politics.
39
 Teorell disagrees. He observed that 
organizations like the European Union help democratization, but measures like sanctions can 
initiate backsliding. Ironically, the final results to either have little to do with Duda‟s government 
and far more to do with Polish voters. They could react adversely to an EU attempt to exercise 
power over their elected parliament. Alternatively, an EU challenge to Duda‟s unpopular and 
illiberal initiatives could garner broad based support for Brussels with Polish voters.  
Poland‟s economic performance helps maintain their political system and level of 
democracy. This supports the scholarly consensus that economics do aid in democratization and 
supporting democracy. Kapstein and Converse wrote that this cannot be left to only a single 
factor. Ersson contributed that an economy‟s true impact is growth. The Polish economy proved 
durable through the most recent financial crisis.  
 Poland‟s GDP growth shows a healthy rebound since 2011. Per capita GDP 
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Figure 10. Per Capita GDP (PPP) by Year, Poland 
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GDP growth is important in managing sovereign debt. This enhances confidence in the 
established political system. Poland finished 2005 with a national debt level of 46.7% of GDP. It 
increased to 53% of GDP in 2010 and leveled off at just over 50% by the end of 2014. This 
shows an overall improvement and an improvement versus the EU trend. The EU ended with a 
cumulative debt of 85% its GDP.
42
  
There are other economic performances that bode well for democracy in Poland. Noted 
scholars allude to the effect of income disparity as measured by GINI. Kapstein and Converse 
refer to this. Teorell discusses the prevalence of GINI as a factor in the established literature. 
Poland‟s economy improved in this regard as well. Poland‟s level of economic disparity fell 
every year since 2005. Poland‟s GINI is now in line with the rest of the EU member states.  
 
Figure 11. GINI Index, by Year, Poland 
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The collective positive effect of a reasonable debt to GDP, increasing per capita GDP and 
improving GINI have helped maintain democracy in Poland. Its performance kept the larger 
economy out of the political arena. The largest opportunity is continuing to improve 
infrastructure and diversifying its energy sector.
44
 According to Teorell, energy dependency on 
oil is a hazard for most western countries. A crisis in this arena could hurt the stability of the 
government. Another global economic shock could also prove hazardous to democratic stability 
and quality. Poland had a lower debt in 2009 during the last financial crisis. A higher debt along 
with another comparable financial calamity would really test the strength of Poland‟s economy. 
It might also fuel illiberalism and backsliding as some of the literature predicts.  
 The health and quality of Poland‟s democracy might be somewhat challenged under the 
new Duda government. This cannot overshadow the political progress achieved since 1997. 
Poland never enjoyed true self determination before the late 1990s. One interesting point to 
highlight is that despite the efforts by the Duda‟s government in the country, the people and the 
opposition seem readily resilient and willing to protect their rights.  Their ability to do so is a 
characteristic of the stable, well-functioning system in place. Despite the efforts of the 
eurosceptics in Poland, the country still enjoys a reasonably high level of democratic rights and 
freedoms.  
History 
Early Polish history establishes the seeds for some of the characteristics of the modern 
Polish state. Most importantly, this period established the Polish state‟s Christian heritage. The 
country remains largely Catholic. History also provided the seeds for democracy. The legislative 
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bodies, the Sejm and the Senat, are examples of prominent historical antecedents. These are 
referred to in the preamble of the modern Polish constitution as “the best traditions of the First 
and Second Republic.”45 Finally, larger external powers partitioned Poland numerous times.  
This formed angst over the Polishness of the nation and the state and helped create a Polish 
identity. This is a popular topic of conversation in political circles in relation to the role Brussels 
plays in Polish law. These attributes from pre-First World War history contribute to the nature of 
government, as well as the political structure of Poland today. 
There are five political periods in Polish history. The timeline begins shortly after the 
death of Christ with the Monarchy. The Partitions of Poland follows 16 centuries later. This era 
concludes with the First World War. The Second Polish Republic spans the interwar years. 
Communism followed the defeat of the Axis Powers in 1945. The final era is the Third Polish 
Republic, declared in 1989. It is important to point out that external forces demarcate the middle 
three political eras. Partitions at the hands of European powers ended Polish control of the 
original state. World wars gave way to the second republic and, later, Soviet domination.  The 
legacy started by the partitions of Poland created what Poles felt as “the need to fight against the 
loss of national identity.”46  
  The first century reign of Mieszko I  started the Christian monarchy that would rule 
Poland in different forms until 1795. The nation and state would undergo turbulence and 
different regional wars under the control of different kings, queens, emperors and collectives of 
junior nobility. The early Polish Christian monarchy survived the Golden Horde of Genghis 
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 This version of the Polish state reached its high 
point during the Jagiellonian Dynasty after the union with Lithuania in 1386 and the defeat of the 
Teutonic Knights in 1410.
48
 This Polish Monarchy was an autocratic regime. There was a very 
rigid class system in place. The nobility made up the highest class. Only this 8-10% of the 
population enjoyed the rights and privileges. Serfs made up 72% of the population. Along with 
Urghers and Jews, they had no rights at all and were not considered citizens.
49
 
 Poland developed its democratic ideals in several stages. Jan Olbracht, a Jagiellonian 
King, first introduced the notion of democracy in 1493. He created the Sejm and the Senat to 
advise the king and serve to protect the wider interests of Poland and its nobles.
50
 In 1573, the 
Jagiellonian line of kings ended and  electio virilum, or “elected monarch”51 was established. 
Nobles were now allowed to vote for a king. This king was constrained by Henrican articles: 
protecting noble rights, supporting religious toleration and convening the Sejm twice a year.
52
 
These minor advances exposed Poles to limited examples of democratic rights. They introduced 
the ideas of a restrained central authority and created political antecedents of the Sejm and Senat. 
However, their contemporary effect was minor. It was still the sixteenth century and there was 
still a ruling class. Prażmowska wrote, “the word `free‟ when applied to the description of a Pole 
invariably was applied to the nobility and not the community as a whole.” The peasant class 
remained unrepresented and enserfment continued.
53
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Democratic and constitutional development slowed throughout the period of Poland‟s 
partitions. The partitions and the subjugation of Poland to foreign powers followed numerous 
European wars. Poland was first partitioned in 1771, in which it lost a third of its lands.
54
 A 
second partition came in 1793, making it smaller.
55
 The third partition of Poland wiped it from 
the map. This started a period of domination by Russia, Germany and Austria.
56
 Several 
milestones contributed to the concept of Polish democracy in the late eighteenth century. First 
was the Polish Constitution of 1791. Then, there was the Polaneic Manifesto in 1794. The third 
and final of the period was the 1807 Polish Constitution imposed by Napoleon following his 
defeat of Prussia.  
The Polish Constitution of 1794 was an important document for a number of reasons. 
First, it was Europe‟s first written constitution.57 Mark F. Brzezinski sees the document as the 
culmination of seven centuries of “constitutional evolution”. It recognized the will of the people 
and separation of church and state.  For this, it is often spoken of in the same high regard as the 
U.S. and French constitutions of the same era.
58
 Marian Hillar is far more critical. He noted the 
mythology and romanticism in the analysis of the constitution. He wrote that it as “a measure to 
guarantee the continuation of a stratified society.”59 Brzezinski concedes that what it provided 
was “a far cry from popular sovereignty”.60 
The slow slog of Poland towards real democracy continued. The Poleanic Manifesto was 
put into effect the following year. This act protected serfs from eviction. More substantively, 
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Napoleon‟s defeat of Prussia in 1807 placed Poland within is realm. The accompanying 
Constitution of 1807 implemented key tenants of the Napoleonic code. This included more 
political antecedents to modern Polish democracy: concepts of equality under the law and 
religious tolerance. The document also abolished serfdom.  Six years later Napoleon would lose 
the Franco-Prussian War and Poland fell under the control of Czarist Russia.
61
 This all but halted 
the democratic progress in Poland.  
  Democracy, rights and freedoms continued to elude Poland after the Congress of Vienna. 
Austro-Hungary, Prussia and Imperial Russia divided what is the state of Poland today. The 
newly minted “Kingdom of Poland” still had a Sejm. It comprised of nobility only with only 
nobles and landowners voting, but the body had no legislative power. The Russian Czar served 
as the Chief Executive. This rendition of the Kingdom of Poland was completely dependent on 
Russia during this period.
62
 Landowners still controlled peasants, who could not vote. Local 
nobility enforced landlord rights and could conscript troublesome peasants into the army.
63
 There 
were intermittent, unsuccessful revolts. Romanov Czars dissolved the Sejm countless times. 
Russian leaders would occasionally abolish the constitution. As Prażmowska titles one of her 
chapters, Poland was a “Polish nation without a state”.64   
  The Second Polish Republic emerged after the First World War. Article XIII of 
Woodrow Wilson‟s Fourteen Points called for “an independent Polish state”.65 The government 
was modeled after the Third French Republic. The government had a weak executive and a 
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powerful legislature with a large number of political parties.
66
 Unfortunately, this system proved 
dysfunctional in Interwar Poland.  Democracy advanced very little most and receded for others. 
There was no reliable, consistent democratic leadership. The political parties were unstable. 
They pulled in various directions at different times. Different governments attempted to rule the 
country with no effect. The first Polish President was assassinated. Four years later there was a 
military coup led by Józef Piłsudski.67 This began the period known as the “Rule of Colonels”.68 
Piłsudski tried changing the Constitution to place limitations on established democratic practices. 
When the Sejm blocked this, he sent troops to the building. He became Prime Minister and 
imprisoned opposition leaders.
 69




 The political landscape in Poland was organized chaos. There were various parties based 
on political ideology, there were other parties based on ethnicity. New parties formed, combined, 
aligned and opposed each other constantly. Fragmentation earmarked the Polish elections of 
1919, 1922 and 1928. Piłsudski launched a party, the Government Bloc meant to place the 
country‟s interests over politics. Ethnic political groups divided and subdivided, while other 
minority groups emerged.
 71
 The Government Bloc displaced the traditional right. Minority 
voters saw their votes being diluted by an increasing number of minority parties.
72
 These voters 
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threw their support behind the Communists, the Socialists or other parties of the left. 
73
 Some of 
this was aided by Soviet influence and Russian Communism‟s contemporary success.74  
 The democratic result of the Interwar Period in Poland was inertia at best. Piłsudski‟s rule 
bypassed the legislature. Minority rights were neglected. The Polish government took steps to 
strip the Ukrainian language and culture from their Orthodox Churches. More seriously, 
Ukrainians were often victims of physical and property violence. The state sponsored some of 
this activity.
75
 William W Hagen‟s study shows that the plight of Jews in Interwar Poland as 
comparable to that of pre-WWII Germany. He quotes Mariam Kosciałkowski, an interwar 
government official in Poland, who stated that anti-Semitism was “common” and used by “all 
parties for election purposes.”76 Even noted leaders of the Catholic Church in Poland blamed 
Jews for the poor conditions in the new republic.
77
 As a whole, Poles suffered high 
unemployment, insufficient infrastructure,
78
 income disparity, poverty and legal inequality.
79
 
 The interwar years also saw external conflicts that established domestic political feelings 
in Poland. First, the Poles had border disputes with Lithuania and Czechoslovakia. Second, the 
Bolshevik Revolution in Russia occurred in 1917. This changed the political landscape of central 
and eastern Europe. Many countries feared Russia more than Germany. The Poles fought a war 
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with the Soviet Union until the countries signed a treaty after two and a half years of fighting.
80
  
Communists came to power in Hungary and Romania. Peoples of the region feared Stalin‟s 
policies and increased violence from Communists groups.
81
 This fear led the Poles to decline an 
offer of protection from Stalin and the Soviets.
82
 Poland‟s military leadership turned to Hitler to 
no avail. 
83
 Three weeks later Hitler and Stalin signed the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact. 
Hitler attacked Poland while the ink on the agreement was still wet.
84
  
There were two large factions resisting the Nazis in Poland by 1942. First, there was the 
Home Army backed by the Polish government in exile in London. The other was the Soviet-
backed People‟s Guard. The People‟s Guard later helped form the Polish Worker‟s Party. The 
Homeland National Council developed in 1943 and became the Polish Committee of National 
Liberation. It proclaimed itself the legitimate government of Poland. Moscow recognized it 12 
days later.
 85
 Churchill rebuffed appeals from the Polish government in exile that asked for 
British help.
86
 This changed the future of Poland for the next 45 years.  
 Inept and betrayed describe the interwar governments of Poland best. The period of true 
democracy between the wars was barely brief enough to mention. It, however, is typical of many 
European governments of the period, like Weimar Germany, for example. While crafters of these 
governments sought the diffusion of power away from monarch-like heads of state, their political 
pluralism showed little stability. Large numbers of political parties can make a consensus 
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impossible. In many cases this leads to the rise of strong men. In the case of Poland, it was the 
Colonels. (Present day Egypt witnessed a similar turn of events recently.) The interwar 
governments represented the last opportunity for Polish self-determination. Throughout World 
War II and the Cold War, much of Polish policy was dictated by Hitler, victorious the Allies of 
the Second World War or the communist leadership of the Kremlin. A clear political reference to 
this is the Constitutional ban on fascist and communist political parties. Another contribution 
from the period is the growing desire for true Polish leadership and the preservation of Polish 
identity.   
 The failure of the United States and Great Britain to defend the idea of democracy in 
Poland left the country firmly in the hands of the Soviets. However, non-communist political 
parties, the Peasant Alliance and the Socialists helped form the provisional government. The 
communist party was the weakest of the three coalition partners, but wielded great power. Red 
Army forces and the NKVD undercut opposition to the party and the party held key positions in 
the government. The communists staged a national referendum in 1946 and a general election in 
1947. By the end of 1948, the Peasant Alliance was destroyed and the communist party absorbed 
the Socialists. This ended Poland‟s post-war political plurality.87   
 The 49 years of Communist rule in Poland were brutal, especially for the Catholic 
Church. Initial Soviet policies in Poland were shaped by moves to make Poland more 
homogenous and minimize or eliminate the role of the Catholic Church. Ultimately, the country 
became more Polish and more Catholic.
88
 Stalin was keenly aware of the nationalistic sentiments 
of Poles. He sought to suppress this nationalism and any future pressure to unify the country by 
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dividing Poland by ethnic lines. The Soviets moved Belarussians and Ukranians into other areas 
of the Soviet Union and repatriated ethnic Germans.
89
 Polish leaders were replaced by Moscow-
trained communist leaders. They attacked the Catholic Church, confiscated its property and 
incarcerated priests.
90
 Following the death of Stalin, Polish workers took to the streets. Polish 
troops fired upon them and killed around a hundred protestors. The protests spread. The party 
rehabilitated a communist figure jailed by Stalin, Władyslaw Gomułka.91 As communist leader 
of Poland, conditions in Poland improved to “bearable”.92 Gomułka allowed private farming and 
small enterprise and gave the Catholic church more freedoms.
93
 A faltering economy and 
increased tensions with the church started in the mid-1960s.
94
  
Economic problems continued throughout the 1970s and in the 1980s.
 95
 The 
underground opposition to the communist government grew to include several human rights 
groups and what is described as a “press empire”.96 Polish communist party leader Edward 
Gierek sought to placate the Polish people. He reassured them of improvements in life in Poland. 
His government borrowed money from the West and purchased new factory equipment. The 
investment failed and price increases were needed to meet the loan payments. This sparked the 
protests in the shipyards of Gdansk, led by Lech Walesa. The striking workers were joined by 
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many other groups from around the country. The government was forced to sign the Gdansk 
Agreement. Solidarity became a nationally recognized reform movement.
97
 
The Gdansk Agreement was the first step in establishing modern democratic rights in 
Poland. It contains many of Dahl‟s criteria for democracy. 98  Despite being written in consult 
with the communist government in Warsaw, it espoused much of the democratic rights 
guaranteed in liberal democratic officiating documents of the world today, including modern 
Poland. It guaranteed the role of religious organizations. It provided for a plurality of political 
views in media. It insured the right to self-expression. The document provided for landownership 
and areas of rural self-government. Most Poles including many communist party members 
became Solidarity members.
99
 The central controlled economy continued to flounder and the 
demonstrations and strikes continued. The government made more and more concessions as the 
economic problems mounted in Poland.  
The neighboring communist states and the Kremlin were deeply alarmed by this and 
called for a crackdown. Faced with a Soviet invasion, Polish communist leader Wojciech 
Jaruzelski declared martial law. The government imprisoned opposition leaders, former party 
members who embraced reforms and other activists. Jaruzelski reversed all of the reforms made 
by Solidarity and the Gierek regime. Soldarity was outlawed. Press censorship returned. Soldiers 
patrolled the streets. The poor conditions in Poland persisted through the 1980s.
100
 Gorbachev 
succeeded as Soviet Premier in 1985. His policies gave more freedom for the communist 
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governments of central and eastern Europe to govern their own affairs. Moscow encouraged the 
communist government in Warsaw to invite Solidarity to negotiations.
101
 The Catholic church 
aided in establishing the dialogue.
102
  These Round Table Talks started the end of communism in 
Poland.
103
   
Poland lacked a free civil society, political parties and a government that could be a 
“mediating establishment” after the collapse of communism.104 There was only one non-
communist institution in the country: the Catholic Church. The new parliament went right to 
work, restoring the country‟s name, ended the communist monopoly on power, and declared 
Poland a “Democratic state”. Many of the communist groups changed their names and handed 
their leadership over to a younger, less experienced generation. Most socialist practices and 
institutions were repealed in the first months of 1990. This included the Security Service of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs (the secret police).
105
  
The different political periods of Poland contributed to the current quality of modern 
Polish democracy. The early history of the country rendered the antecedents of the bicameral 
legislature made of the Sejm and Senat, close ties to the Catholic Church and the idea of a 
cherished Polish identity. The Interwar Period and Communist Period contributed to the 
Constitution in the bans on fascist and communist parties and rock-ribbed protections for 
religious freedom, namely the Catholic Church. In sum, the two most resolute historical 
narratives are that of a Polish identity and the role of the Church. Throughout history, the nation 
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of Poland remained strong, intact and self-aware even when there was only a marginalized Polish 
state. Understanding the role of the Catholic Church is essential to understanding how these 
Polish ideals perpetuated down through the ages.  
Culture 
The impact of Roman Catholicism on the nature of Polish rights and freedoms cannot be 
overstated. Church leaders had a large role in writing the modern Polish Constitution. Today, 
Church leaders remain a strong political force. While very Catholic, the Polish people are not 
very free. Catholicism and the rights it insures, instills and provides are limited. This leads to 
very undemocratic and even uncatholic practices at times. Democracy in Poland is limited by its 
strong interconnectedness to Catholic dogma.  
The prevailing cultural feature of Poland is its Catholic religion. Lech Walesa wrote that 
without the Catholic Church, there would be no Poland.
106
 It is a defining institution for the 
Polish people. Ewa Morawski calls the Catholic Church the “major public spokesman for Polish 
society.” Catholicism was essential to opposing communism.107 During the Cold War, the 
Catholic Church took a defining role in the political future of Poland. This is accounted 
thoroughly in Cardinal Stanislaw Dziwisz‟s work A Life with Karol. Poland, of course, was 
intensely personal for John Paul II, a Pole who referred to himself as the “Slavic Pope.” 108 
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Abortion, divorce and contraception were common in the region under communism.
109
 He 
envisioned a free Poland as “The Christ of Nations”, which could be the Savior of the continent. 
 With a Polish Pontiff and a large Catholic population, the Church took an active role in the 
creation of the modern Polish state. Catholic bishops had concrete demands for Poland‟s new 
constitution. The demands helped dictate rights and freedoms in the new Poland. The church 
sought a reference to God, subjugation to God by the state, a ban on abortion and Gay marriage 
and no separation of Church and State.
110
 Most of these theological aspirations for the new state 
of Poland were fulfilled. Chapter 1, Article 18 defines marriage as the union of a man and a 
woman and Chapter 2, Article 38 commits the new state of Poland to the protection “of every 
human life”.111  The Polish Constitution also set religious holidays as federal holidays, 
guaranteed religious instruction in school, and made Catholic charities equivalent to its public 
counterparts in later articles.
112
 The rendered Polish Constitution created a Catholic democracy.   
Pope John Paul IIs personal involvement in Poland and his religious awakening during 
Vatican II played a defining role in shaping post-communist democracy in Poland.
 113
  The two 
major points from Vatican II found in modern Polish democracy were tolerance and the 
supremacy of the Catholic Church. Several of the Vatican II texts advocate religious and racial 
tolerance is mentioned in. The Decree on Ecumenism, Unitatis Redintegratio mentions the 
protestant denominations and the Orthodox Church. The manuscript calls for a unity among the 
followers of Christ. Another passage goes even further. It states, “The Church reproves, as 
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foreign to the mind of Christ, any discrimination against men or harassment of them because of 
their race, color, condition of life, or religion”114 This idea of tolerance is present in the modern 
Polish Constitution.  
Vatican II‟s produced texts call for unity among Christians and tolerance, but also sets the 
Holy See above other practiced, Christian religions. It refers to them as “deficient in some 
respects.” Another passage declares, “For it is only through Christ's Catholic Church, which is 
`the all-embracing means of salvation,‟ that they can benefit fully from the means of 
salvation.”115 Furthermore, to aid in the spread of the Catholic message the Declaration on 
Christian Education, The Gravissimum Educationis calls for Catholic instruction in schools.
116
 
The Polish Constitution provides and funds Catholic teachings and Catholic schools. The 
Vatican II documents also mentions a regulated press. It acknowledges the great power of media, 
television radio, ad film, but warns of its misuse. The document advocates using it to serve “the 
cultural and moral betterment of audiences”.117  
Poland is a Catholic democracy, but there are limits on personal rights. Polish democracy is 
best described as semi-liberal. Many question the true worth of written Catholic teachings in 
                                                          
114
 Pope Paul VI, “Declaration on the Relation to Non-Christian Religions, Nostra Aetate,” The Second Vatican 
Council, October 28, 1965, http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_decl_19651028_nostra-aetate_en.html. Accessed February 23, 2016; Pope Paul VI, “Declaration on Religious 
Freedom, Dignitatus Humanae,” The Second Vatican Council, December 7, 1965, 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-
humanae_en.html. Accessed February 23, 2016.  
115
 Pope Paul VI, “Decree on Ecumenism, Unitatis Redintegratio,” The Second Vatican Council,  
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-
humanae_en.html. Accessed February 23, 2016. 
116
 Pope Paul VI, “Declaration on Christian Education, Gravissium Educationis,” The Second Vatican Council, 
October 28, 1965. http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_decl_19651028_gravissimum-educationis_en.html. Accessed February 23,2016.  
117
 Pope Paul VI, “Decree on the Media of Social Communications, Inter Mirifica,” The Second Vatican Council, 
December 3, 1963, http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-





 Some allege that homophobia is passively supported by the Church. The Church 
opposes gay marriage
119
 and abortion. Abortion remains a very partisan issue that divides the 
country.
120
 Many are unhappy with Church leaders after it was revealed that some Church 
leaders collaborated with the communists during the Cold War. Others are upset and 
disillusioned by sex abuse scandals involving clergy.
121
 Many Poles wish the church would stay 
out of politics.
122
 They question the Church‟s motives. 123 The Church‟s top concern is 
preserving its prominent role in everyday life.
124
 Bishops in modern Poland are comparable to 
lobbyists in the American political system.
125
 Religion and politics and the interests of the state 
and the Catholic Church intersect and overlap.  
Real ethnic equality in Poland is understandably challenging. The country makes 
admirable attempts to provide rights and freedoms for minorities despite being one of the more 
ethnically and religiously homogenous countries in the world. The Polish Constitution provides 
for the toleration and pluralism examined by Vlas and Ghergina.  The Polish Constitution seeks 
to establish a welcoming, even religiously diverse, liberal society. Article 13, Chapter 1 of the 
Polish Constitution forbids national or racial hatred. Article 35, Chapter 2 protects minority 
rights. There a substantial federal laws seeking to implement these core constitutional 
prerogatives. However, there are still gaps in enforcement, opportunities to achieve true ethnic 
equality and other areas where Polish law falls short.     
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Poland has an extensive criminal code dealing with hate crimes. Crimes based on race, 
creed, color and national origin have risen the past few years and the government reacted. 
Imposed reforms have improved the legal responses to hate crimes.
126
 The government formed 
special police forces with human rights officers known as Human Rights Protection Teams. The 
Prosecutor General now has prosecutors who specialize in hate crimes.
127
 More importantly, in 
the past many hate crimes were not prosecuted and were classified as a “minor social harm”. 
Polish prosecutors discontinued the practice.
128
  Unfortunately, these advances in combating 
racial and xenophobic crime accompany a complete absence of protections for member of the 
LGBT community. 
129
An Amnesty International report from 2015 states that the police and 
prosecutors are not even obligated to investigate homophobia or transphobia as a motive.
130
 
Much of this can be attributed to widespread Catholic beliefs.  
Employment rights and protections in Poland are more effective. Despite a lack of 
protections for some against hate crimes, most groups including the LGBT community enjoy 
employment equality. There are very strict economic rights and freedoms set forth in the Polish 
Constitution (Articles 64-69, Chapter Two). This includes minimum wage, working conditions, 
holidays and the provision of social security. True wage equality remains an issue.  
Many studies illustrate that gender equality in the workplace illustrate that gender 
equality, especially in wages, remains an opportunity in Poland. Only 45% of women believe 
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enough is being done to fight workplace discrimination.
131
 In 2014, the World Economic Forum 
(WEF) placed Poland ranked 75th out of 145 countries in economic participation and 
opportunity for women. This sets them in the top half. Part of this assessment is a wage survey. 
The survey cited a higher than actual level of disparity between men and women working at the 
same job. Additionally, over eight years of the study, Poland has shown small improvements on 
the WEF‟s scale. 132 While better than average, Poland still has opportunities to improve 
workplace rights for women. They sit at the lower half of countries in the world and lag behind 
other countries in central and eastern Europe.  
Here again, equality for women contrasts more accepted traditional roles for genders in a 
predominantly Catholic country. A recent European Union report gender inequality cites lower 
than needed childcare subsidies, gender stereotypes and “a conservative view of the family” as 
roots of gender disparity. The government has various programs to try and expand roles for 
women in education and the workplace. The Church launched campaigns to oppose “gender 
ideology” behind these initiatives. The report cites young Poles and their interaction with other 
non-Poles they interact with and meet as a positive factor in the results..
133
 
Many of these non-Poles, more specifically, non-Polish speakers play a prominent role in 
the definition of Polish democracy. Traditional Polish ideals of identity clash with the new 
realities of globalization and free trade. Despite ethnic and religious homogeneity, modern 
Poland embraces multilingualism. The Constitution declares that Polish is the official language. 
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It also provides for language rights for non-Polish speakers (Chapter 1, Article 27). Poland is 
also a signatory to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Fourteen different 
languages are covered. Poland invests money in using some of these languages on TV, radio and 
educational materials. 
134
 Foreign language proves to be a restrictive element in the lives of many 
in Poland.  
A recent report cites language as a major barrier to integration and the success of many 
foreigners in Poland.
135
 This affects the integration of the Roma minority, especially children. A 
failure to learn basic Polish impedes their academic progress in the class room drives high 
dropout rates and causes ostracism by Polish students. The end result is continued poverty and 
poor social development. These affects are compounded for Roma children with special needs.
136
 
Another report cites the obstacles for other minority groups.   
Poles are not used to cultural, religious or linguistic diversity. 
There is a very strong reluctance among the majority of Polish  
society towards accepting refugees, especially Muslims. Muslims  
are often perceived as a threat to Polish culture and heritage. However,  
3,000 Muslim Chechens live currently in Poland with causing any public  




The cited situation of Muslim Chechens and the large number of Lithuanian workers
138
 points to 
both, an ethnic and linguistic dynamic. Geography and an East-West dynamic account for the 
different reactions by Poles to these noted groups.    
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Geography plays a unique role in shaping Polish democracy after communism. Their 
location provides for this in three different ways. Poland leans west towards the EU in the East-
West paradigm. They opt for a society and laws favoring the individual freedoms denied to them 
historically endorsed by modern Catholic teachings. Poland lies safely out of reach for Vladimir 
Putin and Russian political interests. Poland is surrounded by some strong democracies, but also 
other neighboring countries rules by illiberal democratic regimes or despots. These three factors 
help mold the nature of Polish democracy.  
This westward influence created a more liberal democracy in Poland. Much of the rights 
and freedoms included in the Polish constitution are found in the constitutions in the 
constitutions of Western Europe: press, religion, assembly and association.  It guided the 
evolution of the political system, as communism and fascism were banned. The communist 
parties slowly faded as former communists retired and more liberal socialists took their place to 
counterweigh liberal democrats on the domestic political scene.  Due in large part to their 
westward predilection in the paradigm, Poland‟s political structure and landscape now resembles 
that of France, Germany and other European powers.  
Accession to the European Union accounts for some of this Europeanization The 
negotiations for Poland‟s accession resulted in a more liberal democracy. These negotiations 
were no small task. They involved the Sejm and Polish government accepting as much as 
100,000 pages of legislation and this was the easy part. Implementation and the changes of 
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Polish law to align with EU Directives was more challenging and follow.
139
Unrealistic 
expectations compounded the difficulty. A majority of Poles believed that joining the EU would 
mean access to Western wealth without changing or concessions. With many changes unpopular, 
the EU‟s image was somewhat sullied. Thus, it became the target of many political groups 
including specifically eurosceptic parties.
140
  
 The alterations to Polish government affected every aspect of Polish life. There were 
numerous improvements to worker‟s rights. Employment contracts, mandated time off for 
workers and parental leave regulations all changed. The EU directives also mandated changes to 
youth employment laws.
141
 Joining the European Union meant changing immigration and 
refugee laws. These laws changed incorporated the EU directive on temporary protection for 
refugees. This resulted in more affirmative decisions on refugee applications.
142
 A large change 
to the grand scheme of Polish government was accepting the supremacy of some EU regulations. 
EU membership obligates Polish courts to interpret laws in accordance with EC law and the 
European Courts of Justice. In the event of a conflict with established Polish law, jurors are to 
use the EU law.
143
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The Polish ambition for self-rule and their strong ties to Roman Catholicism led them to 
look west in the context of the East-West Paradigm.
  
The impetus behind this lay within the core 
concepts of “Western democracy”. One of the primary pillars of this democracy is a belief in the 
role of the individual. This is shared in Dignitatis Humanae produced by Vatican II. Poles see 
themselves as being caught in the middle, serving as a crossroads between east and west. The 
Polish situation remained unchanged for centuries: fighting off Mongol attacks, conquered by 
Germany, divided by larger powers and dominated by the Soviets. This created an aspirational 
environment for Polish self-determination and democracy. In this regard, some see Poland as 
“the Christ of Nations”. It was repeatedly crucified by partition and occupation and will return as 
the Savior of the continent. Poland is an “essential foundation of Europe‟s true authentic unity.” 
144 
 This differs from the role of the political submissive many nations play in the states east of 
Poland.  
Poland‟s democracy is further aided by its safe proximity to Russia. Over the last decade, 
Putin‟s regime sought regional hegemony over some of its former satellites. Poland‟s location  
prevents Russian military adventurism and large Russian minorities from easily entering the 
country. There are few Russian speakers and few ethnic Russians.
145
 Polish is Catholic, where 
Russia is Eastern Orthodox. The Polish population has no segment or group that is pro-Russian. 
Therefore, Russia has little political influence in the country.  The speedy expansion of NATO 
and enlargement of the European Union aided in buttressing any attempts by Russia in exert 
political influence in the country. This is reinforced today by sharing borders with Germany, 
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Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. Each state is a democracy free of any worrisome 
Russian influence.   
The resulting effects of Poland‟s safe distance from Russia increase the quality of 
democracy in Poland in an especially regional manner. These effects allow there to be a unified 
voice against Putinist Russia. This is important in two ways. First, there are no large pro-Western 
and pro-Russian groups that clash. This can result in oppression of one group at the hands of the 
other. Clashes such as these come in the form of oppressive governments that seek to silence or 
dissolve opposition to their policies, either pro-Western or pro-Russian.  This was all seen in the 
Ukraine. Second, it leaves Poland to embrace most of the pro-Western, liberal democratic ideals 
of the European Union.  
The final role that Poland‟s geography plays in its quality of democratic rights and 
freedoms is in political contagion. During the Cold War and early in the post-communist period 
this was related to the spread of liberal democratic ideals viewed positively by most people. The 
more recent wave of irregular, eurosceptic parties has changed the bright view of the 
phenomenon of political movements spreading internationally. Poles see successful democracies 
to the north, little democracy and Russian invasion to the east and backsliding to the south. Thus, 
the trajectory of most Polish governments has been clearly towards the liberal democracies of the 
West. This is punctuated by the military cooperation with the U.S.
146
 The new Law and Justice 
Government‟s perceived moves against some of the most basic individual rights and freedoms 
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sparked protests in several Polish cities. Some Poles worry that their new leader will emulate 
Hungary‟s Orbán.147 They fear the spread of illiberal democracy into their Polish, liberal 
democratic state.  
 The effect of Poland‟s location on a globe helps mold the true nature of rights and 
freedoms in their country. Their quality of democracy is increased by their lean to the west in the 
East-West Paradigm.  Poland enjoys a higher quality of democracy because of their safe distance 
from Putin‟s Russia. However, Poland occupies a place in an increasingly dangerous 
neighborhood. A new government similar to neighboring Hungary took post in 2015. The regime  
attempted to rebalance the Constitutional Court, implement domestic surveillance and limit the 
established press freedoms.  Geography matters to Polish democracy. 
Conclusion 
The history, culture and geography of Poland play an operative role in the strength and 
quality of their semi-liberal, Catholic democracy. Though they may be under threat, Poland 
offers many liberal rights and freedoms.  This is an achievement for a country that is decades 
younger than its Western counterparts and formerly communist. Their history of oppression and 
victimhood created a nation of people seeking a state. This state is distinctly Roman Catholic. 
These two reasons led the country to adopt the framework and foundational rights of modern, 
Western, liberal democracy. Poles have, so far, shied away from their former Soviet masters, 
who they have little in common with. Despite the decision to look west, embrace NATO and 
embrace the EU, Polish democracy is not perfect.  
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Their Catholicism is their democracy‟s foundation and their spiritual strength. The 
religious basis for much of their democracy, their freedoms and their rights also serves as a 
limiting factor. Large groups are denied basic rights in the name of Catholic teachings. Many 
crimes are not investigated for the same. Poland‟s ethnic homogeneity serves as a divisive point 
for many Poles as well. Ironically, this seems specific to non-Europeans, but not just Muslims. 
Poland and its Catholicism evolved into the basic European nation-state.  
Polish democracy‟s future looks bleak under the leadership of Duda and the Law and 
Justice Party. In terms of political rights and freedoms, the barbarians are at the gate. While 
much of the power grab of 2016 is contingent on a threat to national security or national 
interests, the act itself is astounding. A country that seemed to be a model for democracy in the 
making; a state that produced the President of the European Council now offers many basic 
rights conditionally. Many Poles rose up to oppose the Law and Justice agenda in 2016. They 
took to the streets in protest and formed groups reminiscent of the Solidarity movement. This and 
further pressure from the European Union and other international players might be the only hope 








 History plays a large part in the quality of modern Hungarian politics. From the end of 
communism to present day, its role dwarfs that of economics, culture or geography. It was the 
impetus behind the evolution of Orbán‟s illiberal democracy.  It is not enough to say that 
Hungarians have a long collective memory. They have a strong memory culture
1
 in Hungary. 
Hungary enjoyed one short period of true democracy before 1989. Before this, the Hungarian 
people lived under various undemocratic systems, sometimes quite contently. It is as if electoral 
authoritarianism suits them. There are other more specific historical antecedents. Anti-Semitism, 
Antiziganism, and other forms of xenophobia exist in many countries of the region. However, 
few places see these narratives as institutionalized as Hungary. For their part, political parties 
and politicians use religion and language to reinforce pre-existing historical mantras. 
 The Orbán government fostered Hungary‟s decent into illiberalism.  It passively deals 
with crimes and rights violations against certain minority groups, if at all. The administration 
used the New Fundamental Law of Hungary passed in 2012 to consolidate Fidesz power. The 
document offers a wide variety of rights, but also implemented supermajority voting practices. 
Furthermore, the provided rights are difficult to enforce. Orbán took steps to eliminate true 
judicial review of the government and restrain the press. These moves by the Fidesz government 
drew widespread condemnation. Hungarian democracy under Orbán is clearly illiberal, 
something he openly embraces.      
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Hungarian democracy is maintained by a constitution, The Fundamental Law. The 
current Fidesz government led by Viktor Orbán wrote and passed new constitution into effect on 
January 1, 2012.
 
This is the first post-communist constitution in Hungary. Before this, Hungary 
was governed by the amended communist constitution passed in 1949.
2
 The Fundamental Law of 
Hungary sketches an image of a relatively liberal, modern democracy. There are some 
interesting aspects to the document specific to Hungary. The “Preamble” speaks of a “Christian 
Europe”, while at the same time commits to promoting both Hungarian and minority languages. 
It also mentions supporting a Hungarian diaspora. The Fundamental Law provides the basic 
rights afforded most people in most western democracies: voting, property, religion, speech and 
association. It also establishes equal rights, specifically gender equality, bars child labor and 
establishes working conditions, social security and guarantees universal education.  
The document addresses popular constitutional issues from the late 19
th
 and early 20th, as 
well as the 21
st
 centuries. There are articles obviously based on religious tenants despite also 
establishing a separation of church and state. Article L of the “Foundation” defines marriage as 
that of a man and a woman. Article II of the “Freedom and Responsibility” section insures for 
the protection of the unborn. The document addresses more contemporary issues, as well.  
Article III of “Freedom and Responsibility” prohibits human trafficking, a large problem in the 
region. This article also bans human cloning. Article VI establishes a protection of personal 
information. The constitution creates limits and restrictions on spending and sovereign debt in 
Article 36 of “The State”. It places limits on budgets versus gross domestic product and 
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addresses debt reduction measures. Article 37 limits international bailout terms. The document 
attempts to preserve basic 19
th
 century religious beliefs while providing 21
st
century rights.  
Links to Hungary‟s past are further reinforced by Article U of the “Preamble”. It is a 
lengthy entry that names the Hungarian Socialist Worker‟s Party as a criminal organization. It 
lists the various crimes of the former communist party, including submitting to foreign interests 
and betraying a country. Furthermore it seeks to establish an investigative body to uncover the 
crimes committed during the Soviet communist period. Many different states undergo 
reconciliation following authoritarian regimes, but this as different tone. It leaves the statute of 
limitations on communist era crimes open ended. The passages have a strong aroma of score-
settling.    
The Constitution establishes a three branch government. The power is concentrated in the 
legislature known as the National Assembly. The Assembly is the basis for Hungarian 
democracy. It is the only regular instance of voting in the Hungarian political system. The 
members of the National Assembly choose a President and Prime Minister. The President must 
be 35 years old and can only serve two 5 year terms. The President deals in domestic matters and 
serves as the Chief of the Hungarian Armed Forces. Most importantly, the President nominates a 
Prime Minister. The Prime Minister nominated by the President and elected by the members of 






Figure 12.  Democratic Criteria of Hungary 
Field of Assessment  Criteria 
Right to form and join political parties and 
interest groups. 
Freedom and Responsibility, Article VIII 
Freedom of Speech and Expression Freedom and Responsibility, Article IX 
Right to Vote Freedom and Responsibility, Article XXXIII 
Eligibility for Public Office 18 years old* 
Right of political leaders to compete for 
support/votes 
Freedom and Responsibility, Article IX 
Alternative sources of information Freedom and Responsibility, Article IX 
Free and fair elections The State, Article I 
Institutions for making government policies 
depend on votes and other expressions of 
preference 
The State, Article 8 (Referendums) 
The State, Article 5 
Political participation in the European Union 29% versus 42.5% Member State Average in 
2014 EP Elections 
General Economic Conditions over Time GDP Growth:+10.23 points in five years, but 
trailing pre-crisis figures  
GINI: +3.3 points in the last 12 years  




The Hungarian election system is “one of the most complex in Europe”.4 There are 
single-member constituency lists and national lists. The single member-constituency lists are for 
specific locations: town, village and city. The national lists are published by voting blocs: 
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primarily political parties or minority groups. Hungarians vote for one of each. Single-member 
constituency candidates win by securing the most votes. These officials account for 106 seats. 
The other 93 seats are disbursed proportionately based on the national list votes and “fragment 
votes” (candidates that earned votes but lost their single-member constituency seats). There is 
also a 5% threshold. No party can seat a representative unless it is met.
5
  
The constitution provides for a judicial branch of government to provide for judicial 
review. This branch is led by a fifteen member Constitutional Court. Again, the National 
Assembly elects members to the Court. There are two other bodies that attempt to insure 
constitutionality of laws: the Curia and the National Office of the Judiciary. The head of these 
national offices are, again, elected by the National Assembly. The President of the Republic 
appoints lower level judges. The Fundamental Law also states that the National Assembly elects 
Prosecutors and a Commissioner for Fundamental Rights. This Commissioner‟s primary task is 
protecting the rights of “nationalities living in Hungary.”6 
Hungary‟s constitution maps out a liberal democracy. However, the quality of democracy 
in Hungary has come under widespread criticism in recent years. First, many legal scholars, 
international organizations and constitutional specialists object to the fashion the new 
constitution was passed into law and the democracy it yields. Many warned of the development 
of an autocratic regime and a “simulated democracy” in Hungary.7 Second, human rights groups 
have long scolded Budapest for the treatment and policies towards minorities, namely the Roma. 
This group is not alone. Anti-Semitism has reemerged as well. Finally, the domestic policies of 
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the government in Budapest raised eyebrows of other EU member states and the European 
Union.  
Democratic scholars point out structural and procedural issues with the new Fundamental 
Law emerged. First, the government made the constitution the law of Hungary using heavy 
handed tactics. Many view the passage of the new Fundamental Law as an abridgement of liberal 
democracy. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the Vienna Conference (the 
Council of Europe‟s constitutional advisory body) characterize the way the new constitution 
passed into law as “rammed through”.8 Most opposition parties boycotted the vote. Second, 
important parts of the constitution unfairly favor the Fidesz government in power. Certain 
provisions of the new constitution and Orbán‟s tactics strip much of the democracy from 
government in Hungary.  
The current system lacks the limitations on government of Alvarez‟s minimalist view of 
democracy or the checks and balances of Hasselmann‟s competing maximalist approach.9 EU 
leaders in Brussels are concerned over Fidesz‟s supermajority tactic used to steamroll opposition 
in the National Assembly.
10
 A “qualified majority” or a “two thirds” vote is needed in over 
twenty instances. The constitution requires a supermajority to do much of anything. Others 
allude to the changes to the Constitutional Court. The government enlarged the court and 
“packed” it, placing members politically aligned with the current administration. With the new 
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constitution, the court has little authority over fiscal matters of budget or spending. The court 
now has far less power in reviewing laws passed by the Fidesz controlled National Assembly.
11
 
Many view the plight of the Roma minority as the largest deficiency in Hungarian 
democracy. The Roma represent the largest minority in Hungary. They experience widespread 
systematic discrimination in education, employment and housing. Many even refuse to self-
identify in fear of reprisal, violence or discrimination.
12
 70-80% of the Roma in Hungary live 
below the Poverty Line. Segregation, discrimination and a lack of equal opportunities in most 
facets of life are hallmarks of the modern Roma experience in Hungary. 60% of Hungarians 
claim that the Roma are genetically pre-disposed to crime. Racial profiling and unwarranted 
violence by the police is also a concern.
13
  
The Roma are easy scapegoats for right-wing politicians and targets for paramilitary 
groups. Fidesz came to power and the ever more far-right Jobbik party emerged with substantial 
support in the Hungarian Parliamentary elections in 2010.
14
 Jobbik (the Movement for a Better 
Hungary) rails against “Gypsy crime” and is led by Gabor Vona, who also founded Magyar 
Garda. Magyar Garda serves as the foot soldiers of a violent far-right wing front that developed. 
They wear traditional “folk dancing dress”. Their symbol is an ancient Hungarian crest that was 
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first revitalized by the fascist Arrow Cross regime in the 1940s.
15
 There have been numerous 
crimes perpetrated by Magyar Garda members against Roma in Hungary.
16
 These occurred 
despite a national ban on the group. 
Members of Jobbik and Magyar Garda are not only anti-Ziganist but anti-Semitic, as 
well. In 2012, Jobbik parliament member Márton Gyöngyösi suggested that all Hungarian Jews 
be cataloged because they were a security threat.
17
 In 2012, three Holocaust monuments were 
vandalized. Other aligned groups have contributed to the anti-Semitism in Hungary, as well. The 
leader of the Outlaws Army stated that Adolf Hitler was not yet appreciated, but his time would 
come. Another group, Pax Hungarica, made a statement commemorating Hitler‟s birthday.18 
Despite outcries from advocacy groups, international organizations and non-government 
organizations, little is done about anti-Ziganism or anti-Semitism.  
The steps the Orbán administration took were largely cosmetic and did little to relieve the 
suffering or end the hate. Fidesz does not condemn Jobbik.
19
 Orbán‟s government does nothing 
about their rhetoric.
20
 A local Budapest court banned Magyar Garda in December 2008.
21
 
Despite the ban, a Jobbik member of the European Parliament wore his Magyar Garda uniform 
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to the European Parliament.
22
 While many fault Orbán for the rise of anti-Semitism and anti-
Roma feelings, others point to a larger issue. Henriett Dinok said, “It has become a standard 
practice for many politicians to use the `Roma issue‟ as a vote-winning strategy in elections.” 23 
Unfortunately, Dinok is right. Despite the visceral message and the negative implications, Fidesz 
and the right wing won by large margins in the last two Hungarian elections. Fidesz, its 
conservative partner the Christian Democratic People‟s Party and Jobbik combined for over 69% 
of the electorate in 2010 and 65% in 2014.
24
 
The de facto conditions in Hungary are far different from what would be expected from 
the written law. The new Fundamental Law of Hungary outlines countless rights. It loosely 
mirrors the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Many sections of the new constitution 
address very specific groups: women, religious minorities, ethnic minorities and non-Hungarian-
speaking citizens. The failure of the government, either orchestrated or unintentional, to enforce 
their own constitution supports negative contentions about democracy in Hungary. The 
conditions in Hungary lend themselves to Diamond‟s definition of a hybrid regime: democracy 
without what are considered basic rights. A failure to preserve and secure basic rights is not the 
only problem with the quality of modern Hungarian democracy.  Orbán‟s other political tactics 
and changes support the allegation that Hungarian democracy might be dead.   
Another problem for democracy in Hungary is freedom of the press. Throughout 2013 
and 2014 the government in Hungary has been lambasted by observers, analysts and members of 
the press. Even the head of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Junker, greeted Orbán by 
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saying “hello, dictator” in Latvia in May 2015.25 The government now has more control over the 
media, including a “Media Council” that can shut down outlets. The political leanings of the 
government body meant to enforce the personal information protections of the new constitution 
are being questioned.
26
  The government is accused of exerting influence on private outlets to 
gain favorable coverage. Reporters are often brought up on charges for breach of good repute 
and hooliganism”. Broadcast licenses are denied to stations critical of the Orbán government.27 




The European Union and several of its courts have ruled that much of what Hungary is 
doing is wrong. The European Court for Human Rights ruled against new Hungarian surveillance 
laws and practices. They pointed out that the law contained no judicial oversight.
29
 They criticize 
this, Orbán‟s cronyism and dispute the validity of his 2014 re-election. Some say the election 
was neither fair nor free.
30
  Despite criticisms, Hungary has done very little to improve the 
quality of democracy.
31
 They have instead, opposed the idea of EU sanctions against Poland and 
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the sanctions against Russia.
32
 Rights advocates called for a full audit of Hungarian democracy 
under the Orbán regime or a suspension of their voting rights.
33
 
An analysis of contemporary Hungarian democracy and the Hungarian democratic 
system yields a very unflattering assessment of their democratic quality. The current political 
situation in Hungary fails all three of the distinctions Alvarez and his fellow scholars earmark as 
a liberal democracy.
 34
 First, the government seems despotic. The Constitutional Court provides 
little limitation or legal constraint on the government. Orbán‟s government lowered the 
mandatory retirement age to replace judges with more Fidesz leaning jurists.
35
  Second, the legal 
structure is hamstrung by a supermajority clause. This results in virtual one party rule. Third, 
election observers questioned the fairness and legitimacy of Orbán‟s 2014 re-election.  
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) report on the 
Hungarian Elections of 2014 is very critical of the election process and question the fairness of 
the elections. The report stated that Fidesz enjoyed an “undue advantage” due to tight campaign 
regulations, a biased media and campaign activities that “blurred the separation between political 
party and the State”. The report points out that much of this is the product of recent legislation 
passed by Fidesz. Political radio and TV ads were banned in the country. The ban was later 
found to be unconstitutional, but for the election of 2014 media access was limited. Fidesz took 
advantage of its role as the ruling party by creating government public service messages that 
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were virtually campaign ads. The report also highlighted recent changes that “removed checks 
and balances” from the current government. The changes reduced the number of members of the 
National Assembly from 386 to 199. Government officials redrew the voting districts and 
gerrymandered them to benefit Fidesz. The report concluded that the elections were not fair and 
advised the OSCE to push Budapest for reforms in their electoral law.
36
  
There are clear fundamental differences between Budapest and Brussels. Many blame 
Orbán.
37
 Most Hungarians take issue with how the government decides to negotiate with the 
Union, but not with the European Union itself.
38
 The Hungarian turnout in European 
Parliamentary elections has fallen, but remains higher than the rest of the region.Hungary‟s 
approval of the European Union is in line with the rest of the member states. According to the 
Standard Eurobarometer 84, pollsters offered Hungarians three choices to classify their general 
outlook of the Union as “positive”, “negative” or “neutral”. The percentages of the Hungarian 
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Like most other member states, around 40% of Europeans hold a positive outlook, another 40% 
have a neutral view and 20% disapprove of the Union.
40
 This is within five points of the numbers 
Hungarians voted in to approve of their country‟s membership in the Union in 2003, when only 
16% of Hungarians voted “No”.   
 
 
                                                          
39 Eurostat, 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tsdgo310&plugin=1 Accessed 
August 11, 2016. 
40
 European Commission, Eurobarometer 84, Autumn 2015. 
http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/yearFrom/1973/yearTo/
































There are probably several reasons to account for the lack of change in these numbers. 
First, Hungary enjoys a moderate level of representation in the European Parliament. They hold 
2.8% or 212 seats. Second, Fidesz is a member of the large and popular European People‟s Party 
in the European Parliament. This insures that Hungarian interests are heard.
41
 Third, there are 
large economic benefits that accompany EU membership. Hungary benefitted from a €20 billion 
IMF bailout in 2008. It rescued the Hungarian economy from a free fall during the financial 
crisis of 2007.
42
 The Hungarian economy subsequently stabilized.  
 The current financial outlook for Hungary is carefully optimistic. Financial analysts cited 
both growth and expansion in the Hungarian economy since the bailout. Despite tax increases on 
certain sectors, retail sales growth was at an eleven year high in spring 2015.
43
 Following the 
IMF bailout, Hungarian GDP tracked reasonably well. This expansion of the economy coincides 
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Figure 15. Per Capita GDP (PPP) by Year, Hungary  
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Per capita GDP doubled in Hungary from 2000-2015. Post bailout, there was nearly a 
25% improvement for Hungarians. Unemployment dropped from 7.7 to 7.1% from 2014 to 
2015.
46
 This is great progress since the double-digit unemployment figures of 2011-2013.
47
 The 
employment market has rebounded to pre-2008 crisis levels.
48
 Hungary‟s per Capita income PPP 
now sits at around $25,000 (PPP), the same level as their counterpart Poland. This is where the 
balance sheets of the two countries diverge. There are other economic factors that have not 
improved and even gotten worse in Hungary in recent years. Hungarians disproportionately 
benefited from the recent recovery. Hungary‟s long term solvency could be in peril, as well.  
Income inequality increased steadily from 2009 to 2012 and remains an issue. This is a 
recent trend that began after the bailout. This lends credence to Teorell‟s.  External, targeted 
economic forces from international organizations, like sanctions, can hurt the quality of 
democracy. Hungary illustrates that the same forces in the form of external bailouts can prove 
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 It is important to note the domestic political repercussions. The 2009 bailout also served as the 
impetus behind the section of the new constitution restricting bailout terms and austerity.   
In terms of these bailouts and macro policy, Hungary is less stable than many of its 
central and eastern European neighbors. It carries a sovereign debt of 94% of its GDP.  
This amount of debt is higher than the European Union average. Hungary‟s debt is more than 
double most of the other countries in the region. A sharp downturn in the future could affect the 
current GDP and employment levels causing a crisis or even default.  The 2011 constitution 
addresses these situations. Articles 36-38 set limits on government spending whenever the debt is 
higher than 50% of GDP. They also give the Constitutional Court broad powers in annulling 
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laws in the event the debt reaches these levels.  Furthermore, the results of these acts by the court 
remain in effect even after the debt recedes.  
The improvements in the Hungarian economy since 2008 have probably stymied the 
eurosceptic movement within the country. However, the tactics of Viktor Orbán‟s regime have 
degraded the quality of democracy in Hungary. Orbán‟s illiberal democracy is enshrined in the 
compact forced upon the country by a party line vote with no opposition. The true harm, the long 
term implications arise from the need for supermajorities throughout the constitutional process. 
These can be yielded like a broadsword against any opposition working to reform Hungarian 
democracy. Fidesz erected a government not unlike that of Moscow, who they occasionally 
gravitate towards. 
History 
History is a large factor in the quality of liberal democracy in modern Hungary. The 
strong effect history has on contemporary politics in Hungary is due to a very strong memory 
culture.
50
 The wide variety of different forms of governments and democratic arrangements over 
Hungary‟s history had a few characteristics which have re-emerged in modern Hungary. First, it 
is important to note that until 1989, Hungary had no real democracy other than the two years of 
the Second Hungarian Republic. Second, when the Third Hungarian Republic was declared, 
Hungarians kept their traditional unicameral National Assembly. Finally, their long history is full 
of former enemies and perceived threats. Some are valid, while others are completely false 
narratives that are widely held. Unfortunately, this last fact is reflected not only in written law, 
but in the political conditions in the country for certain groups.  
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The history of Hungary begins at the turn of the first millennium with eight centuries of 
monarchy. This is followed by the Duel Monarchy known as the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
Following the First World War there was a short communist period. Then, there was a period 
known as the Kingdom of Hungary. It lasted from 1920 until the Second World War. During the 
Second World War, the Arrow Cross Party led the country for a short time. There was a short 
period of somewhat liberal democracy known as the Second Hungarian Republic from 1946 to 
1949. The Hungarian People‟s Republic lasted until 1989 when communism collapsed and the 
Third Republic of Hungary was declared.  
What is essentially Hungary and Hungarian started in the first century. Magyars asserted 
themselves over six other tribal groups in the region of central Europe. The Magyars fought their 
German neighbors and endured a “tug of war between Catholicism and Orthodoxy”. A marriage 
resolved this in feudal fashion. The Hungarian monarchy was established on Christmas Day on 
1000 AD with the coronation of St. Stephen following his marriage to the daughter of a rival 
Catholic, Bavarian prince.
 51
 Stephen established a safe, functioning, Christian country through 
peace treaties, marriages, and a strong government system.
52
 St. Stephen welcomed immigrants 
and embraced the linguistic diversity. He stated, “…for a state which owns but one language and 
one habit is feeble and fragile.”53 
Hungary was a prototypical European feudal monarchy. Very few people had any 
democratic rights, Landowners and nobility wielded the little power they had over their lands 
and estates. The first real glimpses of Hungarian democracy came in the 13
th
 century. A 
collection of tribal chiefs evolved into a Diet, which chose the king. The Diet gained more power 
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over time and became a legislative branch that would send legislation to the king for approval.
54
 
In 1526, Ottoman Turks invaded Hungary.
55
 This left Hungary divided between Royal Hungary, 
the Turks and a separate Transylvania.
56
 It is most interesting to point out that Jews in Hungary 
flourished under Turkish rule. In exchange for Turkish tolerance many Jews fought alongside the 
Turks against Habsburg forces.
57
   After repeated defeats at the hands of Habsburg armies, the 
Turks relinquished control of Hungary after 156 years.
58
 
Hungary lost its independence to the Austrian Hapsburgs. Despite this loss, Hungarian 
nobles retained much of their power.
59
  In 1608, the Diet took the shape it kept until 1848. It 
became bicameral. The upper house was occupied by the nobility. The lower house comprised of 
middle class members of specific areas. The peasantry was not represented. In this system, only 




 century saw a flurry of wars.
61
 The start of the 
19
th
 saw the Hungarian‟s revolt against Austrian rule and christen what is commonly referred to 
the Reform Period by many historians.
62
 The revolution yielded the April Laws which 
“constitute a charter of the breakthrough of modern Hungary”63 and “laid the foundations of the 
modern Hungarian state”64.  Act IV of 1848 expanded democracy, yet didn‟t really improve its 
quality. Many feudal practices were abandoned and Hungarian was declared the official 
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 More Hungarians gained voting rights, but there were the expected 19
th
 century 
restrictions. Only male landowners of a specific income and certain trades could vote.
66
  
 The main contribution of the 1848 Diet and the April laws was a new, modern political 
structure that offered representation, albeit limited. The Upper Chamber remained unchanged. It 
would be made of nobility. The lower chamber would be made of 446 deputies elected by the 
new expanded electorate. This government would be able to communicate with the Austrian 
monarch as an equal.
67
 Shortly after the creation of the new, more modern legislative body 
differences on monetary policy and Hungarian military reinforcements would cause Vienna and 
Pest to meander away from each other again. Yet another war was fought.
68
   
The Compromise of 1867 ended the conflict with Austria. The compromise established 
the Dual Monarchy and began the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In the agreement, Hungary 
regained most of its legal sovereignty except for “common affairs” to include defense, 
international trade and treaties. These issues would rest with the Crown.
69
 The compromise 
began moves towards becoming a mainstream European democracy. Steps were taken to make 
Hungary more open. Minorities were granted more rights. Foreign languages were permitted. 
“Nationality schools” and cultural groups were established to help migrants. Quality of life and 
infrastructure was improved too. The government started public schools and a public health 
service.
70
 There were subsequent moves to liberalize Hungarian democracy. Laws were passed 
providing for civil marriages and the registration on births, deaths and marriages by local 
governments. There was also a law recognizing the Jewish religion and providing for Freedom of 
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 Geopolitically, the Dual Monarchy sought security through a mutual defense 
agreement with Germany.
 72
 The First World War followed.  
The Treaty of Trianon ended the First World War between the victorious allies and what 
became the Kingdom of Hungary. The new Kingdom‟s borders were redrawn and Hungary lost 
territory to various European states. The treaty gave Hungarian territory to a new “Czecho-
Slovak state”, known as Czechoslovakia and the new “Serb-Croat-Slovene state” of Yugoslavia. 
The agreement made the new Hungarian state agree to insure minority and non-Magyar speech 
rights, equal rights for all and freedom of religion. Hungary also forfeited all of their overseas 
holdings.
73
 Trianon is considered by some as the “greatest tragedy” in Hungarian history.74  
The Trianon Treaty has a tremendous impact on Hungarian democracy and the quality of 
rights for some in Hungary. Some scholars trace the roots of today‟s right wing politics to the 
“lingering trauma”75 of the Trianon treaty. Some refer to a “Trianon syndrome” that makes 
Hungarians “bristle with resentment”76. László Kövér, the current Speaker of the National 
Assembly called it a sad day in Hungarian history and a tragedy.
77
 Several Hungarian 
government representatives lamented the loss of land, the plight of the Hungarian diaspora and 
vowed to strengthen the Hungarian identity.  In June 2016, young nationalist radicals held a 
march through the middle of downtown Budapest. The route passed in front of the Serbian, 
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Romanian and Slovakian embassies.
78
 As far back as 2010, mainstream Hungarian politicians 
called the treaty “a robbing peace, an unjust peace which was concluded on the basis of ignoring 
fundamental human rights and freedoms.”79 This is the basis for xenophobia and resentment of 
non-Hungarians for many in the country.  
Count Mihály Károlyi declared Hungary‟s First Republic on November 16, 1918.80 
Negotiations over post-war borders led to President Károlyi‟s resignation. He handed the 
government over to a coalition of Social Democrats and Communists. A Soviet Republic was 
declared on March 21, 1919.
81
 The parties merged and took their orders directly from the 
Bolsheviks. Bela Kun, a journalist close to Lenin, became the head of state.
82
 Their economic 
policies mimicked those of the Soviet Union: nationalization, collective farms to name a few.
 83
 
They also endeavored to establish an internal police force like the Soviet Union‟s NKVD. The 
number of their victims ranges from a few hundred to a few thousand.
84
  
The Hungarian Soviet Republic contributed to the nature of modern Hungarian 
democracy. This is due in great part to the number of Jews who led the short-lived, communist 
government. It lasted only 133 days and met a bloody end.
85
 Entente-backed Romanian armies 
invaded and defeated the Hungarian Red Army in November. The Entente engineered a 
Romanian withdraw and Hungarian Admiral Mikos Horthy marched his Hungarian National 
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Army into Budapest the next day.  This chapter of communism in Hungary ended with revenge 
and reciprocity. Horthy looked away while military units launched a White Terror. Military units 
targeted supporters of the Kun Regime, socialists, democrats, and Jews. Several historians note 
that anti-Semitism swelled following the collapse of the Moscow-backed regime.
86
 
The Kingdom of Hungary was established with a caretaker government to negotiate with 
the Entente until elections. The government operated “flawlessly” until 1939.87 In the end, it 
would be Hungary‟s association with Hitler‟s Germany that would spell the end of the realm. 
Admiral Nicholas Horthy was elected Regent of Hungary on March 1, 1920.
88
 There were 
several changes to voting rights and election laws in the limited time of the Kingdom. First, in 
1919, the government made a decree that extended limited voting rights to women. Potential 
female voters could vote if they could speak and write one of a number of approved languages.
89
   
Three years later the government applied a number of restrictions to voters. Voters had to 
have been citizens for 10 years and have four years of primary education. Women had additional 
requirements to be met. Women voters had to be married, have three children or have an 
independent income. Interestingly, the age requirement for women was waived if they were 
university educated. The secret ballot was abolished in rural areas and party lists replaced 
individual constituencies in major towns and cities. The government intended to protect their 
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In 1926, the government underwent a structural reform. Despite the initial advances in 
democracy in the early days of the kingdom these changes, again, sought to preserve the power 
of the elite. The Upper House, known as the House of Magnates, was changed. Up to this point, 
the Upper House consisted of senior, wealthy nobility. The new Upper House contained four 
different groups. Certain noble families elected some of the members. Other members were 
drawn from the leadership of the predominant religions: Catholics, Protestants and Jews. Some 
were elected from the academic ranks. Others were senior tradesmen. Most were elected in one 
fashion or another. Hungarians exercised universal suffrage and elected both the Upper and 
Lower Houses of the Parliament for five year terms.
91
   
A series of Prime Ministers guided the Kingdom‟s government. These prime ministers 
politically migrated towards Berlin as Germany gained more geopolitical power in the region. 
The government signed the Anschluss with Nazi Germany in March of 1938. This meant 
aligning domestic politics with those of Berlin. Codified anti-Semitism came in three successive 
legislative waves over the next three years.
92
  Hungary regained much of the territory lost under 
the Trianon Treaty under the hand of the Nazis.
 93
 This and the reintroduction of the secret ballot 
aided in support for Hitler in Hungary. Many Hungarian Nazi supporters came from the 
reclaimed territories lost in the Treaty of Trianon.
94
 This aided the Hungarian fascists of the 
Arrow Cross Party. The party was the third largest Fascist Party in Europe in the 1930s. It 
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emerged as the second largest party in Hungary after the elections of 1939.
95
 The Arrow Cross 
Party seized power with German assistance in 1944. Their hit squads sought and executed 
thousands of Jews.
96
 The tenure of the Arrow Cross Party was short lived. Soviet forces occupied 
the country months later.
97
    
The pro-Nazi Arrow Cross government neither holds a monopoly on anti-Semitism in 
Hungarian history nor did anti-Semitism end with the groups‟ downfall. In fact, this anti-Jewish 
rhetoric proves to be one of the stronger historical antecedents of modern Hungary.  Jen Becker 
wrote, “A culture of resentment of Jews, `gypsies‟ and `communists; has intensified.” It is all 
historic.
98
 Anti-Semitism was the intellectual property of right-wing political groups before the 
First World War. Three anti-Semitic trends emerged afterwards. They were scapegoated for the 
defeat of the Central Powers in Germany and Hungary.
 99
 In late 1918, a Roman Catholic Bishop 
accused Hungarian Jews of evading military service. Bishop Prohászka warned that Hungary 
might “become a Jewish country”. More specifically he warned of Jewish revolutionaries.100 
This fostered a second trend in anti-Semitism: a perceived “a `natural‟ attraction of Jews and 
international communism.” 101 This Bishop and others like him throughout the region focused on 
Jewish communists. This created what Hanebrink coined the “Judeo-Bolshevik Myth”. 
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Hanebrink wrote that such paranoia was not unusual in central and eastern Europe after the First 
World War, but also that the effect was especially powerful in Hungary.
102
  
The final anti-Semitic products of the First World War were associated with the Treaty of 
Versailles. These were the myths of a Jewish conspiracy to wrest control of Europe, the ever 
popular “stab on the back” narrative (Jews betraying European countries), and the idea that 
Jewish bankers profited from the payment of war reparations.
103
 Some scholars view the Treaties 
of Versailles and Trianon differently. They feel the losses of Hungarian lands and money in the 
treaties left Hungary crippled and demoralized. It was easy prey to the enticements of Hitler‟s 
Germany.
 He offered Hungary a return of their lands. This left Hungarian Jews “caught in the 
middle”. 600,000 Hungarian Jews and Roma were exterminated by the Nazis and the aligned 
Arrow Cross Party.
 104
 Regardless of the cause, one would think that such a horribly, dark period 
of history might serve as a formidable warning to present day Hungarians. It has not. 
 Several authors allude to a common, broad denial of the past on the part of Hungarians. 
Laszlo Somorjai feels that history is important to Hungarians because so many have simply 
refused to deal with the past. This leaves the country open the racist nationalism of groups like 
Jobbik.
105
 Paul Lendvai agrees with him.  
Polls on recent Hungarian history reveal a rejection of any 
attempt to come to terms with the past and a strong tendency  
to embrace nationalistic and xenophobic stereotypes. Everything  
in Hungarian history that was a failure or `unpleasant‟ is blamed on  
neighboring countries, on minorities or on foreigners living in Hungary.
106
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He notes that only 4% of people between 18 and 30 know what “Holocaust” means.” Two-thirds 
of Hungarians believe Jews are too powerful in business. 50% of Hungarians believe Jewish 
financers are responsible for the world economic crisis of 2012. 40% think that Jews worry more 
about Israel more than their mother country”.  In 2009, 46% of Hungarians said Jews talk about 
the Holocaust too much.
107
  
Not only does the “iron silence” about Hungary‟s role in the Holocaust continue, but anti-
Semitism and crimes against the Roma minority continue. Márton Gyöngyösi, a member of 
Jobbik, called for Hungarian Jews to be cataloged and screened as national security threats.  
Another Jobbik candidate recently accused Jews of using gypsies as a “biological weapon” 
against Hungarians.  Alarmingly, he won his seat despite this. Other right-wing and eurosceptic 
parties in Europe reject Jobbik‟s anti-Semitism.108 Wilders of the Netherlands and Le Pen of 
France refused to form a European parliamentary voting block with Jobbik in the European 









 They were banned from the Holy Roman Empire in 1501. In 1666, French 
king Louis XIV said that Gypsy men should be imprisoned, the women sterilized and children 
placed in poorhouses. Spain declared a “Great Gypsy Round Up” in the late 18th century. The 
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 The 1910 
Encyclopedia Britannica states that Gypsies “have no ethical principles and they do not 
recognize the obligations of the Ten Commandments. There is extreme moral laxity in relation to 
the two sexes… At the same time they are great cowards.”112 During the period of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, Empress Maria Theresia implemented a program of forced assimilation. This 
included removing children from their parents.
113
 
 The plight of the Roma in Europe continued into modern Europe. There are varying 
reports about the numbers of Roma killed by the Nazis. Belinda Cooper wrote that 
approximately a half million Roma were killed. The Office of the Commissioner of Human 
Rights in the Council of Europe notes that some European states lost half of their Roma 
population. Central and eastern European Soviet satellites saw a “Gypsy Problem”. Their policy 
included breaking up families and dispersing them to different countries of the Warsaw Pact. 
Despite this, even then, Gypsies occupied the worst jobs.
114
 Even today some EU states 
fingerprint, segregate or expel Roma populations.
115
 
 Hungary has the largest issue with anti-Roma activity. This should be no surprise for two 
reasons. First, the Roma represent the largest minority in Hungary.
116
 They are a large, ready-
made target for xenophobic, nativists. Second, oppressing Roma is probably second nature to 
many Hungarians because of Hungarian political history. The Dual Monarchy saw them as 
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inferior and attempted to assimilate them. The Nazis and their Arrow Cross brethren 
exterminated them. The communists tried destroying their culture by breaking up their basic 
family units. One of the few consistencies in Hungary‟s political history is a lack of rights and 
equality and poor treatment of the Roma.  
Democracy in Hungary after the Second World War had an unfulfilled and short life. 
This period is the closest Hungary came to liberal democracy before 1989. The government was 
started in the adverse conditions highlighted by Kapstein and Converse.
117
 The country had a 
large war debt and indemnities. There were some institutional weaknesses. Hungary had no 
political system following the war. However, parties coalesced. They successfully forged 
coalitions to govern. Kenez wrote that Soviet support for authentic coalition government in 
Hungary was “perfectly genuine”.118  Molnar differs. He summed the period up best. He wrote, 
“For three years, Hungary lived a limited and supervised democracy under Soviet occupation.”119 
Perhaps, if left alone, the Second Hungarian Republic stood a chance. 
The Yalta agreement called for elections. The Soviet leadership abided by the agreement. 
Elections were held in August of 1945. The electorate was the most expanded of any in 
Hungarian history up to that time. All Hungarians, male and female could vote. Property and 
education requirements were dropped.
120
 The Small Holders‟ Party won 57% of the seats. They 
formed a coalition government that included the communists.
121
 In short, the Soviets needed this 
type of election. Moscow allowed the creation of multiparty system to give their future plans 
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legitimacy. It attempted to lull the Allies into some sort of false hope, but more importantly it 
provided the Soviets with a method to take charge later.  
Moscow‟s political moves in Hungary immediately following the end of the war look like 
parts of a larger plan aimed at taking power. These moves culminated in the rigged elections of 
1947.
 122
 Molnar wrote that the key to Moscow‟s plan were the certain political “mines” planted 
in the different parties and the political system. Historians refer to these political maneuvers as 
“salami tactics.” When detonated, the communists could take charge.123 Leaders of prominent 
non-communist parties were arrested and sent to the Soviet Union others fled the country in fear. 
Communist operatives infiltrated non-communist parties. In 1947, the National Assembly passed 
laws disenfranchising large numbers of people: former Nazi sympathizers, people who fled the 
entering Red Army at the end of the war and other political opponents of the communist party.
124
 
The stage was set. The communists faced fragmented parties in the election after the salami 
tactics of Moscow.
125
 Despite 49% victory, the communists further consolidated power two years 
later.
126
 The Hungarian People‟s Republic began with the elections of 1949, which were even 




 The Hungarian communist leaders modeled their rule after Soviet policy. This included 
forced industrialization, agrarian collectivization and using education as propaganda. They 
imposed a state security apparatus like most other communist regimes. In1950, state security, 
AVH, monitored an estimated 1.3M Hungarians. 6,000 were jailed without trial. 387,000 were 
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condemned for various crimes against the state.
128
 When Stalin died, the leadership in Moscow 
saw fit to relax tensions by easing political oppression. Stalin‟s successors felt “that the screws of 
Stalinism had been tightened too recklessly.”129 The Hungarian General Secretary, Mátyás 
Rákosi was replaced by Imre Nagy, a more moderate member of the party.
130
  This was the first 
in a chain of events that led to the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. 
Nagy had a few immediate goals. First, he ended of softened some of the more 
oppressive measures of Stalinism. He rolled back some of the economic policies. Nagy granted 
amnesty to political prisoners. Politically, he bravely sought to modify single party system.
131
 
Nagy wanted to revive some parties excluded from Hungarian politics by the one-party policy. 
These parties would be known as the Patriotic People‟s Front. This would pursue national 
instead of Soviet oriented themed socialism.
132
 This plan worried hardline communists. Rákosi 
organized their support and overthrew Nagy. The following year, Nikita Khrushchev gave his 
famous renouncement of Stalin at the 20
th
 Party Congress. Many hopes democracy might follow. 
This included university students of Budapest.
133
 
Hungarian University students saw a possibility for change in the death of Stalin. The 
Hungarian Communist Party permitted the students to demonstrate. The students sought free 
elections, wanted Soviet forces out of Hungary and demanded Imre Nagy be named Prime 
Minister. The student demonstration of a few hundred grew into a mass demonstration of a few 
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 A ceasefire was brokered and Nagy was named leader of the government and started 
to move to a multi-party system. He declared Hungary‟s neutrality and withdrew from the 
Warsaw Pact. In response, Soviet forces attacked Budapest and crushed the revolution. Nagy was 
tried and executed in 1958.
135
  
The 1956 Revolution is a prime example of how history can affect democracy. It is “at 
the core of contemporary political culture” in Hungary.136 The events of the nine days on 
October of that year played a part in the collapse of communism, figured into the rise of Orbán 
and made their way into the Hungarian Constitution. Central to the memory of the Revolution 
was the fate of Imre Nagy. Before the end of communism in Hungary, over 300,000 Hungarians 
attended a formal burial for Nagy. This “delegitimized” the communist regime and illustrated the 
power of the Hungarian people.
137
 Karl P. Benziger wrote that “Memory culture in Hungary is 
powerfully reinforced through various rites of memorial that include not only the burial of the 
dead but also the remembrance of symbolic figures who help link Hungarian identity to the 
connect of community and nation.”138 
Some of the first acts of the new Parliament in 1990 involved the 1956 Revolution. These 
included rehabilitating Nagy and others and commemorating October 23
rd
. It is important to note 
that some of the participants of the revolt served in Parliament at the time.
139
 There other aspect 
of the Revolution politically addressed was justice. Many Hungarians seek the prosecution of 
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those who collaborated with the Nazis, member of the Arrow Cross Party and worked with the 
communists.
140
 The soldiers who helped put down 1956 revolution are primary targets for this 
movement.
141
 The judicial principles and democratic ideas behind such a prosecution are 
wrought with peril: extending statutes of limitation, ipso facto laws being enforced. Yet, the 
Constitutional Court granted that such prosecutions were legal citing the Geneva Convention. 
The massacres on October 1956 fall under crimes against humanity.  
A very recent political reference to the Revolution of 1956 came in 2006, when protestors 
took to the streets to show their opposition to the election of Prime Minister Ferenc Gyursany. It 
became known that he lied to the Hungarian people about promised tax cuts and fiscal policy to 
get elected. The protests were staged at the very same places on the very same calendar days as 
the Revolution. Viktor Orbán took advantage of the historical imagery to call for Gyursany‟s 
resignation.
142
  His Fidesz Party staged a mass gathering at Astoria Square and other 




Janos Kadar became the Secretary General after 1956. He knew that the socialist utopia 
had come partially unraveled. Kadar seemingly pushed the limits of Moscow‟s toleration. There 
is no indication that he ever entertained the notion of liberal democracy, but he offered a more 
tolerable authoritarian rule. He restored churches, their subsidies. The government reformed the 
criminal code and granted a partial amnesty. When he felt pressure from regional communist 
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peers, he re-collectivized agriculture, but he used tax incentives to lure farmers. He is famously 
quoted as saying “Those who are not against us are with us.”144   
The material goods of “goulash communism” made life in Hungary more tolerable. This 
same liberal Hungarian model held the roots of its own downfall.
145
 Allowing Hungarians 
precious nibbles of free market capitalism and very limited liberal rights gave them an alternative 
when the economy took a downturn and the Soviet system faltered. Eventually, Moscow 
replaced the intransient Kadar and started negotiations with opposition groups. On October 23, 
1989, the Third Hungarian Republic, the Hungary known to the world today, was declared. In 
the first few years of the republic, the state took great steps in securing human rights. The 
National Assembly amended the 1949 constitution which “recognizes the inalienable an 
inviolable, fundamental rights of law, and regards their observance and protection as the state‟s 
primary responsibility.” It provides for equality regardless of race, color, religion, sex, political 
views national or social origin, wealth or ancestry.
146
 
The history of Hungary is a chronological mix of different political leaderships. It has a 
long period of traditional European monarchy, a short period of constitutional monarchy, 
subservience to a foreign European power, two different eras of communism, a short period of 
fascist rule and, now, two periods of democracy. The historical antecedents are limited, but 
resilient. The lack of a substantial period of democracy until now seemingly makes them tolerant 
of rule that smacks of authoritarianism. The structure of the Hungarian legislature remains 
unchanged, but they also retain some age old racist attitudes towards Jews and the Roma. These 
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groups historically served as scapegoats and this continues today. Hungary proves how history 
can dominate a political landscape and not always in a positive manner.     
Culture 
Culture affects the quality of Hungarian democracy in marginal, yet negative ways. The 
country is largely secular. Many declared Catholics and Protestants would be best described as 
lapsed. The co-opting of pre-Vatican II themes and use of the Church as a bully pulpit for Far 
Right endeavors are the lone impacts religion has on politics and democracy in modern Hungary.  
Ethnicity and language are used in much the same manner. Most Hungarians view European 
migrants and ethnic groups as benign. Others from outside the continent or who are regarded as 
less European are kept from their exercise of full rights. In this, language barriers prove useful. 
Religion, ethnicity and language aid in lowering the quality of democracy in modern Hungary. .    
Religion in post-communist Hungary is a multi-faceted conversation. First, Hungary is 
religiously diverse. There is a large Catholic congregation in Hungary. It also has the largest 
Protestant population in the region.
147
 One might suspect to see Woodberry and Shah‟s link 
between Protestantism and democracy or the positive effect of post-Vatican II Catholicism noted 
by Berger and Philpot. You would be disappointed. A large number of Hungarians are 
religiously unaffiliated. This unaffiliated group is the largest of its kind in the region. 
Researchers attribute this to either church collaboration with the communist government or 
oppression by the regimes. For whatever reason, modern Hungary today is largely secular. 
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Research shows even those who claim a religion attend infrequently.
148
 For most Hungarians, 
religion is something that has been reduced to the tool of the Far Right political parties.  
The pluralistic quality of Christianity in Hungary dates back to the Reformation. The 
Reformation was very popular in Hungary.
149
 Measures taken by the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
further distanced Hungarian society from the Catholic Church.
150
 The end result is a religious 
diverse population that maintains a shrinking Catholic population. In 1992, Catholics accounted 
for 50% of Hungarians.
151
  Today, Catholics account for 45% of the population and Hungary is 
15% Protestant.
152
 Yet, the fastest growing number is the group that associates with no church. 
Hungarians claiming no religious preference are the second largest group at 27%. 18% state 
“none” when asked about their religious preference.153  
These figures lead to a discussion of central and eastern Europe: secularization. The 
existing literature lends three different theories credit for secularizing Hungarians. First, some 
scholars use modernization theory to account for it. Second, some scholars point to communist 
oppression. Third, others cite church collaboration with the Hungarian communist regime. This 
has the most support among analysts and researchers. The other two are not only supported by 
fewer in the field, but they do not stand up to critical analysis. Gautier wrote that modernization 
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accounts for a decline in religious beliefs and activity.
154
 Máté-Tóth, a former theologian, 
supports this. He advanced the notion that EU influence indirectly secularizes member states.
 155
 
This simply does not stand up to scrutiny when observing other countries in the region, namely 
Poland.  
There is evidence that communist repression of religion initiated secularization in central 
and eastern Europe.
156
  Communists in Hungary were relatively hard on religious leaders. Their 
tactics included prison sentences, torture and internment.
157
  Müller and Nuendorf researched the 
effect of differing generations and established the age of fourteen as an essential benchmark in 
developing religion.
158
 There is a high disparity between religiosity between the pre-Cold War 
and Cold War populations in Hungary.
159
 However, some facts support that there is not a direct 
causal relationship between communist oppression of religion and recent secularization. Many 
scholars point to the church reaction to the anti-religious, government tactics. 
The final explanation for Hungary‟s secularization was the churches cooperation and 
collaboration with the communist regime in Hungary.
160
  The Catholic and Protestant churches 
discovered that aligning itself with the communist regimes was the only way to survive. 
Protestant churches accepted the role of a “church within socialism”. 161 The Catholic Church 
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often “appeared as an official Church serving the interests of the government.”162  The decision 
to work alongside and, in some cases, with the government cost them credibility.
163
 Many 
Hungarians associate church with socialism.
164
 54% of Catholics today have little or no 
confidence in their church.
165
  The result is a far less religious country.   
The secular nature of the Hungarian populace is evident in their post-communist politics. 
Religion had very little to do with the transition to democracy in Hungary after communism. 
There is a trend away from religion in the contemporary written law of Hungary. 
166
 When 
communism collapsed in 1989, Hungary did not adopt a new constitution like most other states 
in the region. The old Soviet-styled 1949 constitution was kept in-place although it was heavily 
amended. The new Constitution passed into law in 2013 has the earmarks of a more secular 
document. The Preamble mentions Christianity, but in the context of “nationhood”. It lists some 
rights and laws that are based on widely held Christian beliefs. There is no mention of a specific 
church nor is there any real reference to theology specific to a single denomination. A large 
portion of the document addresses practical issues (specific rights in the work place) and says 
little about anything spiritual. The document is reflective of the more secularized contemporary 
Hungarian state.   
 Paradoxically, religion plays a role in the everyday, domestic politics of modern 
Hungary. Politicians, specifically Orbán, use religion for political purposes.
167
 Most are not 
liberal or very democratic in spirit. Both churches essentially support far-right groups. Catholic 
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priests give politicized sermons and distribute pro-right leaflets.
168
 The Catholic Church ignores 
the plight of the Roma and is careful not to confront Fidesz or Jobbik. Reformed Calvinist priests 
gave blessings at radical right-wing events. 
169
 Church leaders from both denominations attended 
the inauguration of Magyar Garda.
170
 This political alignment with the far-right is the extent of 
religion‟s impact in Hungarian democracy. These far-right political efforts tend to target 
minorities.   
The ethnic minorities in Hungary are small, but growing.  85% of the population claim to 
be at least partially Hungarian. The Roma minority make up 3.2% of people living in Hungary, 
while ethnic Germans comprise 1.9%. This can be deceiving. More than 7% of the population 
claims to be multi-ethnic and 14% are classified as “unspecified”. 171 These figures compare to a 
Hungarian population 15 years ago that was measured as 92% Hungarian.
172
 Over the last decade 
Hungary became less Hungarian. Many see this as a negative side-effect of open borders, 
migration and the older “problem” of the Roma. This contributes to established historical second 
class status for non-Hungarians. 
Ethnic minorities, religious minorities and different groups of every ilk enjoy basic rights 
under the 2012 constitution. Yet, none of it really seems to matter. First, simply put, “migrants 
aren‟t welcome in Hungary.” Orbán opposes a multicultural society and fears Hungarian people 
“dying out”. Some in the Fidesz government want the ability to round up and arrest asylum 
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seekers and end immigration.
 173
 Many political parties and paramilitary groups, like Magya 
Garda, regularly engage in hate speech directed at migrants, along with Jews, the long-hated 
Roma and members of the LGBT community. The Budapest Pride Parade celebrating gay rights 
was attacked by neo-nazis.
174
 Newer laws addressing hate crimes go unenforced. Ethnic minority 
children are segregated in schools. These minority groups suffer from inadequate housing.
 175
 
Some NGOs familiar with the migrant situation in Hungary see the improvements in the asylum 
process and steps towards integration as “window dressing”.176 
Another opportunity for improvement for minority groups in Hungary is gender equality. 
There is little published about women‟s rights, violence or more of the physical threats to women 
in Hungary. Like most other former Soviet satellites, women achieved suffrage in the early 
1900s. Abortions are not unreasonably restrained.
177
 Most of the advances for women in 
Hungary came from NGOs and the government under the new 2013 Penal Code. Domestic 
violence has larger jail sentences and stronger restraining orders. A new women‟s crisis hotline 
was established. There are generous maternity leave options. There are more generous 
government stipends for stay at home parents and parents of disabled children.
178
  
Despite government efforts, women lag behind in other areas. Politically and 
professionally, women are legally equal to men according to the written laws and constitution in 
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Hungary. Women have large problems in public and private sector jobs. Daycare is hard to find 
in more rural areas.
179
 This keeps workforce participation lower. Women are paid just over half 
of what men are for equal work despite laws against it. There are few women in government and 
virtually none at the higher levels. The World Economic Forum ranks Hungary in the bottom 
half of the world and the worst in Europe when it comes to the overall lives of women. In 
political empowerment, Hungary is only sixth for the bottom.
180
 
Language rights impact democracy in modern Hungary three ways. First, there is the 
legal framework. This is found in the new Constitution and the newer Penal Code. The next 
aspect lies in the educational approach by the government. The third and final part of languages 
function on democracy is the implementation of liberal language rights and gaps between de jure 
rights and de facto conditions. The 2012 Hungarian Constitution ensures equal rights regardless 
of spoken language.
181
 Much like many other EU member states Hungary ratified the European 
Charter for Regional and Minority Languages.
182
 Legally speaking, non-Hungarian language 
speakers should enjoy the same rights and opportunities as any other Hungarian. This is also 
reflected in the multi-lingual approach seen in Hungarian schools.  
Hungary has a law that provides for primary education for children in either Hungarian or 
the language of their national or ethnic group. The kindergarten program in Hungary is very 
liberal and open to minorities. “An increasing number of kindergartens provide care, nursing and 
                                                          
179
 European Parliament Directorate General for Internal Policies, “The Policy on Gender Equality in Hungary, 
Update 2013”.  
180
 World Economic Forum, “Gender Gap Report, 2015 - Hungary”. http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-
report-2015/economies/#economy=HUN. Accessed July 3, 2016.   
181
 The Fundamental Law of Hungary 
182
 List of signatories to the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages. 
http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/148/signatures. Accessed July 3, 2016. 
186 
 
education for children of foreign citizens.”183 It is very interesting to note that the source of this 
data said very little about the Roma minority. It discusses nationalities and language speakers 
from other EU states, but nothing about Roma children. This highlights one of the largest gaps 
for integration into Hungarian political life for Roma and migrants from other non-European 
spaces  
The efforts made by the Hungarian government in terms of language neglect the people it 
needs to help the most. The 2015 Mission Report collected material from various NGOs about 
language. In summary, much of the information offered to Roma and asylum seekers is not in the 
right language. Much of it is offered only in Hungarian.
184
 MGYOSZ, the largest organization of 
employers in Hungary, cite that language is the largest obstacle to integrating newly arrived 
persons into the labor market.
185
 One researcher notes that the difficultly of learning the 




The difference between the written law and actual conditions of rights for foreign 
language speakers is substantial. Officially, non-native speakers are protected from workplace 
discrimination.
187
 Yet, the new Penal Code fails to safeguard non-Hungarian speakers from 
discrimination or hate crimes.
188
 This lack of legal support for language rights is even worse at 
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the local level. The 2015 European Commission assessment of Hungary‟s integration plan 
mentions a lack of implementation and oversight at the local level numerous times.
189
 In 
summary, minority rights, whether it is language or otherwise, are approved in Budapest, but 
mean very little outside of the National Assembly.   
Geography 
 Geography is relevant to the discussion of the quality of democracy in Hungary, but far 
greater in terms of the region. There is little to be found in reference to east and west religiously. 
The East-West paradigm and Hungary‟s geographic relation to Russia effect Hungarian 
democracy in a limited manner. Hungary‟s geography has a greater impact on the rest of the 
region. It presents a possible source for a reinvigorated wave reversal of Huntington‟s Third 
Wave. In this regard, contagion does not affect democratic quality in Hungary. Politics in 
Hungary could affect the politics in neighboring central and eastern European countries. It 
illustrates what a contagion might look like from the source.   
The East-West paradigm plays a minor role in shaping democratic quality in Hungary. 
There were essentially three stages in its function. First, NATO and the west helped form the 
initial post-communist government. Second, the rise of Vladimir Putin and his subsequent 
overtures and threats altered the dynamic. Finally, the rise of Fidesz and Orbán place the 
paradigm‟s effect were it is today. For it seems that Hungary is sitting closer to Putinist Russia 
than the United States and even the EU leadership in Brussels. Orbán marked the new embrace 
of power politics and self-interest in lieu of many of the founding principles of the European 
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Union. This illustrates not only the power of the East-West paradigm, but how it evolved over 
time since 1989.  
 Hungary and most former Soviet satellites moved itself politically closer to the west 
following communism. It joined NATO in 1999 and the European Union in 2004. The notion of 
belonging to a modern Europe, implied promises and possible economic benefits motivated post-
communist, pro-western regimes for a quite a number of years. Culturally, it made sense, too. 
There are few ethnic Russians in Hungary. There are few Eastern Orthodox adherents. The 
number of Russian-speaking Hungarians is not noted it is so small. The celebrated “return to 
Europe”, the new world order and prospects of western affluence made the alignment logical.  
 This period illustrates the positive effect EU membership has on democracy in Hungary. 
Hungary had extensive work to complete before their membership to the European Union was 
granted. Some changes to laws and structure met with opposition. The government in Budapest 
cut their deficit, their healthcare system was modernized and somewhat privatized and wages 
were increased.
190
 New food safety regulations were passed to align with EU standards.
191
 
Protection of personal data was bolstered.
192
 The parliament passed new amendments to the 
Labor Code.
193
 There were large scale changes in the treatment of the Roma minority. The 
responsibility was reassigned to the office of the Prime Minister.
194
 The government made large 
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changes to their visa and asylum policies. They also aligned their border security with EU 
standards with neighboring countries.
195
 
 Over the next few years, the economy deteriorated. Orbán and the conservative Fidesz 
Party won control of the government in 2010. Relations with the west and the European Union 
soured over the next few years. Initially, this was caused by the international outcry over 
Hungary‟s immigration policy. The Union‟s demands for reform placed Budapest in less than 
good standing with EU leadership.  Many have discussed revoking Hungary‟s European 
Parliamentary voting rights over their opposition to EU migration policy and contemplating re-
introducing the death penalty in Hungary.
196
  Viktor Orbán drew Hungary closer to Putin. In 
light of the sanctions against Russia for the invasion of the Ukraine, Orbán was characterized as 
a “disloyal member [of the EU] agitating it from within.”197 Hungary broke with Brussels and 
signed a bilateral gas deal with Moscow. This flew in the face of EU efforts to punish Russia 
over their invasion of the Ukraine and support for Assad in Syria.
198
 Orbán continues to oppose 
the EU on further integration and migration policy.  
 It is important to note that Hungary‟s proximity to Russia has little to do with Hungarian 
domestic affairs and rights. Orbán does emulate the illiberal democracy of Russia. He and Putin 
rule in much the same manner. They differ in that Putin seeks to destroy the EU and Orbán 
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simply wants member states to have sole control over domestic affairs. He has no issue with the 
free trade zone which benefits Hungary a great deal. In this respect, Orbán is not pro-Putin. He is 
Pro-Orbán. He seeks to ingratiate himself to the Hungarian people and the oligarchs that profit 
from Hungary‟s economic success.199 One only needs to see Orbán‟s pro-NATO comments after 
the July 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw to see how thin his ties to Russia are.
200
 It illustrates 
that Orbán is not pro-East or pro-West. He is pro-Orbán.  
 Orbán‟s government plays a specific role in the contagion model. Miller wrote of the 
democratic contagion in the days following communism. Huntington spoke of democratization 
comparably: in waves. Orbán represents what might prove to be something akin to Cold War 
domino theory. It is a palpable example of a wave reversal or Diamond‟s “democratic rollback”. 
Hungary represents the contagion in this situation. It is a possible starting point for an erosion of 
liberalism in democracies or democracies as a whole. Some fear Poland is already a victim. The 
phenomenon does not stop there. Following the Brexit, Orbán‟s government proposed a national 
referendum on the proposed EU migration quotas. Some researchers predict a “referendum 
contagion”.201 While not a victim of the contagion, Hungary seems like it might prove to be 
patient zero. This might lead to other countries breaking with Brussels on large issues. The 
contagion could signal a reversal on EU integration.  
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 History is the dominant force in molding a modern illiberal democracy in Hungary. 
Culture and geography play far smaller roles in shaping its character. The press faces obstacles to 
its freedom. Women face legal and economic hurdles to equality. Minorities experience 
discrimination and hate crimes, often with little recourse. The Orbán Regime oversees this lack 
of fundamental rights and seeks to control power by manipulating the judicial branch of the 
government and safeguarding their power with supermajority requirements in the legislature. It is 
comparable to a historian picking some of the worst of Hungarian history and implementing it as 
law.  
  Much of the deficiencies in democratic rights in Hungary are historical antecedents. Anti-
Semitism is rooted in the national memory of betrayal by Jews who formed the interwar 
communist regime of Bela Kun. This hate and animosity was fed by European contemporaries 
and Hitler‟s Germany. The second class treatment of the Roma is another age old institution that 
Hungarians inexplicably embrace. These attitudes towards threats to Hungarian identity flourish 
today and include similar attitudes about non-European migrants and refugees. Even native 
Hungarians are left with the scraps and trappings of democracy and lack a clear voice as the 
National Assembly represents an institutional mimicry
202
 of the Diet under a monarch. Today, 
Fidesz is the nobility and Orbán their king.
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 Geography, the East-West Paradigm and accompanying contagion infected the emerged 
contortion of Bulgarian government. The state‟s post-Communist government is a mafia state 
with limited democratic rights. The situation is deceiving in researching Bulgaria since the 
collapse of communism and social democracy. There are plenty of historical antecedents that 
lead one to suspect history is the prime influence on Bulgarian politics today. The same can be 
said of Eastern Orthodox. Yet, deeper investigation reveals that the common denominator is their 
neighbor across the Black Sea. The former Soviet Union and the subsequent Russian state 
established strong ties with the country centuries ago, but remain exerting influence through 
extra-political means.  Complicating the research of post-communist Bulgarian democracy is its 
current state of transition. 
 The portrait of political rights and democracy in Bulgaria today is a snapshot of a medias 
res. Russian influence (communist, religious and criminal) stymied the initial quality of 
democracy and liberal rights after the declaration of a democratic state. These influences started 
to decline with Bulgaria‟s accession to the European Union. Advocates for democracy can only 
hope that Bulgarian President Rosen Plevneliev will continue reforms and break control of the 
oligarch‟s “thick necks”1. This will give EU influence more time to develop Habermas‟ theory of 
post nationalist democracy.
2
 It can produce freedoms and rights to the point where Bulgaria Is on 
par with other liberal democracies seated in Brussels. 
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Democracy in Bulgaria was established on July 13, 1991 by the Constitution of the 
Republic of Bulgaria. The document guarantees most of the liberal rights enjoyed in liberal 
democracies around the world:  universal suffrage for all persons over 18, protection from 
discrimination based on race, sex or ethnicity, political plurality and religious tolerance. The 
constitution also bans torture, ensures the rights of the accused, and provides for basic privacy 
rights, the right to petition and the right to an education. The document also contains an 
extensive number of obligations for the state. It establishes universal healthcare and state run 
hospitals. It sets up a pensions and disability fund, as well as financial safety nets for the 
unemployed. It states that the state will play a role in raising the children of the country. It also 
seeks to provide free school up through college. 
The Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria addresses many of the basic liberal 
democratic rights found in other Western democracies. The document, however, is far less 
thorough in terms of rights and privileges than most of its central and eastern European 
neighbors or fellow European Union members. This is most evident in the number of 
amendments to the constitution originating from ratified treaties with the European Union. If 
anything, the document can be read like the rings of a tree. The original document illustrated a 
refined communist influence. This accompanied the obvious influence of the Orthodox Church. 
The pull away from the communist past and the work of post-communist, pro-democracy groups 
is evident, as well. Membership to the European Union accounts for the most recent changes to 
Bulgaria‟s constitution.  
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Bulgaria‟s constitution illustrates lingering post-Cold War support for collectivism and 
core communist beliefs. The first article of the first chapter declares the inviolability of popular 
sovereignty. Such “people power” rhetoric is common among communist and socialist regimes. 
The constitution is hefty with communal ideals and sets out to establish a large strong 
government that theoretically defends its people from harms, dangers and even themselves. 
Article 16 guarantees and protects “labour”. It creates a constitutional right to a job for 
Bulgarians. Article 18 establishes state ownership over natural resources, the right to regulate 
radio licenses and a monopoly over telecommunications, railways and mail. Later in the 
document, it declares a freedom of expression (Article 39), but this is limited by challenges to 
the “established order”. Also, Article 43 states that some political groups will have to register. 
The implication is that some parties could be dangerous.  
The document has several historical antecedents from its communist past, but the true 
dangers to liberal democracy in Bulgaria‟s constitution are what are not included. Article 43 does 
not state what kind of political groups will be registered. Furthermore, there is no reference to the 
Communist past, past party members or the communist party itself. Many other countries in the 
region have bans on the communist party, fascist parties or comparable groups. Bulgaria‟s 
constitution does not reference the 40 years as a Soviet satellite at all.  
The Orthodox Church left its impression on the form of Bulgarian democracy. The 
writers of the Bulgarian constitution incorporate the most basic, and some of the more 
controversial, tenants of Orthodox dogma into the document. This is somewhat surprising. 
Orthodoxy is the largest denomination and religion in the country, but there are a large number 
Bulgarians that claim no official religion, 27.4%.  Article 13 declares Eastern Orthodox is the 
“traditional religion” of Bulgarian. This despite pledges for religious tolerance and no official 
195 
 
religion. Article Four guarantees “life” and Article 28 guarantees the “right to life”. This means 
opposition to abortion. Article 46 declares that a marriage be between a man and a woman.  
These measures continue in Bulgaria despite membership in the European Union. Perhaps, this 
will change as much in the country is in transition.  
 
Figure 17. Democratic Criteria, Bulgaria 
Field of Assessment  Criteria 
Right to form and join political parties and 
interest groups. 
Fundamental Principles, Article 6 
Freedom of Speech and Expression Fundamental Rights and Obligations of 
Citizens, Articles 39 and 40* 
Right to Vote Fundamental Principles, Article 10 
Eligibility for Public Office National Assembly, Article 65: 21 years old,  
President of the Republic, Article 93: 40 years 
old 
Right of political leaders to compete for 
support/votes 
NOT GUARENTEED 
Alternative sources of information NOT GUARENTEED 
Free and fair elections Fundamental Principles, Article 1 
Institutions for making government policies 
depend on votes and other expressions of 
preference 
Fundamental Principles, Article 1 
Political participation in the European Union 35.8% versus 42.5%  Member State Average in 
2014 EP Elections 
General Economic Conditions over Time GDP Growth: Doubled in the last three years 
to nearly 3% 
GINI: +36% and increasing steadily 




The Bulgarian government is divided into the three traditional branches: executive, 
legislative and judicial. The executive branch is led by the President. Candidates must be 40 
years old. They are directly elected for five years terms with a two term limit. 240 elected 
members comprise the unicameral legislature, known as the National Assembly. Members must 
be 21 years old and serve four year terms if elected. The members of the National Assembly 
nominate the Prime Minister, who is the head of the government. The President is the head of 
state and appoints the nominated Prime Minister. Both the legislative and executive branches 
have input into the composition of the judicial branch. 
The judicial branch provides judicial review and oversight of the government. Three 
main courts exist in addition to courts in the various localities. The three most important courts 
are the Supreme Court of Cassation, the Supreme Administrative Court and the Constitutional 
Court. The chief justices are appointed by the President for five year terms. After that, they can 
remain on the court until they are 65 years old. The Supreme Judicial Council is chaired by the 
Justice Minister and selects judges for the courts.  The Supreme Court of Cassation over sees the 
conduct of justice within the courts system. The Supreme Administrative court oversees the 
government and the Council of Ministers, the President‟s cabinet. The Constitutional Court 
provides the true judicial oversight. This court is comprised of 12 justices. Four are elected by 
the National Assembly. Four justices are appointed by the President. The final four remaining 
justices are selected by the Supreme Courts or Cassation and Administrative Law. 
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The largest challenge to Bulgarian democracy is corruption. The Bulgarian government 
was infiltrated by modern day gangsters after the Cold War.
 3
  These crime organizations 
misused and plundered money given to Bulgaria in efforts to revitalize its economy and 
modernize the country. Corruption in Bulgaria is three times higher than the European Union 
average.
4
 These criminal organizations embezzle cash, commit tax fraud and circumvent 
countless other violations of domestic and international law.
 5
 The Mafia in Bulgaria is deeply 
involved in contraband cigarettes, human trafficking and illicit drugs (heroin and amphetamines).
 
These groups “exercise a considerable influence over the economic activities in the country.” 6 
This makes their support important to politicians. This level of corruption is a threat to 
Bulgaria‟s sovereignty. 7 A U.S. intelligence memo from 2005 noted that corruption infects all 
three branches of Bulgarian government. Mob bosses have purchased their way into the political 
arena.
8
 More recent analysis by Moisés Naím cites that “the national interests and the interests of 
organized crime are now inextricably intertwined.”  
The EU investigated Bulgaria various times for government fraud, but some say Brussels 
has made matters worse.
 9
   Critics say that Bulgaria reverted to totalitarianism in 2009 with the 
election of Boyko Borisov to Prime Minister.  Borisov still has connections to the former 
communists who are important figures in the underworld.
 10
 Many of these men were former 
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communists who “are fond of European money, but not European regulations.” 11  In 2008, the 
European Commission cancelled hundreds of millions of dollars in aid to Bulgaria due to 
corruption concerns.
12
 These types of punishments were the impetus for stronger efforts on the 
part of the Bulgarian government to wipe out corruption and curtail their money making 
schemes, like drug trafficking.
13
 Yet, there has been little progress made.
14
  Naím characterizes 
Bulgaria as a mafia state.
15
 A Bulgarian politician was quoted as saying that “other countries 
have the mafia; in Bulgaria the mafia has the country.”16  
The mafia in Bulgaria is intertwined with the government. The Bulgarian mafia, as it is 
today, was started by former state security leaders. They had taken bribes and allowed the drug 
smuggling during the communist era. When communism collapsed throughout the region, they 
were already in business. Illicit drugs are a big business for the mafia in Bulgaria, which makes 
the situation complicated. The depth of the involvement in government by the mafia is 
incredible. It is on every level. Some fear that the country might not be able to exist without it.
17
 
The corruption in Bulgaria damaged public confidence in both parties. Representatives 
from every part of the political spectrum participate in corruption. Members of GERB, the 
center-right party, and its main opposition the Socialists have each had high profile allegations 
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and revelations about involvement in dirty politics, cronyism and ties to organized crime.
18
 Some 
Bulgarians turned to alternative parties. One of these parties was ATAKA. The party drew on 
principles of both the far left and far right. It emerged as the union between splinter groups from 
across the political spectrum in 2005. Instead of debating ideology and politics, the group took to 
capitalizing on the malaise of the country.
19
 
ATAKA attacked the status quo, the established political system and its associated 
corruption. Along the way, a dangerous nationalism rose. ATAKA used “a discourse of ethnic 
and religious intolerance to garner popular support on the far right for what is essentially a far-
left political agenda.”20They openly declare the infallibility of the state, a ban on all non-
Bulgarian language and leaving NATO. At the same time, the party calls for a very robust set of 
social programs and state that these programs take precedence over military spending.
21
 Much of 
their platform might sound soft-eurosceptic albeit extreme. However, they are not eurosceptic 
and make no mistake they are a far-right group.  
ATAKA is vocally critical of ethnic minorities and the Roma.
22
 The party founder Volen 
Siderov blames the recent increase in crime, which he cannot factually support, with 
international organizations that tell people that come to Bulgaria that they “should act 
                                                          
18
 John O’Brennan, “Corruption still dominates political landscape as Bulgarians go to the polls,” Irish Times, 
October 3, 2014. http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/corruption-still-dominates-political-landscape-
as-bulgarians-go-to-the-polls-1.1950754. Accessed August 1, 2016; Maria Guineva, “High-Profile Court Hearings in 
Bulgaria Against Backdrop of OLAF Visit,” Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, October 26, 2015. 
https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/4531-high-profile-court-hearings-in-bulgaria-against-backdrop-of-olaf-visit. 
Accessed August 4, 2016.  
19
 Stoyan Sgournev, “The Explosive Rise of a Political Party: The Logic of `Sudden Convergence’,” European 
Sociological Review 26, no. 6 (December 2010): 642. 
20
 Kristen Ghodsee, “Left Wing, Right Wing, Everything,” Problems of Post-Communism 55, no. 3 (May/June 2008):  
28 
21
 ATAKA, 20 Principles of the ATAKA Party. 
http://www.ataka.bg/en/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14&Itemid=27. 
22
 Sgournev, “The Explosive Rise of a Political Party,” 642. 
200 
 
differently.” He declared that “Racism was never an issue in Bulgaria. However when crime 
rates rise, and all this crime originates with these ethnic groups, people start having negative 
sentiments. So there is not a single village in Bulgaria that has not been robbed by Gypsy 
groups.”23 This extremism appealed to many Bulgarians. Many attended ATAKA‟s 
Independence Day political rallies.
24
 In June 2005, the party garnered 8.8% of the national vote. 
In 2014, their support slipped to 4.5%.
25
 The party has not seen the popularity it did before 
Bulgaria‟s accession to the European Union.   
Membership to the EU has a positive effect on Bulgaria‟s transition to higher quality 
democracy. The transition from mafia state to true liberal democracy in Bulgaria is slow. Union 
membership accounts for the most recent advances in liberal democratic rights in the country. 
Article 4 commits Bulgaria to aid in the building and integration of the EU. The National 
Assembly amended Article 22 granting land rights for foreigners. Article 85 establishes the 
mechanics for integrating EU treaties and policies into Bulgarian law. Articles 42 and 105 sets 
the parameters for Bulgarians electing Ministers to the European Parliament and how the 
ministers work with the government on Sofia. Bulgarian President Plevneliev voiced his support 
for EU policies as a whole and endorsed the idea of a closer Europe. He advocates for greater 
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Bulgaria is a very pro-EU country. 51% of Bulgarians have a positive opinion of the 
European Union. Most of their opinions about Brussels‟ policies are more pro-EU than most 
other members states.  The only notable objection is to adopting the common currency.
 27
 This 
approval of the Union is also evident in their participation in EU elections. 
 
Figure 18. Voter Turnout in EU Elections: Bulgaria, EU and Central and Eastern Europe 
 28 
 
                                                          
27
 European Commission, Eurobarometer 85, Spring 2016. 
http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD



































Unfortunately, Eurobarometer 85 highlights what most Bulgarians are concerned over: their 
economy. Unemployment and the economic situation in their home country is the largest concern 
Bulgarians have by far. Concerns over immigration are half of what they are in other member 
states. Fears about terrorism barely register in the study.
 29
 
  Economics are problematic for Bulgaria. In many cases, economics cause problems for 
developing democracies. In Bulgaria‟s case, the slowly developing democracy caused economic 
problems. The “legacy issues” from the early post-communist period, the crisis in 2008 and the 
political instability of 2013-14 have hampered the development of Bulgaria‟s fledgling free 
market economy.
30
 This partially accounts for being the poorest country in the European Union 
with one of the highest degrees of income inequality. Regionally, only parts of former 
Yugoslavia have a lower per capita GDP.
 31
 
The sovereign debt crisis hit Bulgaria very hard. Unemployment rate jumped nearly 30% 
from 2009-2010.
 32
 Both the labor market and the economic structure of the country have 
problems. Large numbers of younger people are leaving Bulgaria for other countries. Low labor 
participation and skills mismatches are problematic, too. This leads to the problems endemic to 
other parts of Europe suffering from “greying”. Large numbers of the disabled and elderly are at 
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risk. The healthcare system faces major financial challenges.
33
 Bulgaria is now the oldest country 
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The structural problems are few, but large. The Bulgarian financial system is 
unpredictable at best and seen as unsupportive to business. There was a domestic banking crisis 
in 2014 and there are still few reforms in place. The economy lacks structure and safeguards, 
especially in pensions and banking. Companies are leery of entering a marketplace or labor 
market with a reputation for corruption like Bulgaria‟s. The legal framework and justice system 
are view with skepticism by those with foreign dollars. The lack of speed in instituting reforms 
and positive change simply compound the existing problems.
 
There are substantial risks to the 
economy of the country despite improvements over the last few years.
 37
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There are short term positives results. Today, the unemployment rate sits at 9.2%. This is 
lower than the European Union average. This measure improved over the last three years.
38
 
Overall GDP growth increased over the last few years.  The European Commission predicts 
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Bulgaria saw a 20% increase in foreign direct investment in 2015. So far two large companies 
including Coca-Cola opened manufacturing plants in the country in 2016.
 
Chinese companies are 
looking to invest, as well.
41
 Additionally, the country has improved its greenhouse gas emissions. 
This enables more energy efficiency and independence.
 42
 Other projects are simply waiting on 
further reforms. Eliminating inefficiency in government and barriers to commerce will enhance 
foreign trade. (Four of the top five trading partners are EU members.
43
) This will foster better 
relations with other Union members and increase the integration of Bulgaria to the rest of 
Europe.  
The supersession of criminal interests over that of the Bulgarian people defines the lack 
of democracy in Bulgaria. It is the antithesis of Dahl‟s expanded notion of governmental 
responsiveness.
44
 Sofia experienced this democratic deficiency multiple times. First, there were a 
series of anti-mafia protests that turned violent in 2013. While political in nature, the protests 
targeted the entire system of graft and corruption instead of particular political parties.
45
 Little 
has changed. Second, attempts by reform forces within the government to end corruption have 
stalled in the National Assembly. A report to the European Commission and European 
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Parliament points out that legislation to fight corruption and organized crime stalled. Observers 
and the people of Bulgaria wait for legislation introduced two years ago.
46
  
Bulgaria fits neither Hasselmann‟s maximalist definition of democracy nor that of 
Alvarez and his fellow scholars. A main component of Hasselmann‟s notion is checks and 
balances.
47
 There are no checks and balances when judges are bribed and participating in 
corruption. Additionally, there is no separation of powers if the power is resting with a group of 
oligarchs that hold sway over large, different parts of the government. This second aspect of the 
nature of Bulgarian politics can be applied to Alvarez‟s minimalist notion.48 The people who 
make the laws are not acting for the will of the people. They are acting out of self-interest.   
An interview with Bulgarian President Plevneliev in April 2016 created the feeling that 
Bulgaria is a country in transition. All the forces seem to be at work to create a true liberal 
democracy, but it is highly questionable if enough will change in the country to achieve it. The 
people are pro-European and look towards closer ties to other European countries through trade 
and economic opportunities. The President, who is an independent, seems ready to continue 
trying to reform domestic politics in Sofia. The European Union and its member states, as well as 
the United States could provide willing partners in democratic development. The question is if 
these forces can combine to eliminate the power of organized crime. It stands in the way of 
foreign direct investment from the private sector. It earns the country skepticism from 
organizations like the EU who have the ability to help. A healthy economy and strong democracy 
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with liberal rights n stop the exodus of working age Bulgarians and diffuse the octogenarian time 
bomb Bulgaria perches on.   
History 
 Bulgaria existed in different forms before the first millennium. The First Bulgarian 
Empire was established in 681 by a Bulgar noble named Aspruch. It was the standard medieval 
arrangement with boyars occupying councils and an assembly with tribal chiefs.
49
 Two hundred 
years later, one of Aspruch‟s successors, Boris I, sought a national religion.  He decided on 
Eastern Orthodox.
50
 This started the Bulgarian tradition of Orthodoxy that exists to this day. In 
1018, Byzantine Emperor Basil II incorporated Bulgaria into his empire.
51
 Tsar Peter II and his 
brother defeated Byzantine forces and started the Second Bulgarian Empire.
52
 This lasted until 
the 14
th
 century when the Ottoman Turks defeated the Bulgarians. Turkish rule lasted some 400 
years.
53
 In the 18
th
 century Russia earned the right to protect Orthodox Christians in the Balkans. 





 century saw a flurry of development in Bulgaria highlighted by their 
independence and their first of four constitutions. Early in the century, Bulgarians elected 
councils to communicate with the Turks and Greeks. They started schools that taught Bulgarian 
language. Bulgarians gained an independent Bulgarian Orthodox Church in 1849.
55
 In March 
1878, Russia and the Ottoman Empire signed the Treaty of San Stefano at the end of the Russo-
Turkish War. The treaty gave independence to Serbia, Montenegro, Romania and Bulgaria. 
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Bulgaria was “intrusted for two years to an Imperial Russian commissioner” until Bulgaria 
elected a prince. Turkish troops withdrew from Bulgaria. Russian troops remained until the 
Bulgarian militia could stand up.
56
 The Treaty of Berlin signed shortly thereafter revised San 




 This initiated the Third Bulgarian State. Their first order of business under the watch of 
Russian Administrator General Prince Aleksander Dondukov-Kosakov was writing a 
constitution. The Turnovo Constitution established the Principality of Bulgaria. The Constitution 
was written at a Grand National Assembly comprised of 231 delegates. 89 were elected. The 
Russian Administrator chose some delegates, as well. Orthodox bishops, the Muslim Chief Mufit 
and Grand Jewish Rabbi were included. The rendered Turnovo Constitution was “one of the 
most democratic in Europe”. It provided for freedom of speech, press, and assembly. It outlawed 
slavery and called for compulsory education for boys and girls.  Liberals in the assembly 
defeated attempts to establish an upper house. This created a unicameral legislature.
58
  
It was not without weakness. Power was concentrated in the monarchy. The monarch 
could dissolve National Assembly and held the legislative prerogative. The Council of Ministers 
could legislate by royal order. The judiciary acted on behalf of the monarch.
59
 The result was that 
clashes erupted because the Prince was so strong. Most of the Princes and members of the 
executive branch were Russian nobility. The prince eventually used the power to reduce the 
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Bulgarian declared its full independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1908 and entered a 
period of three different wars: the two Balkan Wars and the First World War.
 61
  Russia and 
Germany courted Bulgaria for their support. Germany paid Bulgaria to join the Central Powers. 
Most Bulgarians were pro-Russian. The government used martial law to shutdown newspapers, 
retired pro-Russian Generals and started German propaganda. Bulgaria joined the fighting in 
1915.
62
 Opposition to the war led to the birth of the modern Bulgarian communist party. The 
Bulgarian “Narrow Socialist” Party joined the Communist international started by Soviet leader 
Vladimir Lenin. They changed their name to the Bulgarian Communist Party. In 1919, the party 
took 47 of 236 seats in the National Assembly and became the second largest party in Bulgaria.
63
 
The Treaty of Nuilly concluded the First World War between Bulgaria and the victorious 
Triple Entente. The results for Bulgaria were similar to that of the other Central Powers. They 
lost territory. The treaty limited the size of their military and manufacture of weapons. Bulgaria 
acknowledged newly formed Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia as well as the protectorates of 
Morocco and Egypt. Bulgaria adopted several of Woodrow Wilson‟s Fourteen Points.  These 
represented changes to the liberal rights afforded some in the country. It guaranteed religious 
freedom, minority rights and equality before the law. Another large change was the obligation to 
provide education in languages other than Bulgarian.
 64
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The Interwar Period in Bulgaria was a turbulent political period earmarked by coups and 
uprisings by democratic factions, socialists, the communist party and members of the military. In 
1923, Macedonian radicals captured and executed Prime Minister Aleksander Stamboliiski.
65
 
The communist uprising ended after they bombed a church and killed 100 people.
66
 The period 
was also punctuated by a reeling economy and rampant corruption (illegal drugs, weapons and 
embezzlement). The political system was paralyzed to act against it. In 1934, Zveno, a group of 
social democrats backed by the military, overthrew the government. They banned political 
parties, replaced elected officials with appointees, dissolved the parliament and strengthened the 
role of the church.
67
 
In 1937, King Boris III restarted local elections. The following year, elections for the 
National Assembly were allowed using new election laws. Communists were banned from 
running. This was unenforceable. Political parties were still illegal. There was a literacy 
requirement for voting. For the first time, women could vote, but only if they were married or 
widowed. The elections were not fair or free. The government selectively used the ban on 
political parties to disqualify candidates opposing the government.
68
 At the same time, Germany 
signed the Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union. Due to this and less censorship, 
communists had a strong showing in elections the following year. The 1939 elections were 
neither fair nor free either. 
69
 
Germany offered Bulgaria restoration of traditional lands the country lost after the First 
World War. Unfortunately, anti-Semitic tactics followed from the government in Sofia. The 
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National Assembly passed “Law for the Defense of the Nation”. They were Bulgaria‟s version of 
the Nuremburg Laws that stripped Jews of many of their basic rights.
70
 Other laws passed later: 
restrictions of movement, special taxes, confining Jews to ghettos. When it came time for 
Bulgaria to deport their Jews as part of Hitler‟s Final Solution, there was an outrage led by the 
Orthodox clergy and dissenting members of the National Assembly.
71
 Eventually, Boris II and 
the royal family intervened and prevented the 50,000 or so Jews in Bulgaria proper from being 
deported to concentration camps.
72
  
The situation became very complicated when Germany attacked the Soviet Union. This 
plunged Bulgaria into violence. Communists in Bulgaria organized into bands of partisans. One 
of the more popular groups was called the Fatherland Front. They attacked government buildings 
and assassinated government figures. They were joined by the Jews. Soon, every anti-Fascist and 
anti-German faction was fighting the government as partisans. The Soviet Union and other Allies 
sent aid and officers to fight alongside the partisans, too.
73
 The government collapsed in May of 
1944.
74
 The situation in the streets became more dangerous. Now, Bulgarian soldiers, German 
forces and the partisans were all fighting each other.  
The Soviets declared war on Bulgaria on September 5, 1944. Four days later there was a 
communist coup and the streets of Sofia were drenched in blood. 30,000 Bulgarians were 
executed in two months of “spontaneous purge campaigns”. Stalin directed the communist forces 
to target politicians, judges and non-communist activists in a “judiciary purge campaign”.75 Half 
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the members of the National Assembly were executed.
76
 In spring of 1945 and other 2,730 death 
sentences were summarily carried out.
77
 Many partisans gained positions in the new government 
or the new communist Bulgarian Worker‟s Party after the coup.  
The new government attempted to impose an un-Soviet socialism called the “People‟s 
Democracy.” It had all of the trappings of a social democracy: party pluralism, a free press and 
other basic fundamental freedoms, including private property. Stalin admonished him personally 
for it.
78
 Soon after, the Bulgarian communists took its cues directly from Moscow.
79
 They 
completely ignored the existing constitution. They ruled using decrees, issuing new laws and 
amending current ones.
80
After rigged elections the opposition parties boycotted, the communist 
government abolished the monarchy.
81
 On December 4, 1947, they adopted a new constitution.
82
  
The new constitution was Bulgaria‟s second. It is known as the Dimitrov Constitution, 
named for the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Georgi 
Dimitrov. The document was modeled after the Soviet Constitution of 1936. It proclaimed the 
new People‟s Republic of Bulgaria. It placed much of the economy under state control. It 
outlawed public ownership “at the detriment of public interest”. Executive power was exercised 
by the Council of Ministers with no judicial oversight. The legislative body was now the 
Presidium of the National Assembly. It replaced the Supreme Court of Cassation and Supreme 
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Administrative Court with a single Supreme Court.  Despite having many rights included in the 
document, there was nothing democratic about life in Bulgaria under communism. 
83
 
Communist life in Bulgaria was different than in other Soviet-styled states. Bulgarian 
communists operated an oppressive state to be sure. Between 1944 and 1962, 285,000 Bulgarians 
were sent to concentration camps.
84
 Yet, the regime softened after Stalin‟s death. There was 
some private property permitted. 80% of households owned their home or apartment. Most farms 
were never nationalized. There were healthy expenditures on education. Bulgaria had a large 
network of government run hospitals. More than half of Bulgarians enjoyed relatively nice 
vacations with their families at beaches or mountain resorts. There was no unemployment. 
Furthermore, a “soft socialism” in the 1970s started in the 1960s when the concentration camps 
were closed. Much of this was due to robust economic times based on and a steady Soviet market 
for Bulgarian exports and cheap Russian oil.
85
  
The history of Bulgaria presents two linked and constant historical antecedents to modern 
Bulgarian democracy: the Orthodox Church and Russian influence. At several different points in 
history, political figures used the power of religion to their advantage. The Trunovo Constitution 
included Orthodox bishops into the Grand National Assembly. Later, Zveno bolstered their 
power by incorporating the Orthodox Church into their government system in 1934. This 
prominence of The Church still exists today. A related historical phenomenon repetitiously 
presents itself throughout Bulgarian history: the Russians. 
 Russia established strong bonds with its little Orthodox cousin, Bulgaria, very early in its 
history. The official declaration of this relationship occurred in the 18
th
 century although it 
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already existed and can be found in Tsar Peter II‟s earlier defense of Bulgaria from the western 
Orthodoxy of Byzantium. This ecclesiastical based relationship manifested itself in the secular 
relationship between the two states over time. Thus, while Bulgaria and Russia shared much in 
the way of politics in the past, the true cohesive force was The Church.  This presents ample 
material to study in terms of the East-West Paradigm for Bulgaria.  
The leader of Bulgaria for most of the period of “soft socialism” was Todor Zhivkov.86 
His regime introduced Bulgaria‟s third constitution in 1971. It confirmed the single party state. It 
ended the separation of powers that the Dimitrov Constitution made allusions about. The 
National Assembly combined the executive and legislative power of the government. The State 
Council would be a creation of the party and the state. It has a list of liberal democratic rights the 
reads like a Western European democracy, yet there are seemingly minor wording differences 
that make large differences. Freedoms are guaranteed by the State by “placing the necessary 
material conditions for the purpose at the disposal of the citizens.” 87 
The 1980s were different in Bulgaria than the rest of the Soviet satellites. It barely started 
at all and then it started late. Bulgarian glasnost started in 1987. Bulgaria was different because 
of its history and culture. First, Bulgaria never had any uprisings like Prague in 1968. There was 
never a cohesive anti-communist opposition. In terms of anti-government activity, “nothing ever 
happened”. Second, Bulgarians looked to the Turks and Greeks instead of eastern Europe. 
Finally, most Bulgarians did not hate the Russians. Giatzidis wrote that the Bulgarians found 
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security in the predictable communist system.
88
 The economics and lifestyle of post-1960 
Bulgaria surely played a part in this. 
This changed in 1988 and 1989. Opposition groups started to form. Many were 
concerned about apolitical issues like the environment. The stronger challenge to the regime 
came from within its own party. In an ill-conceived move to inflame nationalistic feelings, 
Zhivkov started forcing ethnic Turks to assimilate. This triggered demonstrations that turned into 
a bloody fiasco when police opened fire into groups of protestors. To make matters worse, the 
communist leader then facilitated an exodus of ethnic Turks into Turkey. A new generation of 
communists had enough. 
89
 
There was an internal coup and the new leaders pledged to forge a new democratic 
socialist government. It advocated for political pluralism, the rule of law and to end corruption.
90
 
They entered into round table talks with anti-communist groups. Bulgaria adopted their present 
constitution in 1991.
91
 These groups knew little about politics or elections. The new Bulgarian 
Socialist Party (reformed young communists) won the first three elections. One major issue that 
emerged in the period was the activities of the old communist elite. They used their old 
connections and money to their advantage. This was the origins of the contemporary mafia in 
Bulgaria. “Corruption became the rule” in Bulgaria.92 The Socialists were finally voted out of 
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 Eastern Orthodoxy impacts the quality of democracy in Bulgaria with some of its archaic 
beliefs and its concepts about individuals and their rights in relation to government. These 
deficiencies are serious in Bulgaria because of the large number of practicing Orthodox in the 
country. Today, 80% of all Bulgarians are Eastern Orthodox. 
94
 It is “an ancient church, newly 
charred and chastened by decades of oppression and martyrdom.”95 Unlike other Christians, 
Orthodoxy never had a Reformation or a Vatican II. Much of their teachings remain as they have 
been for thousands of years. It opposes cremation and abortion, yet does not condemn capital 
punishment.  It allows for divorce under very strict circumstances. It allows for remarriage 
(referred to as a “second” marriage) and “in exceptional cases” a third, but only with the 
“appropriate penance”. A fourth marriage is never allowed in the Orthodox Church.96 
The church‟s policies in dealing with other religions seem to lack toleration and counter 
to religious plurality. Orthodox priests are barred from participating in religious services with 
non-Orthodox clergy. They may not “co-celebrate” with them in marriages, baptisms or funerals. 
Orthodox congregants are discouraged from attending social events in non-Orthodox religious 
settings, particularly non-Christian events.  “Mixed marriages” with non-Orthodox are only 
permitted as exceptions. The diocesan Bishop must grant permission before hand. The non-
Orthodox celebrant must promise and plan to convert to Orthodoxy shortly after the marriage 
and the man and woman must sign an agreement that any children from the union be baptized in 
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the Orthodox Church. These marriages are a major exception as many Orthodox priests refuse to 
conduct them at all.     
 The Orthodox religion does not acknowledge the individual in relation to the 
government. The Slavophile approach taken by Eastern Orthodox rejects materialism, liberalism 
and individualism. They contrast political freedom with spiritual freedom.
97
 The church believes 
in a separation of the church and state but seeks symphonia. This is the belief that the church and 
state are equals; “two parts of an ensemble whose conductor is Christ.”98 This conveys the notion 
that both the Church and the State are ordained by God. It allows Orthodox adherents to honor 
political leaders as isapostoloi or “equals as apostles.”99 This notion of a government ordained by 
God and leaders as the messengers or agents of God is preposterous to most non-Orthodox. It has 
no place in the concept of Western liberal democracy.  
 An important assumption in the belief in symphonia is that the State is a Christian State. 
Monarchs of Orthodox kingdoms were deemed messengers of God when welcoming or sending 
missionaries and general of the same countries displayed Orthodox icons before battles and 
during sieges.
100
 This accounts for countries with a long Orthodox legacy or large Orthodox 
population declaring Orthodoxy as the “state religion” or in Bulgaria‟s case, its traditional 
religion.  The State, as well as the Church, conduct God‟s will. It is a century old belief 
reminiscent of the pre-Vatican II beliefs of Catholicism. They used the motto “God wills it!” as 
they marched off to the Crusades.  
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 Another Orthodox belief is their refusal to acknowledge gay marriage and condemnation 
of homosexuality. There is a constitutional ban on gay marriage in Bulgaria. Their beliefs about 
homosexuality are commonly held in Bulgaria. “Homosexuals in Bulgaria mostly have to live 
their lives in the shadows. Those who come out risk losing their friends and their jobs. The only 
freedoms are in the shadows.” Most view homosexuality in religious terms set by the Church: 
it‟s a sin.101 The “Don‟t ask, Don‟t tell” attitude of Bulgarians was violated by a Gay Pride 
march in 2015. None other than the Church joined anti-gay activists in trying to have it 
cancelled.  These marches in the past have been met with counterdemonstrations and violence. 
The Bulgarian Orthodox Church is in lockstep with its Russian counterpart, referring to any 
display that acknowledges the LGBT community as “propaganda of homosexuality”.102  
 Members of the LGBT Community are not the only targets of the Church‟s sociopolitical 
statements. In 2006 the Church endorsed the activities of ATAKA. In addition to the LGBT 
community, they target ethnic minorities, including the Roma population. These groups endure 
hate speech and violence. Their living conditions are substandard. Many groups lived in 
segregated areas. Their children suffer from a lack of educational opportunities, healthcare and 
other services. There are many instances of police harassment and disproportionate prosecution. 
Sometimes, they are even targets of physical violence.
103
There have been some improvement in 
the national strategy to integrate the Roma and arrived migrants, but further efforts are needed. 
All minority groups, including the LGBT community, would benefit from simple diligent 
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application and a fair judicial process.
104
 Hate speech, which precipitates violence, is on the rise. 
Hate speech is rarely punished.
105
 When these crimes are prosecuted two things usually happen. 
They are either treated as “hooliganism”, which bypass the more severe penalties under the 
criminal law.
106
 Sometimes the courts opt to no prosecute hate speech because of exclusions 
made for free speech and political platforms.
107
 
 Fortunately, not all minority groups deal with the same level of vitriol and hate as the 
aforementioned. Women have excelled in Bulgaria since the collapse of communism. This is 
despite their second tier status in the Orthodox religion. The World Economic Forum ranks 
Bulgaria in the top ½ of the countries in the world for overall quality of life for women. They are 
ranked first in the world for the number of women in professional and technical fields versus 
male Bulgarians. Educational opportunities and literacy for men and women are almost the exact 
same. They have the highest life expectancy versus their male counterparts.
108
 Opportunities for 
women in Bulgaria are improving.  
This is especially true in the political arena. In the last five years the gender gap between 
men and women in Bulgarian politics dropped by a third.
 109
 In 2010 Prime Minister Boiko M. 
Borisov promoted several women to high levels positions in the government. Women served as 
Justice Minister, the Mayor of Sofia and Speaker of the Parliament. There are several reasons 
given for the appointment of so many women. Tatyana Kmetova alluded to the gender equality 
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found in communism. Under communism Bulgaria had the highest percentage of working 
women in the world, represented in a wide variety of sectors of work.
110
 There reality is that the 
increase in political empowerment is due to not only the former communist tradition and high 
levels of education, but also the retirement of the initial generation of post-Communist 
politicians. In the 21
st
 century, in a Bulgaria open to the world, young educated Bulgarian 
women see the possibilities democracy offers.  
The rights of linguistic minorities are preserved in the Bulgarian constitution just like the 
rights of women. Yet, language is a barrier to many in Bulgaria. Article 36 of the Constitution 
guarantees minorities the right to study their mother tongue “alongside” Bulgarian.  Article 53 of 
the document establishes the right to an education up to the age of 16. However, the language 
rights are subject to various obstacles both political and practical. First, there is hesitation to 
commit to this politically. Bulgaria is not a signatory to the European Charter for Regional and 
Minority Languages.
111
 There is also the historical antecedent of the Zhivkov regime that tried 
ending Turkish identity, including their culture. Practically speaking, there are problems with 
establishing the schools and the children attending. Many asylum seekers arriving in Bulgaria 
have no education and are not literate in their own language.
 
Some languages are hard to find 
instructors for (Kurdish).
112
 Many Roma parents think that the schools are inhospitable because it 
seeks to strip their identity away.  
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An analysis of the effect geography has on democracy in Bulgaria is very challenging to 
the paradigm outlined in the methodology section of this work. At the core of the complication is 
the established fact that Bulgaria is a state in transition. Looking across the last ten years, there 
are a dearth of articles discussing the relations between Bulgaria and the west and Bulgaria and 
Russia. Within this period, Bulgaria is reminiscent of a non-aligned state of the Cold War. The 
articles are informative and illustrate where Bulgaria sits along the spectrum between Moscow 
and Brussels but only in relation to the topic of the article. Not only does Bulgaria vacillate 
between the two at different times, but according to geopolitical question. Example: At a 
particular moment in time, Bulgaria may seem pro-Western in terms of security, while being pro-
Eastern in regards to trade. Yet in a month or two, the exact opposite might be true. The 
movement between East and West are based on security issues, democratic issues, larger 
economic matters and energy trade.  
A scholar will find very obvious Eastern tendencies in Bulgaria in terms of history and 
culture. Bulgaria was regarded by some as the Soviet Union‟s most loyal ally.113Robert A. 
Sanders wrote, “Bulgaria… remains a bright spot in the old Eastern Bloc due to its cultural and 
linguistic affinities with Russia.” At two different points in their history, Bulgarians sought to 
become the sixteenth republic of the Soviet Union.
114
 Of course, there is the most contemporary 
historical observation: Bulgaria remained communist while the rest of the Eastern Bloc 
abandoned the system. This highlights another point about the Bulgarian transition out of 
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communism. There was no anti-Russian fervor. The Bulgarians viewed Russians as historical 
allies.  
The strong ties to Russia only get stronger when looking at Bulgarian culture. Bulgaria is 
80% Orthodox and Russia has the largest Orthodox population in the world. The nature of the 
religion illustrates the strength of this connection. It is a relationship you do not see in countries 
that share other religions. There are not especially strong ties between Ireland and Poland or 
Germany and Switzerland. The sobornost, the willing sacrifice self-benefit for the community, 
runs strong.
115
 Aleksander Solzhenitsyn wrote, “Our ingrained and wretched Russian tradition: 
We refuse to learn how to organize from below, and are inclined to wait for instructions from a 
monarch, a leader, a spiritual or political authority.”116 This is nothing to say of their shared 
written language
117
 and a shared body of water, the Black Sea. 
Perhaps this centuries old exchange of language and religion is an ancient contagion. If 
this cultural sharing is considered such, then so is the influence of the Ottomans and the present 
day Turkish minority. The Eastern Orthodoxy and Cyrillic alphabet used in Bulgaria today are 
popularly, and arguably incorrectly known as, “Russian”. One of the larger political parties in the 
National Assembly is made up of Turkish minorities. Cases can be made that the contagions that 
effected contemporary Bulgarian democracy are centuries old.  
The allure of the west and Bulgaria‟s accession to the EU challenge these historical aspects of 
Bulgaria. Their more recent move to democracy not only meant that Bulgaria was further 
entrenched into communism and social democracy, but that there was more to be gained in 
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turning west. These gains include trade, economics and commerce, but also in democratic 
freedoms and rights. While the democratic improvements in Bulgaria may appear 
underwhelming to observers, Bulgaria‟s late start and starting point as “Russia‟s most loyal 
satellite” should not be disregarded.   
Bulgaria‟s accession was a more difficult task than that of its neighbors. Their extended 
period of time under communist/social democrat rule left large pieces of their economic structure 
and economy farther from the EU directives than other central and east European candidate 
states. The voluminous pages dealing with privatization in EC reports evidence it. The reports 
lend the notion of Bulgaria being a slower than average track star running to catch up. While 
faced with many remedial in changes in terms of democracy and rights, the negotiation process 
and Bulgaria‟s accession, in fact, illustrate the transformative power of EU membership.  
   The negotiations and EU accession process improved the structure of the Bulgarian 
judiciary and the nation‟s economic framework. Laws and amendments changed tenures of 
judges, provided for the immunity and removal of judges. They clarified rules for selecting judge 
and magistrates.
118
 The penal code was also changed a number of times to reflect EU directives. 
Bulgaria adopted the Council of Europe Civil law Convention and the UN Convention against 




 EU accession aided the privatization of the Bulgarian economy and embrace of free 
market institutions and ideals. The process is slower than in other countries of the region. It is 
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reminiscent of taking an automobile from the 1950s and updating it with all of the trappings of a 
21
st
 century sedan.  The negotiators were faced with deconstructing a command economy and 
assembling one durable and capable of full integration into the EU‟s common market. Private 
ownership increased. Noted privatizations were in banking telecommunications and 
shipbuilding. The price structures are shifting from administrated to market based. This involves 
a quantitative easing of prices. Prices of basic utilities were brought up to cost recovery levels 




The process of EU membership provided an opportunity for sweeping human rights 
improvements in Bulgaria. Their courts started enforcing the decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights. Their parliament passed comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation. The 
Penal Code was changed to provide for equal treatment of the LGBT community. They also 
completed a battery of regulations to curb human trafficking.
121
 The government also addressed 
children‟s rights by establishing a National Strategy and program for child protection. 122  
The Labor Code was changed to meet EU directives and include protections for workers 
found in most other industrialized countries.  The government established an unemployment 
fund, obligated employers to disclose employment conditions and offered protections to 
displaced workers. Work place equality was advanced with the codification of an equal pay 
regulation and transposition of EU directives on workplace discrimination. Workplace safety 
improved, moving closer towards EU standards. The government also restructured the resources 
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for unemployed. Employment Agencies replaced larger Regional Employment Services 
facilities.
123
    
Examining the East-West Paradigm in terms of politics and economics finds a more 
transient state in Bulgaria. Politically, things have changed a great deal in the 20 years after the 
end of communism and social democracy. EU membership, regional security challenges, global 
geopolitics have occasionally pulled Bulgaria West. Even now, when they move back towards 
Moscow, they are not as close as they once were. The forces that shape Bulgaria now are larger 
in number and different. Traditional relationships and history are secondary to economic needs 
and national interests. There are forces that might temporarily pull Bulgaria more to the East, but 
they are the same forces that will pull it away again in a matter of time. These are largely related 
to commerce, especially in the energy sector.
 124
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The seeds of the current mafia state in Bulgaria lay in the Russian contagions hidden in 
the spread of influence and religion throughout history. Constitutions, elections, voting and 
rights are meaningless with corrupt politicians and a judiciary available to the highest bidder. 
Most Bulgarians enjoy many of the same rights as their fellow Europeans and EU members. 
However, without Dahl‟s responsive government, Alvarez‟s democratic legal structure and 
Hasselmann‟s checks on government power there is no real democracy in Bulgaria.  The political 
leadership of contemporary Bulgaria must continue reforms and eradicate the criminal scourge 
from the political landscape if there is to ever be a true democracy based in Sofia.  
Bulgaria‟s journey towards liberal democracy continues, half completed to this point. The 
work of the Plevneliev regime and recent voter turnout in EU elections gives hope that 
Habermas‟ ideas about the positive effect of EU membership.126 Perhaps, a liberal democratic 
government system in Bulgaria will be the side effect of a larger idea of European democracy 
based on the European Union. Moscow seems to be ready to accept a certain amount of change 
in this regard. At least temporarily, the forces that affect the quality of liberal democracy in 
Bulgaria seem to be changing. 
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V. RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
 The analysis of the hypotheses from the Methodology section rendered two supported 
hypotheses, two unsupported hypotheses and two instances where the case studies were 
inconclusive. This is noted in the statement of the results by hypothesis below. There is an 
additional section after the statement of results. This section contains findings germane to the 
topics of democratic quality in central and eastern Europe, the effect history, culture and 
geography have on democracy in the region and observations vital to draw an accurate 
conclusion on the subject.  
H1: The earlier democracy is achieved historically, the stronger the post-communist 
democracy in the region. The case studies support this hypothesis. The three case study 
countries share two different starting points for democracy. Two of the states, Poland and 
Hungary established the current democratic structures in late 1989. They are in the first 
group of states to convert to democracy documented by Bunce. Bulgaria fell into the 
“laggards” group.1 Despite the end of the official Bulgarian communist regime in 1991, 
the country was led by reformed communists. This government practiced a modified 
version of communism commonly referred to as social democracy.
2
 This party ruled until 
1997.
3
 Only then did Bulgaria really start down the road to democracy. The result was 
predictable. Reports from the accession process showed that there were very basic free 
changes needed to be a true democracy and EU member. For example, large portions of 
the economy were still state-owned in 2002. 
4
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H2: The level of former communist oppression does not appear to affect the quality of 
liberal rights and democratic quality in the region.  
The case studies do not support this hypothesis. The level of communist oppression 
reflects an inverse relationship to rights, freedoms and democracy in modern central and 
eastern Europe. Poland experienced the harshest documented oppression of any of the 
three states included in the case study and they had the highest quality of democracy 
before the recent rise of the Law & Justice regime. Soviet troops cracked down on the 
Catholic Church, one of the only persistent institutions in Polish society. There were 
occasional protests. Sometimes protesters were fired upon.
5
 Kadar implemented the 
relaxed “goulash communism” after he took power following the 1956 revolution.6  
Meanwhile, in Bulgaria, post-Stalin life was confortable. They had good schools, no 





H3: Western religions tend to promote a higher quality of democracy in the region.  The 
results for this hypothesis were inconclusive. Poland is largely Catholic. Most 
Hungarians do not claim a religion. Bulgaria has one of the larger Eastern Orthodox 
religions in the world. Poland is the only case study to test this hypothesis. Much of the 
more recent impact Catholicism has on democracy in Poland is negative. This is an 
interesting divergence from the modern history of the country. Pope John Paul II is 
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credited with aiding in the end of communism.
8
   However, the Catholic Church in 
Poland is not like the Catholic Church elsewhere. The Catholic Church embraces 
religious pluralism and individual rights.
9





  This may be attributed to their isolated position 
behind the Iron Curtain during the institution of the Second Vatican Council.   
 
H4: Western ethnic heterogeneity has no effect on post-communist democracy in the 
region, while the presence of non-Western minorities does. The results for this hypothesis 
were inconclusive. The case study countries offer differing results in terms of the effect 
ethnicity has on the quality of democracy. The Roma present an example of 
discrimination and disenfranchisement based on ethnicity. Yet, the Turkish minority in 
Bulgaria shares a comparable quality of democracy with ethnic Bulgarians. Poland 
contributes little to the discussion because of the homogeneity. It is tempting to use 
ethnicity as a factor in the level of rights and freedoms in the region because of the long 
history of strife based on the variable. There were the post-communist Balkan Wars. 
Moscow intermittently banters about preserving the rights of Russian minorities. 
However, ethnicity as a factor is minor compared to others such as, history, religion and, 
even economics.  
One might conclude that the idea of an ethnic impact on democracy has a temporal aspect 
to it. The Turks in Bulgaria are a long established and integrated minority. Yet, the plight of the 
Roma is long and storied. The ethnic strife that plagued the former Yugoslavia was managed by 
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Tito. In short, the true effect ethnicity has on democratic quality is not the presence of minorities, 
but their role in the political landscape. Turks in Bulgaria are political established with their own 
party. They have a place in the political establishment. The true damage to the quality of 
democracy in the region occurs at the hands of reactionary governments. Fully educated and 
integrated minorities could be a threat and at least cause uncertainty to the status quo. This helps 
explain the recent more restrictive migration policies of many central and east European states.  
These policies can pit the capitals of the region in opposition to Brussels and in the context of 
refugees in conflict with international law.      
H5: Relations with Russia have little to do with the quality of democracy in the region. 
The case studies do not support this hypothesis. Each of the case study countries has a 
different relationship and different history with Russia. These relationships can be broken 
down into political, economic and social. In short, all three understand that Russia could 
be or is presently a threat.
12
 Yet, Moscow‟s true strength in the East-West Paradigm is 
economic for Poland and Hungary. The Russian leadership can use the economic 
blackmail of energy availability or price to extort political gains. This is only countered 
by the power of the EU. Bulgaria is in a different class altogether. Bulgaria and Russia 
have a common religion. Their history shared religion help explain the level of 
democratic quality in Bulgaria. The remnants of the secret police who established the 
organized criminal activity and current mafia state represent Russia‟s impact on modern 
Bulgarian democracy. The European Union and the West offer all three states an 
alternative to Russian influence. The tug of war between the EU and Russia, especially in 
economic matters, illustrates the East-West paradigm.   
                                                          
12
 Larrabee, “Russia, Ukraine, and Central Europe: The Return of Geopolitics,” 43-4. 
232 
 
 H6: Democracy spread through parts of the region like a contagion, but now this type of 
effect is sporadic. The case studies support the hypothesis. The collapse of communism 
that started in Poland rolled through the region like a virus. Yet, years later, things have 
seemingly changed. This supports Kapstein and Converse, who say that a democracy 
matures after six years.
13
 Most advances in democracy now come from domestic pressure 
or international organizations. The domestic pressure is more regular now because the 
political system has matured. People know their rights. There are developed parties and 
interest groups. International organizations now have power because the countries are 
members of organizations like the EU and NATO. The governments have obligations, 
even though they might not always meet them. The result is the countries of central and 
eastern Europe achieving democratic advancements at different points and times. This is 
according to their pressures and priorities.  
 There are additional findings wrought from the analysis of these three countries. Some 
speak to the democracy in the region. Others speak to the effect of history, culture and geography 
on democracy in central and eastern Europe. There are a few that address some very salient 
points about democracy.  
 One observation about the status of democracy in central and eastern Europe pertains to 
the lack of rights and freedoms in some states and the prospect of a “democratic 
rollback”14Democracy, in all its forms, can be ugly, hard work. To say otherwise is to be as 
deceived as the Poles who thought Accession would be easy.
15
 Many highlight that the states of 
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central and eastern Europe are longer “young democracies”16. Many of their trials and 
tribulations are similar to those of much older democratic states. Use the United States as an 
example. The U.S. was not much better at the same point in their statehood. Using 1989 as a 
starting point, the oldest of the states is 28 years old. The comparable year in American history 
was 1809. At this point, the U.S. had not finished expanding to the West. There were still 
tensions with Great Britain. Slavery had not been abolished and still divided the country. One of 
the largest debates of the first half of the 19
th
 century was yet to be made: fiscal policy and the 
National Bank. Today‟s Superpower was racked with social problems, economic questions and 
faced an unsure geopolitical future. Only a few years later, the invading British soldiers burned 
the White House to the ground.  
 They key to states surviving is the resilience of the established systems. This includes the 
European Union. There will be disagreements. There could be crises. There is even a remote 
chance of armed conflict. This doesn‟t change the progress the states of the region have made. 
We have already seen examples of each. The debate over refugees rages on. The debt crisis was 
abated for the time being. Europe survived a series of Wars in the Balkans. The countries of 
central and eastern Europe still rose from the ashes of communism to become fledgling 
democracies with at least a smattering of liberal rights.  
Another observation from the case studies is that history should be regarded when 
studying the politics and democracy of central and eastern Europe. History can prove to be at 
least informative and perhaps, in some cases, predictive. Note the terms “historical antecedent”, 
“institutional mimicry”17 and “memory culture”18.While in many cases we speak of the first two 
                                                          
1616
 Kapstein and Converse, “Why Democracies Fail,” 61-62. 
17
 Ekiert and Ziblatt, “Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe One Hundred Years On,” 91. 
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terms in positive terms: reviving the trappings of democracy, naming the parliaments traditional 
names from history, the terms along with the latter can refer to negative phenomena. Just 
because something is historical, that does not make it a positive aspect of politics. Think of 
Jobbik in their fascist brown shirts with the Arrow Cross symbols. The re-emergence of the dark 
chapters of history can be as dangerous as the emergence of revived democratic practices is to be 
celebrated.  
 Another interesting aspect is the study of religion in regards to rights and freedoms. One 
of the more recent political science fads is researching the compatibility of Islam with 
democracy. The campus library database is awash with articles analyzing the topic any number 
of ways. Yet, there are few volumes looking at the other Abrahamic religions. While Woodberry 
and Shah correctly point out the “natural affinity” between Protestant Christianity and 
democracy,
19
 Orthodoxy is quite different. In fact, it is rather restrictive when it comes to 
individual rights. Most agree that the religion is antithetical to democracy.
20
 The obvious 
observation is that Islam, often maligned for being incompatible with democracy
21
, and 
Orthodoxy, which most reluctantly agree the same, are both eastern religions. However, without 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
18
 Bazinger, “The Funeral of Imre Nagy,” 143. 
19
 Berger, “The Global Picture,” 178. 
20
 Schimmelfennig and Schultz, “Legacies and Leverage: EU Political Conditionality and Democracy Promotion in 
Historical Perspective,”  447; Berger, “The Global Picture,” 80; Vlas and Ghergina, “Where does a religion meet 
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History, culture and religion contribute to the varying quality of democracy in central and 
eastern Europe.  The countries of the region emerged from communism in two different waves. 
The states were hampered by different problems. Many did not have a political system at all. 
Many saw their economies in shambles. The systems and processes created were partially guided 
by the past history their culture and the location between the rest of Europe and their former 
masters in the Kremlin. The region contradicts many of the established theories and methods of 
study. Central and eastern Europe has a very unique history. The states are populated by a very 
diverse collection of peoples. They sit in a very unordinary sometime perilous spot on the map. 
The area is best studied using a regional approach with a regard for their past identity and 
location. More recently, pessimism, xenophobia and a euroscepticsim confront these states.  
No other area in the world has a history comparable to central and eastern Europe. Many 
states were settled in the first century. Unfortunately, some of the regional rivalries and 
grievances are just as old. Through the millennium, the landscape was pockmarked with battles, 
claims to sovereignty, invading armies, passing crusaders, attacking armies and communist 
domination. The occupants collectively practice all three of the Abrahamic religions. This alone 
made peace difficult at times. Many different languages are spoken. Central and eastern Europe 
is the home to several different national identities. Additionally, the countries live in the shadow 
of their former oppressor, Mother Russia. The region‟s singular history, unique culture and 
unusual geography are one of a kind. 
Because of this uniqueness, many theories cannot fully explain their democratic quality 
and government. Traditional economic based models fail. Poland and Hungary are economically 
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stable, but still lack many liberal rights. Social theories that use ethnicity are not adequate either. 
Many of the countries are rather ethnically homogenous, but are still democratically deficient. 
Poland and Hungary are comprised largely of white Christians Most of these theories and models 
based on quantitative measures fail to accurately explain the differences in rights and freedoms 
citizens from different countries in the region enjoy.  Turks are readily accepted in Bulgaria and 
have their own political party. The same Bulgarian Turks would face xenophobia and hate in 
Hungary. 
Religion plays a large role in the quality of rights and freedoms in many of the states of 
central and eastern Europe. This large role in select states can be explained for a variety of 
reasons. For example, the Catholic Church remains the only constant in the society. The 
establishment of the church in Poland goes back thousands of years. A large part of being Polish 
is being Catholic for many Poles. The Catholic Church‟s preponderance of power in modern 
Poland is evident in their laws and post-communist constitution. The Church took a large role in 
is writing and Catholic dogma is incorporated into it. The Orthodox Church takes a different 
attitude towards secular government. It believes that both the Church and the government sit 
equals. This harkens back to the period of divine rite monarchs.  
The location of the region is important to the politics. As it is the frontier of the western 
civilization. They are bordered by non-western countries and Russia. This position grants them 
the unenviable role of the object of both western enticements from Brussels and eastern 
propositions from Russia. EU membership and a close relationship with other member states to 
the west improved the quality of democracy in the region. The participation in the European 
common market aided in the stability of their post-communist governments. Russia, who 
opposes this close partnership between the EU and its former satellites use both carrot and switch 
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to protect its own interests Some states, like Bulgaria, are more inclined than others to work with 
Russia due to close cultural ties, namely the Orthodox Church. 
The unique past, diverse population and particular geography of central and eastern 
Europe help determine the quality of democracy in the states of the region. Other more popular 
and traditional factors are still at work, but they are less important in this particular region. A 
regional approach is the optimum method for researching the throughputs of government and 
democracy in the area. This could be used elsewhere, but definitely not as written here. Few 
places have a comparable history. No place has such a differing mix of people with the history. 
Even fewer have all of this while pinned between the state that served as the twentieth century 
regional hegemon and the twenty-first century supranational state. Central and eastern Europe is 
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